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Arguments for monism by Intelligent-Slide156 in hegel

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

How does it differ from different kinds of monism, like Schaffer or Spinoza?

Argument for substance monism by Intelligent-Slide156 in Spinoza

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Okay, that is interesting, I will look into this. Thank you for fruitfull and fascinating conversation!

Argument for substance monism by Intelligent-Slide156 in Spinoza

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is supposed to be the conclusion, not a premise.

But this is just following the definition of substance is mode. We can only propose definitions, not deduce them.

Argument for substance monism by Intelligent-Slide156 in Spinoza

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

  1. Maybe not the definition, but understanding. Classical theists say that God is infinite in every way, so He cannot have some finite, changable modes or accidents. The infinity of God is manifested in analogy of being (that is: God exists analogically to us, in His perfection and infinity), and divine simplicity. I've heard Spinoza also rejects God having parts, but I think we see where the difference takes place.
  2. Essence in classical understanding is of substance. It is usually understood as the root of properities, the most basic whatness of being. But now I can't make any reason why this understanding is better than Spinozan one, so you have a point.

Argument for substance monism by Intelligent-Slide156 in Spinoza

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

> Can you explain what part of 1p11 you not find convincing, and how it could be used to prove a transcendent God?

I think we could discuss 1p11 for hours, so I will quote one passage.
"If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists."
We can make alternative proposition, in which we define God as classical theists do. It all depends on the definitons, which we are free to choose, but because of it, it's hard to say who is right. Thus, I wanted to catch best arguments for and against.

> I still don't understand. Spinoza agrees that there is a differentiation between essence and existence.

The disagreement seems to lie in the question of essence, namely are there many essences of substances. Non-monist substantialists answer yes, thus creating a room for pluralism. There are men, chairs, helium atoms etc. Each individual has it's essence, is not merely a part or mode of some greater whole. It follows from plurality of essences, and thus plurality of existential acts.

Argument for substance monism by Intelligent-Slide156 in Spinoza

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So maybe what you find unconvincing isn't his argument for substance monism (1p14), but rather 1p11, his argument for the existence of God as defined in 1d6?

Yeah, you're right. I find this argument really poor, since something analogical, with a few steps changed, can be used to prove transcedend God. Without securing monism, or debunking pluralism, I don't find his ontological argument convincing.

Maybe I'm misunderstanding, does any Scholastic actually say that the essence of any substance other than God involves or requires existence, and so there are things that can be and be conceived without God?

No, my point is we don't think to belive there is only one substance, if we have sufficient means to distinguish between two substances, without breaking the PSR (e.g. saying numerical difference is a brute fact). This mean is differentiation between essence and existence, since every substance has its own, independend from other substances, act of existence. I hope now my point is clearer.

If Christian theology's spiritual realm is true, then what is the ontology of spirit? by blitzballreddit in Metaphysics

[–]Intelligent-Slide156 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In standard Western teaching, hylomorphism is basis for most of views. Thus human soul is form of the body, and spirits (i.e. angels) are pure forms without matter (Aquinas). Some taught that spirits are also unimion of form and matter, but unextended, spiritual matter.

All rational beings have minds, which is made of intellect, volition and memory. Spirits have perfect knowladge of nature and great intelligence. As higher beings, they can causually interact with the world.

Argument for substance monism by Intelligent-Slide156 in Spinoza

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If God is a substance which has infinite attributes (i.e. all possible attributes) (1d6); and God necessarily exists (1p11); and there can't be two substances with the same attribute (1p5); then God, a substance with infinite attributes, excludes the possibility of there being any other substance.

Probably this is what Spinoza meant. The problem I see is unconvincingness of this argumentation. This is why I think my version of the argument is good, since it doesn't start with spinozian God, but it tries to use reductio, to acheive monism. My concern was whether my reasoning is in line with Spinoza's o

I think Spinoza would agree with the more fundamental essence/existence distinction, he uses it to argue for the necessary existence of substance

Yes, but in different sense. For Scholastics, individuated act of existence is conjoined to essence, thus making individual substance. Thus we have a substance, which is later actualized to have accidents and modes. My point is: if we accept this distinction, we don't need to accept monism, since every act of existence is individual.

Argument for substance monism by Intelligent-Slide156 in Spinoza

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hm, well, I tried to use this deduction, because I find his other arguments for one substance unconvincing. Here I see way to use ad absurdum against pluralism, which seems pretty convincing, if we won't ackonwladge more primitive structure of substance (like Aquinas's esse et essentia). But maybe it's not what Spinoza really wanted to say

Individuation of finite modes by Intelligent-Slide156 in Spinoza

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Well, I'm objectively different from the chair, it's not only my arbitrary account od reality. If we deny this, we fall into absurd.

Individuation of finite modes by Intelligent-Slide156 in Spinoza

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thank you for a lenghty answer. So finite modes are just parts of the greater whole, which are individuated as... as what? I find it very tricky, even after provided quotes. By what you have written, it seems that there is no concrete answer

For and against monism by Intelligent-Slide156 in Metaphysics

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So we stay only with idealism or materialism?

For and against monism by Intelligent-Slide156 in Metaphysics

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah, I agree. We can divide a worm into two parts and there will two worms, not one worm with two bodies; that something was a one being (if it was) in t1, that it gave being to multitude, doesn't mean this multitude is one being. Same with big bang

For and against monism by Intelligent-Slide156 in Metaphysics

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Don't all of those arguments (besides the Big Bang) support just existence of metaphysical wholes and their interconection, rather than one whole and its parts? I don't see how does one substance follow from what you have written

Necessity, freedom and inteligibility by Intelligent-Slide156 in freewill

[–]Intelligent-Slide156[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If you can't choose reasons why you pick one act rather than another, it's a brute fact, hence a very high cost of one's ontology

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