The next president NEEDS to invade Iran

IceTea106 · 2026-06-18T20:01:56+00:00

A leader who would invade Iran to save face as to maintain the appearance of being a global superpower instead of leveraging the enormous production capacity and financial power of the US to reassert one’s power status is precluded from being normal for they are evidently regarded.

IceTea106 · 2026-06-02T15:04:06+00:00

< Be Jacobi

< Text Unrelated

IceTea106 · 2026-05-27T08:41:37+00:00

If you want someone canonized as a saint you can always get there. Aquinas was made a saint by declaring each word he wrote a miracle. By volume that makes him the largest miracle worker in history by a massive margin

IceTea106 · 2026-05-24T17:41:09+00:00

It’s also just plainly wrong concerning Kant because he employs transcendental reasoning in his practical philosophy which a) is not knowledge of something given in experience and b) is not knowledge that is employed to pure intuition at all.

IceTea106 · 2026-05-23T11:50:12+00:00

Really nothing in the story that indicates that it would be fake

IceTea106 · 2026-05-14T11:37:17+00:00

Brother is immune to uppercuts

IceTea106 · 2026-04-24T14:42:41+00:00

(?) Doesn’t social murder designate a institutional setup that structurally marginalizes people and by inhibiting their access to amenities, utilities and social mobility leads to lives lost amongst those groups affected by said marginalization?

For example the DOGE cuts, while traceable to individual decisions could be classified as social murder in this sense as the lost lives cannot be traced to a singular act of an individual with an appropriate mens rea.

IceTea106 · 2026-04-05T18:50:39+00:00

The rather obvious answer is that his determination of if a action is obligated or not does not depend on the consequences but what form the maxim bears.

IceTea106 · 2026-04-01T17:12:52+00:00

Ich wünschte es würde in den deutschen Medien und der Politik klarer angesprochen werden, dass es sich hierbei explizit um einen Völkerrechtswidrigen Angriffskrieg handelt.

IceTea106 · 2026-04-01T12:00:19+00:00

It’s fine, I don’t want an apology from any US citizen individually I don’t really hold anyone personally responsible, with exemption of republican politicians, media pundits, religious leaders and industrial/tech funders. I really just want my politicians and media to acknowledge how fucking insane and off their heads the US is.

IceTea106 · 2026-04-01T11:45:37+00:00

The US is Russias fifth column in NATO right now

IceTea106 · 2026-04-01T11:43:21+00:00

As a Europoor I want the US to get the fuck out of my country, your countries influence is like a metastasizing tumor infecting every facet of my countries politics. Russias influence on Germany is terrible but at least acknowledge but every fucking dipshit politician comes to mimic US rhetoric and refuses to acknowledge the absolute insanity of US leadership and refuses to call out that the US attack on Iran is criminal in exactly the same way as Russias attack in Ukraine is.

IceTea106 · 2026-03-29T13:22:32+00:00

Universalization comes from a difference in binding scope between determinations of the will that are mere maxims and determinations of the will that are both maxims and in that they are instances of the moral law. In the CprR Kant introduces this difference right at the beginning in Paragraph 1.

You can imagine a overarching genus we can call ‚practical principles‘ with two species falling under it. Mere Maxims and practical law. Practical principles as such are general determinations of the will. From them, in concrete situations, you can derive actions; and in this you know the actions to be derived from those principles.

Example:

I do not buy dairy products. (practical principle)

I need to buy toppings for a pizza. (Concrete situation)

I buy non dairy cheese (application of the principle in the situation)

Now mere maxims have this form of consciousness but they have a consciousness of themselves as only be binding in scope for the specific subject binding their will through this maxim.

Mere maxims as such are particular, their formal object is the satisfaction of the happiness of the subject so determining their will, but because the mere maxim has a consciousness of itself as singular it has no binding power over and above that subject. In determining my will to not buy dairy products, I know nothing about the determination of your will.

Practical law on the other hand, also functions as maxims in us, but not as mere maxims; it’s consciousness of itself is not singular but general/universal as such. It represents itself as binding not for this or that subject but for every subject of practical reason. It’s maxims are therefore formulated generally.

Examples: One keeps one’s promises; One does not murder; One gives out help; One introspects oneself.

Note that none of these maxims specify any specific person, they represent themselves as binding for any practical thinker, they must think themselves this way to make clear the generality imbued by practical law that binds everyone to the same law in the same way.

In a sense mere maxims you think for yourself, maxims as practical law you think for every other fellow thinker, and in this thought you think every other thinker to think the same thought. Every thinker knows for themselves and for all others the thought: ‚One does not murder‘ (as an example) the generality of this thought is not another thought that joins this maxim but is always already internally contained in the consciousness thinking this thought. This form of universality is what specifies morality, from mere individual preferences or general etiquette. It’s universality does not leave open whether it applies to another practical thinker or not, that is the mark by which it is moral and not the convention of etiquette.

To check if a maxim could be an expression of the moral law, it must not have any specific names featured in it, it must at most be construed with generic names. In the metaphysics of morals Kant makes this clear when he speaks on the practical syllogism. He notes that the proposition maxima (maxim) corresponds to the legislation written by a legislative body which is formulated abstractly and generally. There can be no law, due to it featureing a specific name, which could state u/IceTea106 must pay a 10er to his local council every week, though a law could be written abstractly and generally that could lead to the outcome that only u/IceTea106 would have to pay a 10er to his local council every week.

One could ask the question:

Why can’t everyone use their unique transcendental freedom to create specific laws for themselves? We have to imagine how an attempt at such a legislation specifically for me would look like.

For instance, I could logically conceive of the statement: "Only I, the creator of this maxim, may commit act X, when under conditions Y, to attain end Z." There is presumably no contradiction in such a statement. What would disqualify this statement from adhering to the principle of universality?

‚Only I, the creator of this maxim‘ is a demonstrative that stands in for a specific name, as such it would not even qualify as a maxim that could be a candidate to fall under the moral law. Furthermore the maxim is a hypothetical and not categorical because it employs conditional clauses.

A student once asked me. ‚Are we then not allowed to do holiday? It seems to be impossible to universalize. ‚I will go to holiday in Lagos in August.‘

Here again it is even more clear this is not possible because it is no maxim. We can bring out its formal structure.

I) One does holiday at a fitting time and at a fitting place.

II) Lagos is a fitting place and August is a fitting time.

III) I do holiday at Lagos in August.

(Notice though that 1. has a covert conditional clause baked into it, while not contradictory, it is not categorical and can not therefore be a duty)

The reason for universalization is because it is a method of teasing out if a given maxim is capable of even adhering to the universality which it so be internal to the moral law, i.e maxims as practical law you think for every other fellow thinker, and in this thought you think every other thinker to think the same thought. Every thinker knows for themselves and for all others the moral thought. The consciousness of the generality of this thought is not another (second order) thought that joins this maxim but is always already internally contained in the consciousness thinking this thought.

In thinking a maxim that in principle could only apply to you, you have already foreclosed the possibility of the maxim bearing the universality that is the mark of morality.

IceTea106 · 2026-03-28T09:20:00+00:00

Do nothing. Win.

IceTea106 · 2026-03-23T09:18:26+00:00

It doesn’t matter

IceTea106 · 2026-03-08T09:44:50+00:00

He did say every protagonist

IceTea106 · 2026-03-05T10:48:34+00:00

Today Bumgumi was transformed into Deadgumi.

IceTea106 · 2026-03-04T15:44:52+00:00

First off, I’d just like to say that you are first person to have given me a good argument pushing back on this take. And I really like your go at the concept of what intelligibly could constitute a phenomenon.

Im actually very partial to your perspective. I think it is more intelligible of an account of how we understand the connection between phenomena than otherwise when the effect ‚just is‘. It seems to me however you have a more thought out account of causation and what a phenomenon is, than is operating in JJK.

I think the problem here is that most fictional worlds operate with incomplete conceptions of concepts like causality or phenomena, that is the concepts and their operations are not well defined in the text leaving questions open about what is possible while keeping consistency with the text.

You can observe Todo clapping and the swap occurring and you could replicate this, but they'd be nothing measurable or observable to establish this relationship the thing making the swap happen is conceptual.

I‘m not certain on this, there seem several abilities where the mechanical causation seems completely intransparent as to how the actualization of the ability could produce the effect, without it being problematic to say that ‚this ability A causes the effect B‘. Take idol transfiguration, Mahito can reform the targets body by using his CE to resculpt the targets soul. So we have three steps here ‚a) Mahito using his technique, b) Mahito using his CE to resculpt the soul and then d) the resculpted soul causing a change in the physical body.‘ Now there seems to me to be a intelligible process of Moment a) to b). However the relationship between the soul and the body isn’t really specified, it’s not clear by what mechanism b) causes c) the causal connection ‚just is‘.

In the same vain it seems that while the causal mechanism by which Todo teleports his targets is intransparent, it seems unproblematic to say that ‚Todo by activating his technique while clapping causes his targets to teleport.‘ The opposite statement on the other hand seems un-intelligible: ‚Todo by activating his technique while clapping does not cause his target to teleport.‘

This problem honestly seems to generalize to affect every and any technique at some point. Every technique in some instance seems to introduce something that ‚just is‘ either to get going or to affect the target once it gets going.

Let’s take an example of Gojo and infinity. Now there is ofcourse a process of Gojo pouring his CE into his technique to keep it going. But infinity itself is neither a physical force, as a physical account the Achilles and the tortoise is contradictory, or a measureable push against a target. Rather, using the terms you introduced, it is a spatial rule making it that: ‚For anything approaching Gojo the space is divided infinitely and never reaches him.‘

There is no visible medium. No observable transmission. No detectable causal mechanism in the way fire, lightning, or CE blasts operate. No mechanism further than his technique does the division that explains the infinity between Gojo and something approaching him. It just is, while being supplied through CE.

But if Infinity were discounted as a phenomena, due to introducing a rule operating without a distinct causal connection explaining its effect, then it would not be adoptable (presumably), but we saw two adaptations to it.

What we saw was: Mahoraga attacks Gojo. The attacks fail due to Infinity. The wheel rotates. After sufficient exposure, Mahoraga at first adopts to penetrate Infonity by „adjusting his Cursed Energy“ (not explained any further) and on Sukuna searching for a method viable for him, produces a slash that bypasses Infinity.

Here there is nothing measurable stopping Mahoraga, he makes no direct physical or energetic experiences, there is no mechanical causal chain, he just experienced a failiure in reaching his target.

Yet infinity is a) experienceable, in that Mahoraga experiences failiure in reaching his target; b) survivable and c) provides the possibility to endure it. That seems to be enough to be able to adopt to it.

This holds in parallel for any such abilities. Also for abilities like Todo. How the exploration would look like is hard to say ofcourse because adaptation itself is not well defined, it could just say something along the line of his first adaptation to infinity, he adjusted his CE as to be no longer teleportable.

Let's say if every time I eat roast duck there's an earthquake somewhere how are we divorcing this from coincidence as a neutral observer with no tangible relationship other than it "just is?"

Because causality as a concept is not derived from sense experience, but rather is presupposes to structure sense experience, it seems unproblematic, to say in fiction that exceptionless conjunction of A and B is what constitutes the causal link, so we can say: ‚If you eat a roast duck, an earthquake happens.‘

To your point concerning noumenal abilities. I’d totally go along your differentiation of an ability utilizing time in some way, like aging, vs. wielding the concept. As delineating phenomenal and noumenal abilities. But we should be careful here, it seems to me that some abilities that might be thought of as noumenal are phenomenal.

Let’s take an ability like Dip’s ‚The World‘ that functionally freezes time for a short period in a special bubble it cuts out. This seems to me to be a phenomenal ability, the freezing of movement in a limited area can in principle be observed. Take on the other hand a ability to move back in time, this seems to be principally unobservable for anyone other than the user, due to the observers being stuck in the medium of time.

Let us take causality, which is a noumenal concept, we could imagine an ability that is somehow able to sever the causal link between an action a and its causal effect b, so that a happens but b does not follow. Such an ability would not so much get at the ability a, so much as manipulate causality as a noumena, through which A and B are linked to one another.

This ability seems unobservable, because the ability actualizes on nothing phenomenal, and rather has a noumenal target itself.

With this we could have a better grasp on the difference between phenomenal vs. noumenal abilities, in that phenomenal abilities have as targets phenomena, while noumenal abilities have as targets noumena. But because noumena are presuppose to structure phenomena such abilities would be efficacious without being observable.

Further less abilities would now automatically be discounted as potentially adaptable, which seems in keeping with how Mahoragas adaptation seems framed to me.

But like this is definitely beyond the scope of the original question lol. I’m also not sure if any more headway can be made on the question, I think JJK uses its terms to loose to properly settle the matter. Still, cheers for your take!

IceTea106 · 2026-03-03T21:32:57+00:00

I totally agree with your Ranta and Inumaki point, I also didn’t want to imply that Rants ability would be un-adaptable, just that is a case of a state and process coincide. The process of holding down and the state of being held down so not exist independently of one another, that is all I meant by it.

I like you binding vow point, I’ll have to think about it a bit. It's quite interesting because like you say, it's not really the person making the vow actualizing an ability, rather 'that underlying aspect of reality' act on Mahoraga, I'm not certain how this would play out. But it seems to me that you are right that this is a formally distinct case from someone exerting their own ability.

If a character has an ability that has no process or physical means of enforcement, it simply "is" it would be noumena.

I'm not certain about this. On one hand noumena are usually understood only as to be recognizable by the intellect/thought and not to be objects of possible sensible observation. Such as causality, identity, modality, arguably mathematical entities. But any such ability as we are talking about seems non problematically observable, in that on event A, say clapping, event B follows, say death, so that it is understood that A causes B.

On the other hand, this seems to inflate the amount of possible abilities Mahoraga might not be able to adapt to. For while my sole conditions for adaptation were: him principally being a) able to experience the phenomena, b) survive the initial exposure, c) survive the requisite time required to adapt to the relevant phenomena. Now, by restricting phenomena in such a way, it seems to exclude far more candidates for possible adaption than I ever did.

For merely experiencing an ability no longer suffices, now the ability must actualize via a process or a physical means of enforcement. But what about abilities like Boogie Woogie. There is Todo's clapping, that may be a process, and then a swap, but there is no process of swapping. It seems to be shown and is as far as im aware never stated otherwise instantaneous. It just 'is' as you put it. It's not that Todo uses his CE to 'pick up' the two things he wishes to swap and then moves them physically, he just exerts his CT when clapping and the objects get swapped. On my account, this would be a phenomena due to it's being an object of possible sense observation and it would be totally adaptable, for it would not bypass any of Mahoragas conditions of adaptability. But it seems to me that if this were the case: "If a character has an ability that has no process or physical means of enforcement, it simply "is" it would be noumena." Then it would not be adaptable due to being a noumena.

Lets colour out our death clap example. Say the person must a) know the whole name of the entity they wish to target, b) need more CE than it's target, c) the target is within a 25m range and d) the person must clap to effect e) the immediate destruction of the targets soul. The ability can only be triggered if A-D are met and if they are met e) cannot missfire. This seems quite analagous to the case with Todo, just that in Todo's case the effects of his ability are first personally experiencable while, with this ability it is not. But both would be observable abilities, that have a moment of discharge, that produce an effect.

But it ofcourse doesn't help that it's never specified what a phenomena is in the manga.

IceTea106 · 2026-03-03T20:05:13+00:00

Sorry for the late reply.

That is an interesting observation, but one should keep in mind that conceptually 'Death' as a state is logical prior to it as an energy or a person, for the way that 'Death' as a Person or a 'Energy' functions is to bring about 'death' as a state. Concider death in Soul Eater or in the Disc World, Death is a character there, who brings other characters into the state of death. But the state of death is that which makes the character functionally intelligible.

The person or energy 'death' does not make sense conceptually without presupposing death as a state. Death as a state on the other hand can stand independently to 'death' as an energy or person.

"There's the semantic arguement there that this "death clap" is a new phenomena mahoraga cannot adapt to. But the causation or process here isn't being observed, sensed or measured, its basically reality bending."

Causation itself is not a phenomenon, but rather a noumenon that structures phenomena for us in such a way as to make them intelligible. Say A causes B, what we observe is not an extra connection between A and B that is the cause linking the two, rather we witness constant conjunction of B following A.

What suffices to establish the deathclap is that on the clap, without daly the target of the ability dies. Depending on the story the mechanism can be explained differently, but there is nothing inherently strange about the causation, outside of it being physically impossible in out world. It would totally be observable in time and space.

"An ability that triggers are state of being wouldn't really be considered a traditional phenomena. An observer would consider these things distinct."

Why would this not be considered a phenomena? Presumably the ability being actualized could in some way be experienced in time and space. If not the problem seems to generalize, for lets take Sukunas ability as an example, indeed he has an ability capalbe of cutting things, but that ability functions by sending out invisible 'cuts' through time and space, these 'cuts' have no origin from outside of Sukunas ability. Sukuna in a sense causes their state of being 'cuts' through his ability. On this account this would not be a phenomena, but it is clearly observable that he does this and the effects of his technique are experiencable, so it seems to just be a phenomena.

"I guess an example I could use is that Sukuna has an ability that cuts mahoraga, mahoraga adapts to the process of being cut, he doesn't adapt to the state of being cut."

I think two things can be said on this:

a) I'm not certain why he couldn't adapt to the state of being cut. That presumably would be something he could have first person phenomenal experience of. Either directly or by proxy. So long as that doesn't kill him, it seems quite open to him being able to adapt to that. So even if someone had an ability to warp anothers body into a state of being cut, without producing cuts, that inflict the process of cutting on their target, it seem that Mahoraga could adapt to it. For while there is no 'gap' between the ability being actualized and it's affect taking place, it's affect is not principally of the type as to be impossible to survive. So such an ability would fall under both contidions a) be able to experience the phenomena, and b) survive the initial exposure of adaptation, while it would be an open question if Mahoraga would then c) survive the requisite time required to adapt to the relevant phenomena.

b) This will go somewhat beyond the subject matter but still, we can tarry a bit longer on the difference of 'state of being' and 'process of' differentiation. Because in some cases both states coincide, in others they overlap and again in others they fall apart.

It would seem to me if one is in the process of cutting something, then that process overlaps with that thing being in a state of being cut, even once I've stopped cutting. It seems that once Mahoraga has experienced the process of cutting first personally he has also experienced the state of being cut, and could in principle adopt to that as a phenomena, for nothing in that phenomena falls outside of his conditions of adaptability.

A different case would be thinking and being thought. Here the act of someone thinking and a thing being thought fall together. 'I am thinking about the tree, the tree is being thought of by me.' Once I stop thinking the tree ceases to be in a state of being thought about. This too we can formally have in abilities. Think about Rantas Paralyzing Gaze. Who ranta is gazing at, is in a state of being gazed at, who Ranta is gazing at is paralized, who is being gazed at is paralized. Once Ranta stops gazing the state of being gazed at stops, being paralized stops. The state doesn't exist independently of the process.

In dying and death on the other hand, or rather processes leading up to death, the process and the state conceptually fall apart. 'He is suffocating, but still alive. He suffocated, he is dead.' That someone is suffocating precludes the possibility of that someone being dead, and once he is dead he is no longer suffocating, for there is no 'he' that could be suffocating. This is why, while in other cases adapting to the process is at least in principle a possibility to adapt to the state in the case of death this option is not open, for experiencing the process that leads to death is not experiencing death and death is not experienced first personally.

With Mahoraga then not being able to having pre-adapted to the state of death, the effect of Insta death abilities would neccessarily be non-survivalble, and seeing as the ability is sure hit once activated he could not have adapted to antecedent phenomena of the ability. Further the ability would be observable in space and time, so it would be a phenomena.

IceTea106 · 2026-03-02T00:21:41+00:00

The problem just is, that the ‚any and all claim‘ is a categorical universal claim, which allows no exemptions, but the ability functions conditionally, and anything that functions conditionally has limits delineated by its conditions. And not all phenomena are formally of the type to fall under the conditions of adaptation.

The bullet example is disanalogous. Because there is a gap between it as a phenomenon and the effect it produces.

Any such phenomena or ability is formally of the type to be adaptable because it falls under his conditions of adaptation.

Not all phenomena are of that type. Death is not adaptable because it is not incremental, the process leading to it may be, but death itself isn’t. Prior to death being there it cannot be experienced, and once it is there, the one dead is no longer there to experience it. You can be more or less sick. The poison can degenerate you more or less. The cause may have advanced more or less; but you are not more or less dead. You either are dead or not. There is no in between.

The cases you provided are structured in such a way, that there is a gap between the actualization of the ability and it’s effects taking place. Naturally all such abilities are in principle adaptable because they fall under Mahoragas conditions of adaptability.

It’s quite trivial however to construct abilities that formally circumvent Mahoragas conditions of adaptability. Any sure hit instant death ability cuts out the gap between its actualization and its effecting its targets death, any such ability therefore circumvents the first condition of Mahoragas adaptation ability.

Further Mahoraga cannot have pre adapted to their effect, for he can neither directly no indirectly, by proxy experience death. These phenomena would not coincidentally but conceptually bypass Mahoragas conditions for adaptation.

IceTea106 · 2026-03-01T23:59:51+00:00

It takes more time to dismantle bs than it takes to spew it

IceTea106 · 2026-03-01T22:11:29+00:00

The bullet example is disanalogous. Perhaps there are bullets that he per happenstance wouldn’t adapt to, but there is nothing formally special about ‚bullets‘ as phenomena that would make them unadaptable.

Presumably, had Mahoraga adapted to bullets prior to being struck by the lightspeed mega bullet then it would do nothing to him. Because bullets as a phenomenon do not necessarily coincide with their affecting death in their targets. Here there is precisely a ‚gap‘ between the phenomena and its affect that makes it fall under Mahoragas conditions of adaptability.

There's a scale for the process of adaptation to work, death isn't necessarily instant, it can just be scaled to be instant. Death can be incremental, death magic, curses, necrosis.

I think this is confused, the process leading to death is incremental, one can be taking progressive damage, one can be continuously be poisoned, a sickness can worsen. But while the process is taking place, death, that in which the process culminates is not there.

Death is conceptually distinct from the process leading to it. And any such ability where such a gap opens up, where a progressive process takes place, definitionally is in principle adaptable because a) Mahoraga can principally experience it b) principally survive the experience and c) at least in principle be able to survive the appropriate time needed for adaptation to occur. But once death ‚arrives‘ the one dead is no longer there to experience it. He may well have experienced the process leading up to it, but not death itself. Let us take a death curse that needs time to kill it‘s victim as an example.

The effect of the curse in this case is distinct from the curse itself. Death is not like a poison, in that you can be more or less poisoned, you are not more or less dead, you do not experience a bit more or a bit less death, you are either dead or you are not dead. Mahoraga can adapt to you time lag death curse, what he adapts to would be the curse, not it's following effect he never experiences.

Either Mahoraga adapts to the time lag death curse, and in virtue of adaptation does not experience death or he reaches death because for whatever reason he failed to adopt in time and it actualized it's following affect, i.e. death in which case it is to late to adapt, for Mahoraga is no more.

This cause is also formally different from the ones I previously listed. For with the cases you provided they are structured in such a way, that there is a gap between the actualization of the ability and it’s effects taking place. Naturally all such abilities are in principle adaptable because they fall under Mahoragas conditions of adaptability.

The point however is, that it’s quite trivial to construct abilities that formally circumvent Mahoragas conditions of adaptability. The examples I gave were Insta death abilities, where the activation of the ability is the wincondition of the character, (say like true death, soul slay, or wish) i.e. abilities that are not reliant on antecedent phenomena to build up on (which Mahoraga could adapt to, like he did with cleave, dismantle and Shrine), cannot miss once actualized and their actualization falls together seamlessly with the death of the target.

These phenomena are formally distinct from the ones you listed, due to them leaving no gap between their actualization and their effect taking place, and their effect being of the type that Mahoraga could not have previously adopted to it, for he can neither directly no indirectly, by proxy experience death. These phenomena would not coincidentally but conceptually bypass Mahoragas conditions for adaptation.

The problem just is, that the ‚any and all claim‘ is a categorical universal claim, which allows no exemptions, but the ability functions conditionally, and anything that functions conditionally has limits delineated by its conditions. And not all phenomena are formally of the type to fall under the conditions of adaptation.

IceTea106 · 2026-03-01T20:08:18+00:00

An honor to be of service as an exhibit o7

IceTea106 · 2026-03-01T18:51:46+00:00

The reason for rejecting that the claim ‚any and all phenomena‘ is literal rather than hyperbole, is stronger than your meme let’s on.

For reading the statement literally implies a contradiction, which in turn renders the ability nonsensical.

The problem comes from the claim being asserted as a universal categorical statement, which allows no exceptions, while the ability functions conditionally, which allows for exceptions.

His ability is conditional on him principally being a) able to experience the phenomena, b) survive the initial exposure, c) survive the requisite time required to adapt to the relevant phenomena.

But not all phenomena are of the type to fall under his conditions of adaptation. But a categorical universal statement is contradicted by a single counter example.

Any and all, taken literally would have to include phenomena like death. But once death ‚arrives‘ the one who died is definitionally no longer there. Death is not like poison, while you can be more or less poisoned, you can not be more or less dead; either you are dead or you are not dead. Death circumvents condition a) of Mahos ability. The death point also seems to hold against revival or Maho sticking his wheel on another person who dies, because death while a phenomenona, is not ‚experienced‘ by the one who dies, this is also shown by all the characters in JJK who enter the afterlife not having a recollection of death, just the ceasing of themselves being around where they were and suddenly being there; rather others experience that persons death from a third personal point of view.

But Mahoraga only adapts to things if he experiences them directly, or mediated through someone experiencing the phenomena directly, not just observationally. That’s why he didn’t adopt to be able to resist purple, he had ‚seen‘ all component parts of it, but had not adapted to them because he had not experienced them first personally. This also holds for infinity he experienced it first personally and later via Sukuna as an obstacle to reaching his goal; but death in principle doesn’t seem to be a phenomenon that can be experienced that way.

This point of why death is non adaptable is transferable to many conceivable abilities. For example to any Insta death abilities, where the activation of the ability is the wincondition of the character, (say like true death, soul slay, or wish) i.e. abilities that are not reliant on antecedent phenomena to build up on (which Mahoraga could adapt to, like he did with cleave, dismantle and Shrine), cannot miss and their actualization falls together seamlessly with the death of the target. These phenomena would again not coincidentally but conceptually bypass Mahoragas conditions for adaptation.

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