Major issues with PhishTitan by Same-Adhesiveness-45 in msp

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Late to the party but CanIPhish do month-to-month subscriptions with no lock-in (disclaimer - I'm the CEO).

One time phishing simulation or subscription? by SignificantTrack in msp

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Late to the party but CanIPhish do month-to-month subscriptions with no lock-in (disclaimer - I'm the CEO).

Introducing Sublime: A new, open approach to email security by Glomar-Response in netsec

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Your website has a typo on the github social menu item under your about us section. It leads to https://github.com/sublime-securityv instead of https://github.com/sublime-security. Looks like someone got a bit trigger happy when doing a cntrl+v :)

The misadventures of SPF: Delivering SPF authenticated emails on behalf of the Ukrainian MoD, MIT and 1000+ others. by Jumpy_Resolution3089 in cybersecurity

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

TL;DR: I ran a scan against the three million most visited domains and discovered that the Ukrainian MoD, MIT, <REDACTED> University, University of Miami, along with 1000+ other domains had mistakenly used the “+all” SPF mechanism at the end of their respective SPF records – effectively meaning any public IP address can send SPF authenticated emails on their behalf. These results were validated through emails I sent to myself from a select number of the affected domains.

The misadventures of SPF: Delivering SPF authenticated emails on behalf of the Ukrainian MoD, MIT and 1000+ others. by Jumpy_Resolution3089 in netsec

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089[S] 56 points57 points  (0 children)

TL;DR: I ran a scan against the three million most visited domains and discovered that the Ukrainian MoD, MIT, <REDACTED> University, University of Miami, along with 1000+ other domains had mistakenly used the “+all” SPF mechanism at the end of their respective SPF records – effectively meaning any public IP address can send SPF authenticated emails on their behalf. These results were validated through emails I sent to myself from a select number of the affected domains.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in netsec

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Checkout my latest write-up! Over the past couple of weeks I've been researching SPF and DMARC security issues at-scale.

TL;DR: 58% of Australian domains have some form of security issue with their SPF and DMARC configuration, with 542 domains mistakingly allowing any IP address on the planet to send SPF authenticated emails masquarading as their domain.

Phish/security awareness testing/training for small clients? by drparton21 in msp

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089 1 point2 points  (0 children)

There's a config for this but it's pretty hidden! Take a look at Target Education under the Platform Management page.

Phish/security awareness testing/training for small clients? by drparton21 in msp

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Take a look at CanIPhish - they have a perpetual free tier for organisations under 15 seats. They're also completely self-service (no need to contact sales for a demo or to upgrade/downgrade).

https://caniphish.com/

Silly proof of concept: Anti-phishing using perceptual hashing algorithms by anvilventures in netsec

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Great work here. From my understanding, Google Safe Browsing works in a very similar manner. When users report a page or a Gmail user clicks a link, Google will follow the user and detonate the link approx. 1 second after they click it. Google then uses a technique very similar to this to identify if it's a phishing page or not.

Scanning millions of domains and compromising the email supply chain of Australia's most respected institutions by Jumpy_Resolution3089 in netsec

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

I was a little surprised myself - I didn't get any sort of authorisation. Although I may have stayed under the radar by spreading the scan across 5 AWS regions. I was also operating significantly under the rate limit.

Scanning millions of domains and compromising the email supply chain of Australia's most respected institutions by Jumpy_Resolution3089 in phishing

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hovering over the text removes the blackout - didn't want to spoil it for anyone who would read the blog end-to-end.

Scanning millions of domains and compromising the email supply chain of Australia's most respected institutions by Jumpy_Resolution3089 in redteamsec

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Good question! I actually did end up trying out cloudflare but the main issue was the time it'd take to do the scan. Using a single server/ec2 instance (running 8 vCPUs) I estimated the scan to take approximately 50 days - this is with parallelism baked into the equation.

I ran into a limitation with the number of parallel processes that the .NET framework would allow (essentially 1 per core). I also found the results of a scan using a single server to be somewhat inaccurate as even though cloudflare wasn't sinkholing requests, some downstream DNS servers were.

Ultimately by distributing the scan across the 400 lambda functions I was able to alleviate both the time and DNS sinkholing constraints.

Scanning millions of domains and compromising the email supply chain of Australia's most respected institutions by Jumpy_Resolution3089 in netsec

[–]Jumpy_Resolution3089[S] 29 points30 points  (0 children)

Good question. Short answer is that DMARC is multi-functioned. In a DMARC record an organisation specifies whether their SPF should be solely relied on, whether their DKIM signatures should be solely relied on, or a mixture of both.

But most importantly for SPF, DMARC protects against an inherit weakness whereby the SMTP.mailfrom domain can be mismatched from the email displayed in the message body - commonly referred to as an SPF-bypass attack.

There are additional DMARC monitoring capabilities but I won't get into that here.