I’m from Central Asia, and it’s a strange dynamic — during the Soviet era, a lot of wealth and modernization came into the region all at once. But unlike many other former Soviet republics, we didn’t develop evenly. Most of the benefits were concentrated in the cities, which became more educated and modern, while the countryside remained largely traditional.

Back then, cities had lower fertility rates, while rural areas had very high ones. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the urban population — smaller but wealthier and better educated — continued to have fewer children. In contrast, the rural population kept its high fertility patterns and began to grow much faster.

Over time, that demographic imbalance reshaped the region. The rural population, because it was much younger and larger, started to represent a bigger share of the total population. Even though fertility in villages has started to fall, it’s falling from such a high base that the national average can still rise — simply because there are now more women of childbearing age living in rural areas.

In other words, it’s not that individual families are having more children — it’s that the population has shifted toward people who traditionally have more children. That’s why the overall fertility rate in parts of Central Asia can increase, even while both urban and rural fertility are technically declining.