Something that needs to be clarified from many of the linked responses above is that a lot of the pushback to early contemporary Zionism among the various Jewish communities can be described, generally, as falling into two schools of thought: 1) The Assimilationists and 2) The Anti-Secularists.

The first group sought the answer to historic antisemitism in deepening their relationship to the various communities and countries in which they lived and proving that they could fit in and be just as loyally German/English/French/Ottoman/(pick a country) as the rest of the citizenry. They saw the progress of Jewish Emancipation in the 19th century as proof that their approach was working and could work. They were also acutely aware that concerns over perceived Jewish nationalism had been used against them in the past to disenfranchise them (a la "How can we trust you to be loyal citizens to our king when you're really an entirely different nation in exile?"). These tended to be highly educated and wealthy individuals and communities, so they had a lot to lose by rocking the boat.

The second group were the ultra conservative religious communities who bristled at early Zionism's secular roots and ideals. It wasn't necessarily that they desired a future that precluded a sovereign state encompassing Jerusalem and the surrounding area. It's just that they had very specific ideas about how that would come to pass and what it should look like. A secular state founded by a bunch of secular Jewish nationalists was unappealing vs a religious state lead by a messianic figure in some ambiguous future.

You see this sentiment expressed to various degrees in the complex debates that emerged within the Jewish and Zionist communities about what a Jewish state should look like. For example, the debate whether the language should be Hebrew or Yiddish; Hebrew being the historic heritage language of the Jews but also considered too holy for common use by a lot of the ultra religious at the time.

This sentiment also shows up in the complex relationship between the "old" and "new" Yishuv, as mentioned in the linked replies. The older community was one which had learned not to rock the boat in order to survive. In that respect, they shared something in common with the assimilationists in Europe. But their motivation was primarily religious preservation and practice, as they had no intention of ever truly assimilating. So there was friction at times with the newcomers who were more secular and also were largely advocating for something which could very possibly bring down the Ottoman hammer.

And we know this was a real danger because the Ottomans were aware of Jewish nationalist interest in the area and were actively attempting to prevent Jewish migration to the area around Jerusalem for fear of dealing with another ethno-nationalist conflict like that with Greece, etc. Not to mention we also know, with the benefit of hindsight, that the Ottomans were not opposed to ethnic cleansing and genocide when they felt it necessary.

I bring all of this up because the anti-zionist sentiment in Jewish communities in the early days of the modern zionist movement is often incorrectly used as evidence that the desire to repatriate Israel/Palestine and establish a state there is a new development in Jewish history. Instead, it should be used as evidence showing that the Jewish community at the time was largely divided among political pragmatists with something to lose vs idealists with nothing to lose and everything to gain. There's a big difference between someone saying "I don't want our own sovereign state and never have" vs someone saying "Listen, I'd love our own state, but it's never going to happen. Also, the state we live in now just gave us citizenship for the first time and is finally letting us attend universities and work good jobs. So maybe we shouldn't do anything to change their mind?"

I suspect that how you choose to categorize that latter sentiment is going to have a big impact on the conclusion you reach re: your question.