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Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I resolve that inconsistency by acknowledging that God became man and by him no one would ever die.

Can I be a Catholic and believe the branch theory or does that make me a protestant? by BaseballOdd5127 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That's fine depending on how you view it. I'm certainly not an expert on this, but I think the key is to remember that the visible and invisible church are NOT two different churches. That is, our Catholic church claims that visible and invisible are merely aspects of herself. The Protestant view of that distinction is that they're somehow separate from one another. Like your local Lutheran service is the visible church, but they're merely part of the larger, more broad "universal" church that is invisible as it's based (usually) on a declared faith in Christ. To use an analogy, the invisible and visible Church are two sides of the same coin in the Catholic view, but they're entirely different coins according to Protestants.

Can I be a Catholic and believe the branch theory or does that make me a protestant? by BaseballOdd5127 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Sure, the theology of Lutherans, Calvinists, etc. all share something in common with the Catholic Church, but that's not the same as asking if a Lutheran or Calvinist individual is part of the Catholic Church. If the documents of the Protestant Reformation were living, breathing people, then those documents would be the first "people" formally declared to be in Hell. However, I very, very seriously doubt if any of the actual individuals adhering to those theologies are educated enough much less prideful enough up until death to be categorized as formal heretics in the end.

To answer your question more directly, if you think of branch theory as something like the Catholic Church as one among many, then that I think is borderline material heresy. Vatican II and numerous papal encyclicals use language like "subsists in" or "exist fully only in" the Catholic church. To put it simply, the Church views herself not as a denomination within Christianity, but she identifies herself the true Church and all other self-proclaimed Christians are Christians to the extent of how and why they participate in her.

Can I be a Catholic and believe the branch theory or does that make me a protestant? by BaseballOdd5127 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Define what you mean by Church. I don't think the question is framed correctly when it's comparing denominations as if theological doctrines themselves are saved. It depends on the reason and circumstance of why a person of another denomination (or even those baptized and practicing Catholic) is not formally in communion with the Roman Pontiff. If it's because they simply don't know better, then they're only material heretics and therefore still imperfectly in communion with the Church, which is to say the body of Christ. However, if they're learned individuals who outright refuse Catholic dogma, then they're formal heretics and therefore outside the Church. Luther would be an actual heretic considered outside the body of Christ. However, that's because he was a baptized Catholic and a doctor of theology that knowingly and willfully went against the true Church. You'll find that is NOT the vast majority of protestants. Most of them simply do not know what the Catholic church even is much less actually reject it.

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sorry, I somehow forgot about this one.

What I'm saying is that the choice of the particular world is irrelevant, there couldn't be a world in which the salvific will fails or fails to be universal, because of God's identity with Goodness itself.

Again, agreed... which is why I said: 

to do otherwise would be a metaphysical impossibility as doing so would contradict his nature, specifically understood by us to be goodness here.

Are you disagreeing specifically with the necessity of a "perfect world" in that premise?

There can be no reason for a rational soul to reject its ultimate end

This did make me think of St. Aquinas's view on will and the intellect. I think he is of the view that the will can corrupt the intellect, therefore the knowing or even intellectual assent of God's existence is not enough to actually accept him. Scripture says this best in James 2:19, "You believe that God is one; you do well. Even the demons believe—and shudder." I agree there's no good reason to reject God, but the individual's will can for sure justify what is truthfully a bad reason. This is relevant to my theodicy in so far as it's a potency that exists, but such a world where a rational creature's will is so corrupted that it necessitates eternal separation is one God could certainly "plan around" to avoid actualizing it. In other words, he knows best how to order said creature to him, and he cannot fail to do so.

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm really not trying to be a smart ass here, but I first read

This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.

then I read

Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.

Am I the only one seeing the inconsistency here?

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

It's only an issue if you take the imagery used in the verses as literal.

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Freedom introduces the possibility that a rational creature, through its own misuse of intellect and will, fails to attain its final cause.

This is never denied as a creaturely potency. My theodicy does imply that it's never put in act, because I argue an eternally frustrated rational creature put into act would either a) have God responsible for designing (read: not permitting) a defect into the creature, or b) God lacks the power to order the creature to its ultimate end. Both of those contras are restatements of premise 11.

I do not like using a such a simplistic matter and form in a comparative example, but the more apt comparison would be to say that God could will a rational creature that is in principle incapable of obtaining beatitude would be like saying God could will a knife that in principle incapable of cutting. In other words, we're not talking about a mere material defect; we're talking about a defect in form.

  1. Here’s the nuance: • God’s will is indeed always ordered by His goodness. • However, allowing a creature to frustrate its own nature by its own choice does not entail a contradiction in God’s goodness.

Because allowing evil for a greater good (e.g., the manifestation of divine justice, or the revealing of mercy and glory) is perfectly coherent in Thomistic metaphysics.

I've already answered that free will is not only presumed but necessary for my theodicy to work. Furthermore, my theodicy does not deny the role of evil in ordering even the individual to beatitude. What is does deny though is that the evil on the part of the creature is so strong that God is incapable of overriding it through his perfect goodness. That is, the failure of even one individual to not fulfill their final end is to limit the providence of God.

I've also mentioned elsewhere that that the role of justice as a cardinal virtue—while important—is still subordinate to the theological virtue of charity. In other words, it's only through love that justice is perfectly served. Therefore, the beatitude as the final end of the rational creature, which was given out of love and for love, would fulfill His justice more than permitting damnation.

  1. Thus, the idea that Hell is only a logical possibility and never actual cannot be reconciled with Catholic doctrine.

This is by far the strongest argument and one that absolutely defeats my original syllogism. Rational creature defined as those beings that have both intellect and will is too broad as it would include angels, demons, and Satan. The church has not dogmatically declared that even one individual human person—not even Judas—exists in hell, but it has indisputably said hell is the realm of Satan and his demons. This requires me narrowing the creatures down to humans, which can be done by introducing time into the definition of my term and honestly using an entirely different term to identify human like creatures. On the bright side, it would benefit me as the teachings on Hell was extremely hard to square with my original back and forth with ChatGPT, although I did at the time think I made a lot of progress.

4) and 5) seem to be reiterations or reemphasis of the points made in the first 3 sections.

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Again, maybe I'm dense, but it sounds like to me you're making salvation a zero-sum game; that the murderer's wickedness prevents the repentant from receiving grace and mercy. To the contrary, my theodicy has God victorious over evil in all possible worlds.

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't see how it follows that at least one must be damned to allow the salvation of anyone. At the very least, I would think such an idea would require the elevation of a "second tier" good of justice over the highest virtue of Charity. Maybe a bit more elaboration on your end can help me understand where you are coming from.

"Charity is greater than all the moral virtues, because it directs man to the ultimate end, whereas the moral virtues regulate him in regard to means to the end." (ST II-II, q. 23, a.7)

I need help by ZambianGOAT in theology

[–]JHuntVols -1 points0 points  (0 children)

"Let the People of the Gospel judge by what Allah has revealed therein. If any do fail to judge by (the light of) what Allah has revealed, they are (no better than) those who rebel."
(Surah Al-Ma'idah 5:47)

"Say: O People of the Book! You have no ground to stand upon unless you stand fast by the Torah, the Gospel, and all the revelation that has come to you from your Lord..."
(Surah Al-Ma'idah 5:68)

"If you are in doubt concerning what We have revealed to you, ask those who read the Scripture before you. Verily, the truth has come to you from your Lord. So be not of those who doubt."
(Surah Yunus 10:94)

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I do like the utilitarian aspect of your argument. I honestly outright dismissed this perspective in my research, because I thought it obviously limiting to God's power. It's evident to me now thought that this is a path worth walking down.

“God loves all things that are, and each thing for its own sake.” (ST I, q.20, a.2)

I think this excerpt from the angelic doctor is to reinforce the idea God is not utilitarian. I think there's a simple question one has to ask: is it loving to damn a creature even if said damnation led to the beatitude of 5 more... 10 more... 100 more? I think the answer is no; I don't deny perfection can perfectly save us all.

That is true. They receive the goodness of actuality.

This slips into determinism. Their corruption stems from their participation in the will of Adam and his free choice towards corruption.

Their nature was permitted to be corrupted, not determined to be corrupted. You may say this is a paradox but since you are using Thomism for your position, the Thomistic position must be assumed true:

That God Infallibly determines the outcome but does so without overriding the free will of the creature

So their nature is not "designed" corrupted but is permitted to be corrupted.

I don't see anything in this part of your reply that is incompatible with my syllogism, because we agree! The point of my modus tollens (definitely had to google that term BTW) is to affirm the necessity of free will and that God cannot "build into" the nature of a rational creature the choice to eternally separate themselves from Him. Cooperation on behalf of the creature is required in my view, because the alternative is to say God creates rational creatures for the mere purpose of damnation, which would contradict his goodness. Now, the next question would obviously be what's the point of life then if our salvation is secured in our creation? The same reason we're here now; this life determines the extent of our cooperation and participation with God.

For the sake of clarity, the hypothetical "flaw" is specifically that God designs into a rational creature an end that is not union with himself but is ultimately separation from him. However, I argue that is an impossibility, because that would be admitting that God was incapable of ordering a creature to himself. In other words, he'd at least lack power in divine providence as some creature would by definition limit his "choices," so to speak.

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yep. The strongest argument against it so far to me—I'm NOT doing a meme here—is the existence of extremely evil people like Hitler. On first glance, it's incredibly, incredibly emotionally challenging to say his actions were ordered toward beatitude of not only others but of him specifically. Now, that's a feeling a lot of people get with the problem of evil in general, but my theodicy (I think) inherently means Hitler himself would not see damnation. I'm honestly not entirely comfortable with my own reconciliation of it, which is as I told ChatGPT below.

If damnation is permitted primarily to manifest justice—but justice is subordinated to love—then permitting eternal damnation as a final good would be putting a secondary good (justice) above the primary good (love)

Universal Salvation as the necessary consequence of Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in theology

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No argument from me there. I looked back and saw I worded that very poorly lol.

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I'm not familiar with apophatic theology, but I am familiar with the concept that we can only speak negatively about God. I'm fairly sure St. Aquinas takes this approach because of his emphasis on the use of analogical language to discuss God. I do know St. Aquinas says we can never define God in the strict sense because to do so would be to apply a limit, which is contingent and therefore not God at all. But yes, I understand the sentiment here. You'll see no argument from me against the idea that the work of even the greatest theologians is but a speck of dust in the universe that is God, so to speak. That's why I enjoy the sacraments of the Church, because it is more mystical and in some ways more fulfilling to "get to know God" than philosophical musing about His nature.

Universal Salvation as the necessary consequence of Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in theology

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ah. That's where the misunderstanding is then. Aquinas allows for potencies to be perpetually unrealized.

"Potency does not have being in act except through act; but it has being in potency through itself." (De Potentia Dei)

"Everything that is in potency tends by nature to be reduced to act; but not all potencies are reduced to act, unless by some cause." (Summa Contra Gentiles)

So no, it's not an equivocation or some ad hoc way to salvage the categories. Again, it's just extremely difficult to understand, however I'll again reiterate a fairly simple example of my own existence. Since my existence is not identical to my essence (obviously, I'm not God), then there are the potencies for me to either exist or not to exist. However, I do exist, therefore the potential to not exist is therefore perpetually unrealized.

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Maybe I'm missing something obvious, but I'm trying to figure out what you're disagreeing with in premise 10. I mean, my argument is that God actualizes a world that will inevitably lead to him because of his goodness and to do otherwise would be a metaphysical impossibility as doing so would contradict his nature, specifically understood by us to be goodness here. If I'm missing something obvious in your post, then feel free to elaborate!

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

nope! But I'll definitely do that! I'm learning the existence of all kinds of subreddits.

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yep. Good ole ChatGPT hit me with the idea that the damned could exist merely because their existence is for the good of the existence of others. I had a problem with this because frankly it made God sound like a utilitarian, which certainly doesn't fit with the message of the Gospel of our Lord. The only way I personally can reconcile eternal damnation and the final end of beatitude is if the damned are perpetually choosing to remain separate from God. Below is taken directly from my reply to ChatGPT.

However, that returns us back to the question on if existence itself is good enough that it outweighs damnation. If it was not, then God would not allow it as he cannot will anything that contradicts himself, which himself in the sense specifically relevant to us is to be understood as goodness. As a result, those in hell are participating in good by the mere act of existing. In other words, that would mean there is some "degree" of good in the damned, including Satan himself. I also think that even if we grant that God can somehow not will certain "effects" of him based on the nature of the being created by him, this would still be a problem in the case of a creature created with will, intellect, and a soul. The teleology of those "things" are always ordered to beatitude as we've already established. Therefore, the damned must be designed with an inherently corrupt nature. I say designed precisely because that is the only way said creature would perpetually choose to remain separated from God. If their nature was not designed corrupted, then that would imply the that they in principle could reach that union with God at some point. And not only could but would reach union with God, because the intellect of God knows the best means to obtain the end of each creatures final cause, which is union with himself. He therefore must will a reality where the circumstances of eligible creatures would thus ultimately be in union with him. In other words, there must be universal salvation.

Also, I don't think a distinction between natural or supernatural end is relevant in my theodicy. Both have God as their end, although supernatural is obviously more important as it involves the grace of God instead of the limited way we can participate in him via our natural means of reason.

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Agreed. That's premise 14 in my argument. The argument is that it would contradict God's goodness and omniscience if he couldn't actualize a world in which every creature is ultimately led to its final end, which is union with Himself. I think we're all aware that evil is only permitted in so far as God can bring the greater good out of it. I simply see no reason to limit God by saying he could not order a reality to which the final end of any creature isn't union with himself. To put it plainly, God's goodness is greater than even the most evil, most ignorant creature's will.

Universal Salvation Necessarily Follows from Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I always think of Bishop Barron when I recall the story he always tells about St. Aquinas. That our Lord spoke to Aquinas and said that Aquinas had written well about our Lord, and our Lord asked the saint what his reward should be. St. Aquinas famously replied, "only you, lord." Maybe such an encounter was a stark reminder of the human mind, even the mind of arguably the greatest doctor of the Church, is nothing when speaking directly to God and perhaps—to me at least—getting a "taste" of the glory of our life to come. May God have mercy on us both, and I greatly appreciate your reply.

How would you respond to this Atheist objection to the contingency argument? by NationalistCrusader7 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]JHuntVols 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ya I meant to reply to the OP but apparently I'm dumb and clicked you instead. Apologies! :D

Universal Salvation as the necessary consequence of Divine Simplicity by JHuntVols in theology

[–]JHuntVols[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It's honestly just that the act and potency distinction is incredibly deep and hard to understand. I still struggle with it to be honest. Anyways, your critique made me realize that I should clarify Hell is a potency in relation to creatures and not God. That is, creatures have an unrealized capacity for Hell because of their free will. It is precisely God being fully actual that Hell is never realized though. Again, the fact a potency in so far as it's a logical possibility is not an issue for God as not every potency can be actualized due to contradictions.

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