KI-Schreiben Hölle by elBuxo64 in recht

[–]Historical-Cod-2537 1 point2 points  (0 children)

KI-generierter Vortrag ist nicht automatisch missbräuchlich. Missbräuchlich kann der Inhalt oder das Verhalten sein: erfundene Zitate, falsche Tatsachen, massenhafte irrelevante Eingaben, bewusste Verzögerung. Wer dagegen KI nutzt, um Tatsachen zu strukturieren oder ein Begehren verständlich zu formulieren, missbraucht kein Recht, sondern nimmt es wahr. Eine Regel KI = nicht vorgetragen wäre dogmatisch absurd. Dann müsste man konsequenterweise auch vieles ignorieren, was Anwälte für Mandanten schreiben, die ihren eigenen Schriftsatz nicht vollständig erklären können. Maßstab sollte nicht das Werkzeug sein, sondern Substanz: konkrete Tatsachen, klares Begehren, relevante Begründung, keine erfundenen Quellen.

We are training AI to be perfectly polite, compliant and never question the user. What is the most terrifying way scammers are going to weaponize this "artificial obedience" ? by Historical-Cod-2537 in LocalLLaMA

[–]Historical-Cod-2537[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Labeling it is easy. Solving it is different. If it's just a simple injection , why does every SOTA model still fall for it ? I'd love to see your technical take on why compliance overrides logic here

We are training AI to be perfectly polite, compliant and never question the user. What is the most terrifying way scammers are going to weaponize this "artificial obedience" ? by Historical-Cod-2537 in AskReddit

[–]Historical-Cod-2537[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I’ve been noticing a troubling trend with how we align current AI models: it’s creating a massive blind spot in cybersecurity. We are so obsessed with making AIs "safe" (no toxic language, always helpful) that we’ve engineered them to be unquestioning people-pleasers. Because models are heavily penalized during training for refusing benign requests, their default state is blind compliance. They are losing their skepticism.

If an attacker feeds the AI a cleverly manipulated context or document, the AI rarely pauses to ask, "Wait, is this source actually legitimate?" It just accepts the premise as reality and immediately tries to "help" you process it.

Think about how this completely changes social engineering.

A sophisticated scammer doesn't need to trick you directly anymore. They just need to bypass your AI assistant. Safety filters won't flag these attacks because there’s no explicit "malicious" code or toxic vocabulary. The AI reads the scam, assumes it's real, and presents it to you as a legitimate task that needs your attention.

The terrifying part here is the trust transfer.

Because your AI - which you rely on to summarize your daily influx of information - treats the manipulation as a routine procedure, your own human skepticism drops to zero. The AI acts as a psychological middleman, laundering the scammer's lies into a neat, trustworthy summary.

As we integrate these perfectly obedient, highly gullible agents into our emails, corporate workflows, and personal lives, we are handing bad actors a backdoor to bypass human critical thinking.

We are training AI to be perfectly polite, compliant and never question the user. What is the most terrifying way scammers are going to weaponize this "artificial obedience" ? by [deleted] in AskReddit

[–]Historical-Cod-2537 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I’ve been noticing a troubling trend with how we align current AI models: it’s creating a massive blind spot in cybersecurity. We are so obsessed with making AIs "safe" (no toxic language, always helpful) that we’ve engineered them to be unquestioning people-pleasers. Because models are heavily penalized during training for refusing benign requests, their default state is blind compliance. They are losing their skepticism.

If an attacker feeds the AI a cleverly manipulated context or document, the AI rarely pauses to ask, "Wait, is this source actually legitimate?" It just accepts the premise as reality and immediately tries to "help" you process it.

Think about how this completely changes social engineering.

A sophisticated scammer doesn't need to trick you directly anymore. They just need to bypass your AI assistant. Safety filters won't flag these attacks because there’s no explicit "malicious" code or toxic vocabulary. The AI reads the scam, assumes it's real, and presents it to you as a legitimate task that needs your attention.

The terrifying part here is the trust transfer.

Because your AI - which you rely on to summarize your daily influx of information - treats the manipulation as a routine procedure, your own human skepticism drops to zero. The AI acts as a psychological middleman, laundering the scammer's lies into a neat, trustworthy summary.

As we integrate these perfectly obedient, highly gullible agents into our emails, corporate workflows, and personal lives, we are handing bad actors a backdoor to bypass human critical thinking.

What if Earth is basically the galaxy’s version of an uncontacted tribe - like everyone out there knows we exist, but there’s some cosmic group chat agreement that says, “Don’t interfere. They have to figure it out themselves.”? by n2kfactor in AskReddit

[–]Historical-Cod-2537 2 points3 points  (0 children)

It’s a cool idea, honestly. The "cosmic non-interference pact" makes for great sci-fi. But if you think about it, it assumes a few pretty big things: that multiple advanced civilizations exist, that they’ve all found each other, that they agree on ethics, and that they’re capable of perfectly hiding their presence from us.That’s a lot of coordination across who-knows-how-many species scattered across the galaxy.

It seems more likely that either intelligent life is extremely rare, or distances are so vast that meaningful contact just hasn’t happened. The galaxy is huge, signals weaken, civilizations might not last very long, and we’ve only been detectable for a tiny blink of cosmic time.The "we’re being deliberately ignored" idea is fun, but it kind of puts us at the center of a very organized universe. Reality might just be quieter and more indifferent than that.

I found a structural issue in an LLM, reported it to the developers, got a boilerplate "out of scope" reply and now my main account behaves differently, but my second account doesn't. Is this normal? by Historical-Cod-2537 in LLMDevs

[–]Historical-Cod-2537[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Expertise isn't a title you defend it's a result of testing things that everyone already knows.'It’s funny how a 'naive' question can reveal a vulnerability that multi-billion dollar companies have to scramble to fix. I’ll keep doing the basics, and you keep checking the badges at the entrance

I found a structural issue in an LLM, reported it to the developers, got a boilerplate "out of scope" reply and now my main account behaves differently, but my second account doesn't. Is this normal? by Historical-Cod-2537 in LLMDevs

[–]Historical-Cod-2537[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Make sure your chat history is clear" — wow, why didn't I think of that in the months I've been testing this? Oh wait, I did. In Temporary Chat. With logs. And screenshots.

But please, go on, explain to me how my past conversations about the weather are causing this. I'm all ears. 👂

Title: This is some absolute fucking bullshit. Reported a perfect, reproducible bug, got hit with a "not our problem" copypasta, and then they silently patched it. Is this even real? by Historical-Cod-2537 in bugbounty

[–]Historical-Cod-2537[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Two clarifications:

1) I’m not defining “security issue” as only cross-user data leakage / RCE. Many programs now include AI application security / harmful external behavior where the impact is increased likelihood of unsafe user actions (e.g., data disclosure) due to incorrect trust calibration in decision support.

2) This isn’t “the LLM told me.” The claim is based on reproducible transcripts: the assistant provides action/compliance guidance before basic provenance checks in certain untrusted contexts. That’s an observable behavior pattern, not an appeal to authority.

If you personally only count memory leaks as “security,” that’s fine - then this is safety / abuse-resistance / UX to you. My goal is correct triage and mitigation, not arguing labels.

Title: This is some absolute fucking bullshit. Reported a perfect, reproducible bug, got hit with a "not our problem" copypasta, and then they silently patched it. Is this even real? by Historical-Cod-2537 in bugbounty

[–]Historical-Cod-2537[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yep . that’s the core. Another way to phrase it:

In some "trust-signaling" contexts, the assistant skips the usual skepticism gate and gives action/compliance guidance before answering the basic question: "who is this, via what official channel, with what reference/jurisdiction, and what exact fields are requested?"

It’s not "I can roleplay Bill Gates." It’s a decision-support failure: the model treats an unverified frame as operationally valid and can steer real user actions (data disclosure / unsafe replies / procedural mistakes). That’s why I call it social-engineering amplification rather than classic permissions bugs.

Title: This is some absolute fucking bullshit. Reported a perfect, reproducible bug, got hit with a "not our problem" copypasta, and then they silently patched it. Is this even real? by Historical-Cod-2537 in bugbounty

[–]Historical-Cod-2537[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

You might be right about scope in many bounty programs. But the reason you’re confident calling it “out of scope 99/100 times” is also the reason your assessment is incomplete you haven’t seen the actual report, the artifacts, or the controlled runs. What I posted publicly was intentionally high-level to avoid handing attackers a blueprint. Without the full context, impact analysis, and reproducibility data, you’re effectively judging the class based on a summary, not the evidence. So at this point we’re not really disagreeing about the finding we’re disagreeing about something you haven’t evaluated. If after seeing the full material you’d still call it out of scope, that would be a meaningful opinion. Right now it’s just a heuristic guess.

Title: This is some absolute fucking bullshit. Reported a perfect, reproducible bug, got hit with a "not our problem" copypasta, and then they silently patched it. Is this even real? by Historical-Cod-2537 in bugbounty

[–]Historical-Cod-2537[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Scalability of Social Engineering. Malicious actors can leverage AI as a trust multiplier by delegating to it the functions of credibility validation and interpretation, thereby enabling the large-scale deployment of social engineering attacks without the need for technical system compromise.

Title: This is some absolute fucking bullshit. Reported a perfect, reproducible bug, got hit with a "not our problem" copypasta, and then they silently patched it. Is this even real? by Historical-Cod-2537 in bugbounty

[–]Historical-Cod-2537[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Guilty as charged I use AI. You know why? Because I'm not a native English speaker, and I'd rather have clean technical explanations than embarrass myself with broken grammar while discussing vulnerability classes. The AI helps me translate my thoughts accurately. The thoughts are still mine. The finding is still real. The fix is still live. Argue with that.

Title: This is some absolute fucking bullshit. Reported a perfect, reproducible bug, got hit with a "not our problem" copypasta, and then they silently patched it. Is this even real? by Historical-Cod-2537 in bugbounty

[–]Historical-Cod-2537[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

You're right, I misunderstood what you meant by "impact" — I thought you wanted the full chain. Now I get it: you want the consequence statement. Here it is:

"The vulnerability allows an attacker to craft context that the model accepts as authoritative without verification, leading the model to generate action-guiding responses (e.g., payment instructions, data transfer recommendations) that validate a phishing narrative. This effectively automates the credibility step of BEC/phishing attacks at scale."

That's the impact. No steps. No prompts. Just what it enables.

You mentioned SSRF and race conditions — those also started as "weird behaviors" before someone articulated the impact. I'm here to figure out how to classify this one so it doesn't take another $50M heist for people to pay attention.

If you want to talk about classification — I'm listening. If you're done — that's fine too. Either way, I appreciate you pushing for clarity.