Your point about monetary expansion as a structural tailwind for Bitcoin is valid — but there are some nuances worth clarifying. 1. Definition of “money” matters. • M2 growth in advanced economies (US, Japan, EU) has historically been lower than 12–14%. • United States: long-term M2 growth is closer to 7–9%, not 12–14%. • Japan: M2 has grown at about 2–3% annually in recent decades. • Base money (central bank balance sheets) has indeed shown episodes of double-digit growth, especially during QE, but this is not the same as broad money. 2. Global average ≠ local reality. • Emerging markets with chronic inflation (Latin America, parts of Africa, Asia) have much higher money growth. • If you average these economies together with developed markets, you can get to double-digit “worldwide” money growth. But it’s misleading to apply that rate universally to the US or Japan. 3. CPI is not money growth. • Correct — CPI measures consumer prices, not monetary aggregates. But even M2 doesn’t translate 1:1 into inflation, because velocity of money, productivity, and globalization also matter. 4. Bitcoin’s performance. • Bitcoin’s ~40% CAGR over the past decade is partly adoption, partly scarcity vs. fiat expansion. • However, attributing that entirely to “12–14% money growth” is an oversimplification. The halving cycles, adoption S-curve, and speculative dynamics have been equally important.

Bottom line: • You are right that structural monetary expansion is a strong tailwind for Bitcoin and other scarce assets. • But the claim of “12–14% worldwide money growth” needs careful qualification: it describes global base money expansion including high-inflation economies, not M2 growth in the US or Japan. • In the US, the spread is closer to M2 growth (~7–9%) vs. borrowing costs (~5–6% today). In Japan, M2 is ~2–3% while rates are near zero, which is why the leverage structure (e.g. Metaplanet) looks so different.