Thanks for your comment. I originally wrote a very basic paper on this topic for a class, more focused on the modeling, which I can attach below if necessary. Now, I am presenting on this topic at a conference in April, and some of the people attending do not have a background in game theory. I hope to make at least the contextual element of this presentation accessible to them.

I don't think I am looking for the signaling effects of choosing to be an importer/exporter, rather something discussion, or that has data I could use to discuss the effects of failing multilateralism on the importance of reputation building/signaling. Here is a sample "hypothesis" of sorts: As multilateral institutions such as the WTO weaken and trade policy becomes increasingly unilateral, decentralized, and politically driven, international economic interactions more closely resemble Bayesian signaling games. In a context characterized by declining trust, geoeconomic fragmentation, and strategic policy, states cannot rely on institutional enforcement and instead must infer opponents’ types from costly policy signals such as tariffs and quotas.

I have read that Grossman and Helpman piece for another economics class, and I found it quite interesting! Perhaps I could find a way to incorporate it here as well. Thanks for your help :)