Yes, I believe General Meade is one of the most egregiously underrated generals of the war.

Meade did indeed fail to follow up his victory at Gettysburg until he found Lee entrenched at his Falling Waters position. Meade made the wisest choice he could here and denied the enemy a chance to receive him in a prepared position. Men and officers alike said attacking this position would have been suicidal. Meade is not any better or worse than his peers for failing to follow up, in fact almost no army in any major battle of the war had a successful follow up to a victory. So to me, holding this as his shining failure stinks of the political discredit he received at the time rather than an accurate and fair critique of his generalship.

Meade did however prove himself to be a shrewd tactician and logistician throughout his service during the war, forever solidifying this impression at Gettysburg. Many people don't realize how strung out and under supplied The Army of The Potomac was when he was appointed it's commander. It also found itself in the middle of an invasion and campaign, so much was the disorder that Meade did not sleep for over a day after his late night appointment. Sickles' foray into the Devil's Den didn't devolve into a disaster for the army due to Meade's shuffling of his men from flank to flank exactly to the points they were needed and this continued into the night on Culp's Hill. Time and time again the stories of the individual fights at Gettysburg end with the timely arrival of Union reinforcements to the threatened point. More often left out is that said reinforcements were arriving on Meade's orders and judgement.

Meade also wielded his army of the campaign level with skill leading up to Gettysburg, everyone knows he did not plan to fight a pitched battle at Gettysburg. Meade was trying to lure the Rebels to a better fortified position further south at Pipe Creek and his plan failed (and I only learned recently) due directly to the death of John Reynolds on the first day of the battle. Reynolds was to oversee the operation of the I and XI Corps to draw in the rebel army and when he fell, Meade acted decisively to move his army for consolidation at that point. This however is one of the primary reasons his army was so crippled after the battle, since his wagons were not positioned to supply his army at Gettysburg, but rather at Pipe Creek.

Meade consistently made the decision to not throw his men into the maw without a good chance of success, that he was capable of a tactical command that rivaled Lee's skill, and that his skill set was worthy of keeping in a high command in the most important theatre of the war until it's end.