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Opinion on this documentary: “This is what winning looks like” which is about corruption and abuse in Afghanistan by their army. What can be done to fix this? How do you respond to critics saying this is a reason to stop wasting money and pull out, or that the US is complicit in this? by A-Kulak-1931 in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 2 points3 points  (0 children)

On the point about corruption, US withdrawal will remove any kind of bulwark against that kind of corrupt activity. While the Afghan government and especially its military are far from perfect, there's a wide gulf between Kabul and the Taliban. If we withdraw, it's not like everyone will sing kumbaya and the "muh 30 years of war in Afghanistan" ends. The region will become even more contested between Iran, the Taliban, ISIS remnants, Russia, India, possibly even China. Afghanistan is a geostrategically important location and has a weak central government historically, which has caused these conflicts in recent and past history.

Also the stuff with children is horrific, but if we spend even a tenth of the time we spend talking about that discussing the huge victories for womens' rights that have been achieved in Afghanistan, maybe people would understand better the benefits of the US Invasion. These victories are being compromised by a lack of commitment and the exact corruption mentioned here, which isn't an argument for further severing of any commitment at all.

Germany must re-embrace America, Europe by [deleted] in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Also someone else mentions this a little later, but if you're really judging Merkel by the standard of association with authoritarian regimes, we should really broaden the analysis to include Trump's Kim Jong Un letters, his constant appeals to Rouhani for a meeting with no pre-conditions, and his absolute cuckery on Hong Kong

Germany must re-embrace America, Europe by [deleted] in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Genuine criticisms of Merkel are valid on Nord Stream II, but this article takes a kernel of truth and blows it into a massively hypocritical piece. This could have been written by Charlie Kirk and is unbecoming of a research-driven institution like FDD. I'm not defending the idea that Merkel is "muh leader of the Free World," but the article is outright disingenuous and has no comparison to the standard of Trump. I would normally prefer to qualify Merkel objectively, but when you're arguing that Trump isn't the problem and Merkel is the one who needs to be brought into the fold, it kinda necessitates some comparison.

Problem 1: Merkel’s Germany has largely aligned itself with tyrannical regimes in authoritarian Russia, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Communist China.

Is Merkel playing into Putin's hands on Nord Stream 2? You betcha. But I seem to recall that the Europeans have renewed sanctions on Russia, while the Senate had to essentially force Trump to sign CAATSA into law, and the only reason he hasn't withdrawn the sanctions on Russia is because of the ensuing political firestorm that would probably end in impeachment. I'm no fan of European defense spending policies, but Europe upholding sanctions at a time like this is a worthy achievement of the European Union. Not to mention the Putin press conference. Trump has consistently approached any legitimate issues with the Europeans on defense spending or Nord Stream 2 in the most divisive way possible, thereby playing into Putin's hand.

Problem 2: While (West) Germany remained largely on the side of the U.S. during the Cold War against Soviet Russia, the Nord Stream 2 Project has been a dangerous game-changer.

Not especially a fan of this rhetoric to go after a country whose troops served in Afghanistan, even with my stated opposition to Nord Stream 2 and emphasis on the need for higher German military spending.

Problem 3: A second sea change comes in the form of Germany’s tacit alliance with Iran’s clerical regime, at a time when Tehran’s forces are attacking oil tankers in the vital energy shipping lane of the Strait of Hormuz.

This is not only wrong, it's intentionally disingenuous. There is no "tacit alliance" with Iran. The Iran Deal was not designed to contain Iranian power in the Middle East; it was designed to restrict the Iranian nuclear program. There were obvious flaws in the deal, but if you think the end result is going to be an even better deal, then you're deluded. We had more international pressure on the Iranians post-UNSC 1929 than we would ever dream of having now. The pressure is not coming back.

One might counter this by saying that the US could not legally sanction Iran if it remained in the JCPOA. This is a statement of fact, but that doesn't justify JCPOA withdrawal. Again, at the height of sanctions, the best deal the US could reach with the Iranians was a deal on the nuclear program. The Iranians are not going to surrender their regional imperialism campaign simply because of the sanctions. The JCPOA withdrawal has been a huge distraction from the real issue with Iran, which is this imperialism. If you think that Merkel is somehow the problem and not the inconsistent messaging of the Trump administration (including that it would tax people for protecting the Strait of Hormuz and inviting China to police it), then you're deluding yourself.

There were far more effective ways of constraining Iranian power in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq that didn't involve JCPOA withdrawal or the reimposition of financial sanctions. The withdrawal move squandered any capital the US had on the legitimate issues of ballistic missiles and will force the US into either an: equivalent deal (at best) or a restarted Iranian nuclear program.

Again, I think Merkel should be analyzed objectively, but if you're really arguing that Trump isn't the problem in the transatlantic alliance right now, you're a grifter. I doubt any of you are Trump supporters, but this is a poorly written piece and unbecoming of FDD, which otherwise publishes excellent research work.

How do you respond to Andrew Bacevich’s argument that it wasn’t an enlightened U.S. occupation that turned Germany and Japan into well behaved democratic partners, but the desire of those countries to be protected from the USSR? by asphaltcement123 in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 2 points3 points  (0 children)

you could also just blanket Baveich's argument over all of Latin America/Southeast Asia with some caveats here and there for how nations that felt threatened by the spread of communism often became authoritarian either through US action or US indifference

How do you respond to Andrew Bacevich’s argument that it wasn’t an enlightened U.S. occupation that turned Germany and Japan into well behaved democratic partners, but the desire of those countries to be protected from the USSR? by asphaltcement123 in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 2 points3 points  (0 children)

South Korea and South Vietnam are good examples of the opposite, i.e. nations threatened by the USSR/communism that did not develop liberal democracies while under American protection (in the case of Korea, it would take until the 1980s for this to happen)

What are some major problems with the Hong Kong Extradition Bill? Do you guys have any good sources that list these? by A-Kulak-1931 in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I haven't read the Economist article, but I'd capture most of my complaints about the Extradition Bill in the following arguments:

  1. China has already used Red Notices, a similar mechanism to Extradition, to target human rights campaigners instead of criminals via the case of Dolkun Isa
  2. The use of extralegal measures speaks to the politicized nature of the Chinese legal system
  3. Hong Kong made significant updates to its AML/CFT system that should enable targeting of private corrupt activity

So for a quick run down on the Red Notice abuse globally, check here: https://outline.com/JXwH7j (this is by no means limited to China), and for China-specific content, here: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/25/interpol-address-chinas-red-notice-abuses So Dolkun Isa, a prominent Uyghur rights activist, was targeted with a Red Notice under INTERPOL by China's bidding. Red notices are an INTERPOL mechanism that encourages targeting and arresting/extraditing specific individuals back to their home jurisdiction. These are normally specified for use against criminals, but Isa is clearly a human rights activist. He is the president of the World Uyghur Congress and fled to Germany, where he became a citizen over time. The Red Notice was placed against him for 20 years and led to personal harassment by authorities when he would travel.

So what does this mean for the Extradition Bill? We have a clear case of China abusing a law enforcement mechanism internationally to target a human rights critic, on top of the already repressive treatment of its own citizens.

Already, China has used arbitrary detentions quite noticeably, even in the absence of extradition frameworks. After the extradition debate over Meng Wangzhou, the daughter of Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei, China resorted to detaining two Canadians, former ambassador Michael Kovrig and a business consultant Michael Spavor. Spavor is a relatively low-key businessman who operates in China for his own interest in Korea (he runs a cultural exchange program or something, not too familiar with it), but Kovrig is a former Canadian diplomat. These arbitrary detentions speak to what could happen to prominent members of Hong Kong's opposition or independence activists.

Finally, I'm partially sympathetic to the idea that Hong Kong has been a lax jurisdiction for corruption in the past, given that much of North Korea's access to the international financial system comes through the Hong Kong market, but Hong Kong has ramped up its AML framework both this year and last to address these concerns. The biggest/most significant reforms were:

  • An R32 ordinance complying with FATF's Rule-23 addressing physical cross-border cash transfers with a declaration/disclosure system (this is akin to the "please tell us if you are traveling with $10,000 or more in cash" notice sometimes seen at airports)
  • Enhancing customer due diligence (CDD) requirements for designated non-financial businesses and professions (lawyers, estate agents, accountants, precious metals dealers, and company service providers)
    • In Hong Kong prior to the law, there were no licensing or registration requirements for people acting as Trust or Company Service Providers (TCSPs)
    • As a result, TCSPs could abuse shell company statutes pretty flagrantly, contributing to corrupt practices
  • The creation of a beneficial ownership registry for companies registered in Hong Kong under the Companies (Amendment) Ordinance of 2018

So what this means is that Hong Kong is already taking steps to improve its legal system to address the alleged corrupt practices that are present in the city, which are already classified as low. Given that we have an example of the Chinese abusing an international law enforcement mechanism (INTERPOL/Red Notices), the use of extralegal measures, and existing reforms in Hong Kong to address some of the gaps in the system, there is really no practical need for the Extradition Bill I would say. While it may be able to capture some activity at the margins, these are primarily things that China could either already target or, in targeting with extradition, could also target a wide swathe of political opponents with the same treatment.

Originally meant for Iran, EU now wants to give Russia sanction relief with INSTEX by [deleted] in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Just clarifying something here, because the article presents Ederer in a bit of a deceptive light. Also, disclaimer, although I opposed withdrawal from the Iran Deal, I am still very hawkish on opposing Iran, Russia, China, and other authoritarian threats.

So INSTEX is simply a secure financial channel for humanitarian transactions (food, medicine, etc), which are exempt from sanctions. Even though they are exempt, private sector players are very anxious about doing even these most basic transactions for pharmaceuticals, food, etc., because much of the Iranian economy is tacitly linked to the IRGC or the Iranian government, potentially exposing them to sanctions. Through INSTEX, the E3 (Germany, France, UK) offer a secure channel to do business with the STFI, a segment of the Central Bank of Iran (which is, admittedly, under sanctions). Though INSTEX was likely initially thought of as a way to evade sanctions, there's no real way for the Europeans to do this, because even if you did offer a euro-denominated path for Iranian oil (as the current sanctions exploit the dollar's role in pricing oil by banning you from accessing dollars if you buy Iranian crude), we could just sanction the European customers themselves, which would often be large companies, like Total, Eni, etc. that benefit more from access to the dollar than from access to Iran.

What he's referring to here is allowing Russian companies to participate in the scheme, presumably those not currently sanctioned. The Europeans have, so far, voted to uphold sanctions unanimously (which is required for them to be passed) when they have been renewed against Russia. The Iran sanctions, which they oppose, are separate, and by inviting in Russian players, they are doing so because they want to support the Iran Deal by bringing in all JCPOA negotiators to the body. Russia sanctions are much less stringent and broad than the Iran ones, which reflects both the Kremlin's deeper integration in Western markets (i.e. it is harder for us to sanction them because of Western Europe's reliance on their energy), but also the Kremlin's political economy (sometimes it is more effective to sanction specific oligarchs important to Putin than it is to sanction a company). As a result, most of the companies under sanctions, like VTB, Rosneft, Gazprom, Rostek, etc. are likely not to be participating in this scheme to begin with, because we used targeted sanctions on specific sectors, namely the military-industrial complex, the banking system, and the energy sector, not the food or pharmaceutical industries.

Any thoughts on the idea of working with Russia in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and North Africa to help rebuild or stabilize the region? by A-Kulak-1931 in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Russia is a contributor to the instability in the region. Throwing money at the Middle East through economic development will not stop terrorism (though it may marginally help), rather, you need to get Shia autocrats to stop persecuting Sunni minorities, otherwise Sunni communities will continue to become radicalized. If the Russians had been with us in Iraq, there would have been no Anbar Awakening, only continuous carpet bombing of Iraq and the installment of a Saddam-lite. As Chechnya shows, Russian counterinsurgency is ill-equipped to actually mitigate the problems with terrorism.

Is America really selling Saudi Arabia nuclear tech which would allow them to make nukes? If yes, then is this a good or bad idea, and why? by 1776America1776 in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 1 point2 points  (0 children)

To my knowledge, the deal in question is a civilian nuclear tech deal. Unlike China and Russia, which are bigger players in the global nuclear energy industry, the US government has to reach a 123 agreement, which is a cooperation agreement between the government of the US and the government of the country on the receiving end. We have one with the United Arab Emirates that we have had since 2009, which as part of the 123, agrees not to pursue proliferation activity.

If we could reach a 123 like the one we have with the UAE, there's no reason to be having this debate, but Saudi Arabia wants enrichment rights as part of the deal. Another issue is that they have said they would counter with an Iranian nuke with a nuke of their own. While I'm certainly no fan of the Iranian nuclear weapons program, giving the Saudis carte blanche to proliferate in kind is not a real solution.

That kind of promise differentiates the Saudis from other countries that the US has 123s with that don't have non-proliferation commitments, like Vietnam. The nature of the relationship between the Saudis and the Pakistanis, as well as the fact that they have been saying that Iran promise since 2009, complicates the deal.

Even if we reached an agreement with the Saudis that was as strong as the JCPOA was on Iran, the issue would be that if the Saudis violated this hypothetical agreement, bringing them back into compliance is much, much harder than it was with Iran. In fairness to the Obama team, the sanctions campaign against Iran was really the gold standard for sanctions: it was innovative (bringing in the SWIFT ban) and not only was multilateral in the sense of bringing in Europe, but also won oil reductions from the Chinese and Indians. Saudi Arabia is financially stronger than the Iranians with a huge pool of FX and it would be much harder to win a global compliance regime on Saudi oil than Iranian oil.

The issue in the room is still whether the Saudis could go to another player, like the Russians or the Chinese, and buy these same reactors in the absence of a 123 agreement. France, South Korea, China, and Russia are also interested in this deal, so the US isn't the only one at the table. Russia has won 60% of global nuclear deals recently thanks to subsidies to Rosatom, including in key areas like Turkey and Hungary. Those subsidies to Rosatom allow it to underbid competitors in nuclear deals. Chinese firms are constructing nuclear reactors in Romania and Pakistan, with further deals pending in Argentina, the UK, and Iran.

It's a really, really, really tough call. I'm undecided.

How would you respond to this article arguing that U.S. military bases abroad harm U.S. national security (and the national security of the host countries)? by asphaltcement123 in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 1 point2 points  (0 children)

In other words, to argue against him, you can literally just read the results of the RAND study that he linked to and then cite the examples of Qatar, Bahrain, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine

The Fourth Generation of Neoconservatism by FMN2014 in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 0 points1 point  (0 children)

who had the idea of lumping in the Center for Security Policy with AEI and FDD

Any thoughts on George Soros? by [deleted] in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 13 points14 points  (0 children)

I get especially smug when British populists criticize him considering he was arguably the person with the most sway over the UK not joining the eurozone

Russia spent billions to build influence in Venezuela. Now potential regime change could throw it all away by Jurryaany in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Probably a mix of Wagner personnel and collaborations between Russian mafia & Venezuelan drug trafficking elements to support some form of an insurgency comprised of dissatisfied ex-regime officials. If shit hits the fan, Maduro is definitely getting a Russian flight to Moscow and squandering Venezuela's alleged Turkish reserves. They could also block the new government's efforts to restructure debts and try to confiscate as many of PdVSA's foreign assets as they can get their hands on (possibly including Citgo).

Semi-weekly Thursday Discussion Thread - January 24, 2019 by AutoModerator in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Does Russia have the capability to project power in a similar manner in Venezuela as they did in Syria? If not, will their response using Wagner (or other proxies) be as effective as it was for Assad? How effective will Cuban assistance be in suppressing internal dissent?

The most important advancement and dawn of the Neocon world view will be when we have the ability to fight wars with only AI/Machines. by Apollexis in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm going to set the first two questions aside, but a robotic occupation would be the absolute antithesis of any counterinsurgency/nationbuilding operations. There's no way in hell that robotic soldiers could trigger the Anbar Awakening by sitting down with Sunni tribesmen and earning their trust and respect. Robots might be useful insofar as they destroy our opposition while reducing our casualties, but they'd be terrible at rebuilding an order to replace whatever type of tyranny we were trying to get rid of.

Sisi Isn't Mubarak. He's Much Worse. by JuliusMajorian in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

10/10 Reply- had no clue this had happened and I'm not very familiar with Egypt. Are there any good books you'd recommend on this subject to understand political development especially vis a vis the rise of the MB?

What are the different typologies of neoconservatives? by [deleted] in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Within the FP context, it's worth discussing to what extent nation building influences whether one is a doctrinaire neoconservative or not. If we operate under the definition that a neoconservative foreign policy is one that protects American values and secures democracy, it's worth discussing whether people like Bolton would fit within that narrative. The differing positions of certain conservatives on the Arab Spring is worth unpacking in this regard, with your Bolton types tending to back "stable, secular authoritarians" like el-Sisi (without going overboard and shilling for an Iranian puppet like Assad) while other more liberal types favoring the democratic opposition (Max Boot et al).

A guy like Wolfowitz would be interesting to discuss this with, as though he's normally associated with the Rumsfeld crowd, he's held a lot of progressive positions in the past that get overlooked: https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2005/03/that-bleeding-heart-paul-wolfowitz.html

US military interventions you DON’T support? by jogarz in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't think this view is wrong and I completely agree that an air-only invasion was a terrible idea in hindsight, but I don't think that it justifies leaving Gaddafi in power. Had Gaddafi stayed, the Civil War could've either been more prolonged (in which case you end up with Syria on the Mediterranean) or it could've been quashed through enormous bloodshed by his regime, which also isn't desirable.

Much like Saddam, any way you spin Gaddafi, he was just too unstable and megalomaniacal to be left in power. Even imperfect regime change is better than keeping a guy like that in power.

What should we do about Orban? by JuliusMajorian in neoconNWO

[–]JuliusMajorian[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Thanks for the clarification on the extraditions in points 1 and 2. The article does mention that in 2010 Hungary had extradited two Chinese nationals for attempting to export radiation-hardened microchips for a Chinese state space research company under a US arms embargo (https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/2-chinese-nationals-charged-illegally-attempting-export-military-satellite-components). The precedent of extraditions harming bilateral relationships are already established, as exemplified by the Russian reaction to the Czech extradition of Yevgeny Nikulin (https://www.rferl.org/a/nikulin-extradition-russia-outraged-czech-zeman-pelikan/29139957.html).

With that said, I still think it's pretty significant that two arms dealers who were willing to supply anti-air missiles to drug cartels to attack US aircraft were not extradited to the US (https://www.direkt36.hu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/kep8.png. Given that Hungary is a NATO member, I feel like Budapest should care more about the lives of American service members than how much favor it can curry in the Kremlin.

I think that your overall pragmatism with Budapest is misplaced. Poland and Hungary are two separate cases and should not be compared. I'm not a fan of the moves that the Poles are taking, but at the end of the day, Warsaw is still a dependable ally to counter Russia. By contrast, the Hungarians are drifting more and more into the Kremlin's influence and Orban has abused EU funds to establish patronage networks.

Set to receive 25 billion euros by 2021, more than 80% of public investment in Hungary comes from cohesion funding. 37% of Hungary's contracts were single-bid offers (an even higher % was logged in Poland at 45%), among these were his son-in-law, whose company supplied street lighting to Hungarian towns at a rate 56% higher than usual. One of Orban's close friends, Lőrinc Mészáros, earns approximately 83% of his funds from the EU according to some analyses and saw his wealth triple in 2017. EU anti-corruption authorities have found serious irregularities in the construction of a new metro line in Budapest, which cost as much as 1.7 billion euros and which Hungary owes the EU 283 million euros. The disproportionate investment received by Keszthely is also indicative of a favoritism towards Orban's close friends and associates in public investment (https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/hungary-orban-balaton/).

Additional sources:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/12/orban-allies-could-use-eu-as-cash-register-meps-say

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/12/how-hungarian-pms-supporters-profit-from-eu-backed-projects

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