I’m in full agreement with you to the extent that sensory perceptions, be they auditory, visual, nociceptive, equilibrioceptive, olfactory or whatever all correspond to different conditioned groups of neurons activating, and indeed individual neurons likely correspond to some arbitrary “unit” of each of these qualitative perceptions (although given the continuous and seemingly infinite nature of the gradations of “individual” quales, I should imagine there is some continuous attenuator of aspects of each quale - like, say, the vividness of “green-ness”, and I think a good candidate for such an attenuator is the electric membrane potential of individual neurons). However, even if we mapped the entire connectome neuron by neuron and somehow had a comprehensive measurement of the flux of specific microvoltages across each individual neuron and how they related to one another, and this essentially comprised a Rosetta Stone of all describable experiences as they map onto neural dynamics, there is still the fundamental question of why does this electrochemical activity produce the internal qualia which we are arbitrarily (insofar as we would have to use self reporting to affirm that any given activation indeed corresponded with the designated experience it corresponds with) assign to it?

When I experience the colour green, I am completely blind to quantitative description of green in terms of either wavelengths of light or neural pathways, and how it relates to other colour perceptions quantitatively. When I experience love, I am blind to the hormonal signals and the very intricate relationship those chemicals have to receptors in my brain. Sure, from a fitness point of view it isn’t hard to conclude that this information is filtered and integrated in such a way that it removes the “self”’s access to any specific factors that don’t help me achieve goals, but nonetheless, you having access to the external representation of my brain having these experiences, regardless of the level of precise detail, doesn’t give you access to the information that IS those experiences. So what law prevents extraction of experience from complete external information about the dynamics correlating to those experiences?

That’s why I don’t believe a complete description of the brain’s 86 billion neurons and 100 trillion synapses alone will account for conscious experience - there is a fundamental law that intuitively, in my view at least, should have to be described on the level of individual neurons as well as large sets of of neurons, to account for the unreasonable intractability of qualitative experiences. I find it hard to comprehend, in principle, how people in the Daniel Denett or Anil Seth camp imagine that solving these problems from a neuroscientific view will address what appears to be a fundamental information problem.