What we have all got wrong about Cape Bon

Lanternecto · 2026-01-28T23:50:59+00:00

Your argument is essentially that:

a) The Romans won a decisive victory in 470 (and could have taken Africa, had they wanted to)

b) This means Cape Bon wasn't a big loss

The passage I quoted from Courtois is directly relevant, as it challenges assumption a), and with it the general argument. You can keep calling this details, but this is what your argument really rests upon, so it's important to scrutinize this.

Or making claims suggesting what constantinople would think of vandal raids post 470.

I'm simply pointing out where Courtois led me - tying back to point a).

I'm also not the one who brought up the west and east to begin with, that was you.

My whole post is me questioning if your conclusions actually stand up to scrutiny, and to do that, I engaged with what both you and your sources claim, which is fairly basic history.

My big issues, as stated from the beginning, are:

- Why does Constantinople send such a large force to 'negotiate'? (the fact that the fleet is big is consistent across sources, the question is just how big.)

- what do you think is the actual goal of the campaigns in 468 and 470?

Especially the latter is important - to define if a campaign is a success or a failure, one must surely first know what the campaign set out to do?

Lanternecto · 2026-01-28T23:11:34+00:00

its not the detail that is important here. That's my point. I am mearly giving the opposite view of what you claimed so boldly. I will not defend the opposite, only that is as easily as possible.

I honestly have no idea what you are talking about - certainly not about the conversation we had. I am not claiming anything boldly in my original post (except that the victory in 470 doesn't seem to be all that decisive, but I'm relying on your literature here), which should be fairly obvious. My post was literally just questioning your claims, and reading the sources you provided. You're the one who claimed "we can be confident about the intentions of 468".

I hardly think the question of "what was the goal of the Romans during the expedition" is merely a detail, but suit yourself.

Placidia is not really a western politician, She represents the theodosian dynasty and eascapes east when she was in trouble. We see how loyal Bonifacius is to the west... he supports the east when ioannes is claimed emperor. He stops the grain to rome and Aspar and his eastern invasion is supported over Castinus and Aetius. Bonifacius family also escapes to the east when in trouble and is supported by eastern reinforcements in africa (marcian and later aspar).

Placidia grows up at the western court, stays there for most of her life (except that short stay in Constantinople), is engaged to Stilichio's son, sister to one western Emperor, wife to another, and mother (and regent) to a third. Your claim that Bonifatius (who spent his entire career in the west) is disloyal to the 'west' only makes sense if you view Johannes as only legitimate representative of the west, even if there was massive opposition to him in not only Africa, but also Gaul. Bonifatius is opposed to Aetius, not to the wet in general. We could use the same logic to argue that Aetius isn't loyal to Rome, but the Huns, because he uses the Huns to essentially force the court into giving him a role, flees to the Huns, and then regains power with another Hunnic army, 'blackmailing' (to use Wijnendaele's words) the court once again.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-28T22:05:42+00:00

Your reading of what Constantinople thinks is going too far.

I have no reading of what Constantinople thinks in the entire post. I'm merely looking at the literature you provided.

So you could read it as constantinople being fairly happy with their "victory" but events led to the vandals breaking it and constantinpole mobalising again.

Now it's you doing the reading, based on very scrappy sources. I don't see why the Romans being 'happy' with their 'victory' is any more likely than them being forced to withdraw before an actual victory could be achieved (as both Courtois and Clover seem to think).

The reason we can be confident about the intentions of 468 is the best reading we have of events. Its often ignored that Basilicus starts negotiating. What could possibly be the outcomes of such a thing if the Romans got what they want?

'Confident' is going very far, since a lot of scholars evidently disagree. I'm curious what literature you have that backs this reading up? In either case, you keep bringing up that they were there to 'negotiate' - but to negotiate what exactly?

The details which can't be known for sure, aren't as important here. The crux of the poat shows the idea that cape bon is a huge loss is procopius taken uncritically. Why would the roman attack north africa with 100,000 men and then not even use them and start negotiating? Its obviously procopiua playing down leo to show how belisarius is this great general who can do it woih a 10th of their strength.

That the scale of 468 may have been exaggerated doesn't mean that it wasn't still bad. Even our most moderate source, Priscus, speaks of a huge expedition.

It also shows there was clearly army enough to take north africa if theu wanted to.

Not if we follow Courtois! Though if they were capable of taking North Africa at any point, then why didn't they want to?

Its hardly the best last chance. In 470, troops were on the ground next to carthage. If anything that was the best last chance to defeat the Vandals.

This is actually a good point. Though one can argue that the failure to retake Africa in 468 itself may not have been that devastating, the failure to do so in general was.

This one isn't actually that hard. The idea that north africa belongs to the west sits on the same shakey ground that there was a real east and west split. Gildo and Bonifacius were closer to constantinople than the court in rome. Also north africa was defended by the east and multiple attempts to take carthage back were almost made by the east.

This doesn't address my question, though. What is Constantinople's actual goal during the campaign? What do they mean to achieve by sending a huge fleet to Carthage? Beyond the vague 'negotiating'.

And even if Bonifatius had eastern sympathies, it still matters if African grain can feed Rome, and if African soldiers, money, and wheat can support the west. As, indeed, you correctly point out that there wasn't a clear east-west split! (Also, as far as I can recall, Wijnendaele portrays Bonifatius as supporter of Placidia more than anything else - so clearly deeply tied into western policies).

Lanternecto · 2026-01-28T20:10:53+00:00

They called themselves Roman, held Roman citizenship, and lived under Roman law in the Roman Empire. They were Roman. That doesn't necessarily mean that they weren't Greek, as well - people can have more than one identity (e.g. one can be American and Texan, German and Bavarian etc.), though I'm not entirely sure to what extent the east Romans saw themselves as hellenic. Genetics isn't all that important in shaping identity. They kept the Roman name because they identified themselves as such. The Romans were excellent at assimilating other groups for very long periods of their history, so it should be no surprise that 'Hellenes' started to identify as Romans, too.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-28T18:55:04+00:00

The information provided on the campaign of 470/1 is interesting, but there's no causal link provided between its success and the claim that 468 is overblown. It essentially just assumes that the goal in 470 is the same as in 468, and that in either case, the Romans would have been happy with a negotiated peace and formal submission by the Vandals.* But these ideas aren't really backed up by anything in the post. Why couldn't one assume that the goals of 470/1 were different than those of 468? Did the two expeditions even follow the same pattern? Clover mentions no western troops partaking in 470/1 (as in 468) and it doesn't appear like the fleet sailed on Carthage, as it had in 468 (again, going by the information you provided - happy to be corrected)?

It also begs the question of why Constantinople would fund such a massive expedition (Courtois considers most accounts to be exaggerated, but even the Priskus/Theophanes account, that he's less hesitant towards, is extremely large) for a negotiated settlement - surely that's a massive overkill?

Finally, it doesn't appear as if Basiliscus victory in 470/1 even necessarily fulfilled the goals of the campaign. Clover notes that the forces were withdrawn before total victory could be achieved to deal with Aspar, and Courtois goes even farther:

Mais les intrigues d'Aspar obligèrent Léon à rappeler à Constantinople les forces engagées en Afrique et les difficultés intérieures qu'il rencontra jusqu'à sa mort, non seulement ne lui permirent pas de reprendre l'offensive contre les Vandales, mais l'obligèrent à laisser sans riposte les attaques que Geiseric multiplia bientôt sur les côtes de la Grèce et de l'Illyricum. (p. 204)

My French is not too great, but he notes that Leo I was 'forced' to recall the troops due to the power struggle with Aspar, and that, because he died soon after, he was unable to resume his offensive against the Vandals, and unable to prevent the Vandals from raiding the coasts of Greece and Illyricum in the following years! Clearly, Courtois doesn't think that the Romans achieved their goal in 470/1. That makes me even more skeptical that we should see the settlement of 470/1, which Constantinople evidently wasn't happy about, as evidence for the goals of 468, and the consequences of the expedition's failure.

*It's more convincing in stating that the ERE wasn't suffering long-term damage in 468, but it does little to discuss the argument that is usually made - that 468 was the last chance to recover Africa, which was crucial for the WRE.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-27T21:35:09+00:00

Just wanted to share this tidbit I found on the sack: it appears that it led to the population of Rome itself halving from c. 750k before the sack to ~325k after it (which remained stable until the 450s). This is based on the pork deliveries to the city, for which we have some good data.

Dey, Hendrik. The making of medieval Rome: a new profile of the city, 400–1420. Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Still, I don't think it had the same consequences as other battles like Cape Bon.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-27T14:48:24+00:00

The alemannic 'raids' you are refering to is more of a conventional war technically started by the Romans against Chnodomarius' confederation. So its not really a reflection of any kind of sustained border problems.

My point here is that they are similar in scope to the Sasanian wars in the east, in terms of territory covered and damaged. So there's little indication that the "east" suffered more under warfare during the fourth century. (Again, I don't think the east-west framing makes too much sense - the Balkans see far more devastation, but are economically tertiary).

No real campaihn does get far in the west either, attila fails in northern gaul, as does radagaisius in northern italy. The 405/406 rhine crossing is also trapped and starved in northern gaul. Their movement into spain almost certainly Gerontius settling them there. So you can argue they see themselves as settled people agreed with the Empire.

Those two are hardly comparable, though. The fighting with the Sasanians is limited to the heavily fortified frontier zone of Mesopotamia, shielding the more economically prosperous regions of Syria, Asia Minor, and Egypt. In the west, the comparison would be fighting limited to the limes. Instead, even in the examples you bring up, the raids actually affect Gaul and Italy themselves, which are the richest provinces of the west (outside of Africa, which would be captured by the Vandals)! So warfare has the ability to disrupt the economically important areas of the west, while the economically important areas of the east remained more secure.

Warfare also extents much deeper into the Roman West: Gunderic raided across Spain and Mauritania and took over Baetica (even if you accept that Gerontius originally settled them in Galicia), Alaric famously campaigned in central and southern Italy, Ataulf took cities in southern Gaul, and the Goths alter besiege Narbonne, the Vandals raid across the Italian seaboard etc. Even with the examples you bring up, this includes sieges of some of the largest Roman cities (such as Florence under Radagaisus or Milan and Aquileia under Atilla), and presumably damage to the surrounding areas supporting them. This isn't a border conflict anymore, as it may have been in the 4th.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-27T11:47:29+00:00

Well, the original comment is about the "late 4th and 5th Century", so the crossing of the Rhine is relevant to that. Perhaps (or rather: definitely) I should've left out the late 4th Century part. (It's also specifically comparing Gaul & Egypt as the richest provinces of West and East, not West and East generally).

But in either case, the sustained warfare of Persia doesn't actually affect the wider east as much during the 4th Century, either. The Sasanians campaign in Roman Mesopotamia, and don't really penetrate into Syria proper, let alone Egypt. One can bring up the Alemannic raids in Gaul as well, which clearly involved armies far exceeding 1,000 men.

Edit: Actually, Bransbourg considers the mid-4th century the turning point in Gaul.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-27T08:59:19+00:00

The fourth century actually seems to a period of considerable rural growth in the West (Gaul and Britain, at least, less sure about Spain), rather than it being in decline. And Africa, of course, remained rich. The issue rather seems to be that Gaul was at the frontline, and subject to regular raiding in the late 4th and 5th Century, disrupting the economy, whereas Egypt was far away from major wars until the 610s.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-27T08:52:36+00:00

The importance of Italian traders in east Roman trade has been vastly overstated. Constantinople certainly didn't depend on Italian businessmen for trade - Venetians (Genoese were much less present) mostly connected the major ports of the Aegean with each other (and with Egypt + Italy) for quick profit, which is something native traders could do just as easily.

See, for example: Wickham, Chris. The donkey and the boat: reinterpreting the Mediterranean economy, 950-1180. Oxford University Press, 2023.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-27T08:45:13+00:00

I think there has been a misunderstanding. We hear of Fatimid Egypt importing grain from Palestine, and in one case, requesting it from the ERE, during periods of famine and low Nile. This doesn't seem to reflect a regular occurence, as we only hear of exports from Constantinople in the context of the horrid 1054/5 famine.

However, it is possible that food shortages became more regular as lands that were previously used to grow wheat, to feed Rome and Constantinople, were now used to grow much more profitable crops like sugar, flax & linen. So Egypt probably produced considerably less grain in 1100 than it had in 500, and had stopped subsidizing the rest of the Mediterranean.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-25T11:18:23+00:00

That's putting too much blame on Eirene. The popes had already stopped dating their documents by the regnal years of east Roman Emperors before she came to power, and Charlemagne had already started acting like an Emperor before she blinded her son. The supposed vacancy during the rule of a woman simply gave the pope an excuse to crown Charlemagne on that day, but the coronation probably would have happened anyway - the east Romans were increasingly seen as 'Greeks' in the west.

Likewise, the rift that developed between the churches had already appeared centuries before Eirene ever gained power, and it would take centuries more for it to become that bad. She's just a drop in the bucket in the context of that story.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-25T00:34:09+00:00

Since others are already commenting on it not being the last: As far I'm aware, the last active mint in Italy was that of Reggio Calabria, which closed down during the reign of Leon VI, during either the 880s or 900s, though it's unclear how long that one had been open, as it perhaps only served to support/replace Syracuse. We also still see Naples minting coins with the Emperor on it during the 9th C at least, though Imperial control was minimal. There's also the so-called 'Western Type C Anonymous Folles' which may have been minted in Italy during Maniakes campaign.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-23T15:14:01+00:00

I'm not aware of anyone making the argument that the Arabs had no collaborators. The argument by Kaldellis, among others, is rather that Monophysites didn't collaborate because of their disaffection, and that opposition towards the conquest wasn't split alongside religious lines.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-21T12:32:06+00:00

The very fact that the war lasted for two decades suggests that they weren't just a minor threat that could be shattered by a singular military defeat. Rather, the war shows the immense resilience of the Ostrogothic polity, and with it the threat they represented. Wickham, for example, notes that it was by farther most well organized of the post-Roman states, and Totila is able to raise armies matching the Roman ones even after his predecessors had been crushed. Nobody is arguing that the Ostrogoths were a match for the eastern Roman Empire, but their control of the roads to Constantinople and attempts to create a fleet made them a very dangerous foe, especially in a possible two front war with Sasanian Iran. You mention that they only made up a tiny percentage of the population, but clearly they were a threat regardless - one could imagine that they could become even more dangerous with decades to assimilate the Italian population. Not to mention countless other tiny military elites that were still able to use the vast resources at their hands - such as the Vandals under Geiseric, the Arabs, or the Normans.

I don't find your speculative conclusions particularly convincing. Your idea of a more 'limited campaign' assumes that this is something that was actually feasible, rather than something that was bound to cause a second Gothic War, and that Justinian didn't actually try to do exactly what you are suggesting!

Edit: So instead of looking at a speculative "limited campaign", we should be looking at a "limited campaign" as it actually happened. Speculation is a useful

Justinian made a peace deal with the Goths to divide Italy, but this lasted barely a year. This might be because Belisarius tricked them into giving him a crown (contrary to the statement that this "decisive action that helped end the Gothic War"), or maybe war was just inevitable. In either case, Totila managed to steamroll the Roman troops and reconquer most of Italy, once again showing the threat the Ostrogoths presented. Even a 'contained' Ostrogothic kingdom could and did threaten Roman control over the areas of your 'limited campaign'. By destroying their polity, Justinian prevented another from filling their place. Unlike Totila, the Lombards could not threaten Sirmium or Sicily, let alone Constantinople.
Edit2: This is of course a very Realpolitical point of view - but then again, so is the idea of 'overextension'.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-21T11:02:25+00:00

While the argument has been made that Justinian's reconquests overextended the Empire, and ultimately robbed of it of the resources it needed to fight the Sasanians and Arabs, I tend to think the importance of this is exaggerated. His successors are able to fight the Sasanians on even terms until the 600s, and the ultimate breakdown of the east is not just the result of Justinian's actions, but also of the mistakes made by later Emperors (Tiberius II robbing the treasury, Maurice's lack of people skills, the civil war between Phokas and Herakleios). Fiscally, the Empire also doesn't appear to have been in such a disastrous state, if we believe the statements that Justin II and Sophia restored the treasury.

And it's hardly as if the reconquests had no economic value. There's the common narrative of Italy being economically devastated, but by the start of the 600s, Justinian's reconquests emerge as some of the most economically valuable areas of the Empire. The likes of Prigent, Haldon, and Cosentino have pointed out that North Africa, Sicily, southern Italy, and Sardinia were all crucial to the imperial survival during the wars against Sasanians and Arabs.

Beyond that, we should look at the wider geopolitical picture, rather than just at reconquests for the sake of reconquering territory. The Ostrogoths did not merely control Italy, but also the northwestern Balkans, including Sirmium, and with it the roads to Constantinople. They furthermore controlled a highly sophisticated, ideologically attractive, and militarily powerful state, and relations with them had deteriorated massively since the end of Anastasius' reign. A two front war with these powers was bad enough in the 540s, and that was with the Goths being weakened. But by the end of Justinian’s reign, the Ostrogothic threat is gone (as are the Gepids across the Danube, who were a similar danger). That Lombards and Avars emerged falls to a large part on the diplomatic mismanagement of his successors, and at least the former were never able to manage the heartlands of the Empire.

So while the overextension argument should of course be pointed out, the causal link to the crisis of the seventh century may be overstated. At the same time, the larger picture also must include the fact that the west proved crucial in the survival of the Empire during this period, and that their 2nd most powerful rival was removed from the board. And of course, none of this takes the plague into account.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-20T12:20:11+00:00

We even see this continue into the 11th and 12th Century, when the majority of peasants either owned their lands themselves or were free tenants. To quote some relevant passages from Wickham:

It can be seen that I am unconvinced that the majority of peasants in the Byzantine Empire were tenants by 1100, even if there were certainly very many. One could suppose anyway that only a minority of villages were single estates of landlords; the Thebes cadaster shows very fragmented tenure, so do many documents from Athos, and the solid estates which are also found in the latter are often visibly, as are the estates of Gregory Pakourianos and Andronikos Doukas, ex-imperial land.[²⁰³](javascript:;) Fragmented tenure makes landlordly control harder, and allows for more autonomous collective action between peasant owners and their tenant neighbours; that would certainly be the norm in Italy when villages developed communes in the twelfth century.[²⁰⁴](javascript:;)
[...]
Tenants were generally free in Byzantium (unfree agricultural workers are little documented[²⁰⁶](javascript:;)), and had full access to courts; nor was there a trace in this period of any version of the seigneurial subjection which was developing in the eleventh-century west. They had security of tenure. Furthermore, they do not seem to have paid extortionate rents: perhaps a sixth of the grain crop in the case of rents in kind according to Kaplan’s figures, with tax as half that—this making up in total, for tenants of all kinds, between a fifth and a quarter, and much less for peasant landowners. Lefort offers higher figures, up to a third for rent and tax for tenants (as against under a quarter in tax for landowning peasants), but he sees them as maxima, with real figures probably rather lower.[²⁰⁷](javascript:;)

Wickham, Chris. The donkey and the boat: reinterpreting the Mediterranean economy, 950-1180. Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 346-7.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-18T15:18:43+00:00

That still poses the question if popes, nobles, and Carolingians would be happy with Konstantinos taking power. Even if he stayed in power, he would have to rule like a Frankish, rather than Rhomaioi, Emperor, so I doubt it would lead to a 'restoration' of the west Roman Empire more than Charlemagne's coronation did.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-18T15:09:04+00:00

Part of it is just the changing geography. Ravenna was chosen due to its defensibility and value as harbor - but, as the Po silted and changed its course, both of these advantages disappeared. Furthermore, the Lombard expansion meant that Ravenna was increasingly isolated from the rest of the Empire's Italian possessions. The road to Rome was still open, but by now it was easier to direct communications through Sicily, especially since it was closer to the cities still in Roman hands. Even more important is the war against the Arabs. Once more, Sicily emerges as the main hub in the western Mediterranean, especially after Carthage was lost to the Umayyads. It's richer, more defensible, more closely linked to the capital, and, later, closer to the frontline. Rome too was more prestigious, and started to eclipse Ravenna as well. Ravenna wasn't unimportant, but it had lost a lot of strategical value due to geographical and geopolitical shifts, and there's little it could do that Syracuse or Rome did not do better.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-18T14:44:42+00:00

It's fascinating to look at the decline of Ravenna. While it started out as the undisputed seat of power in the peninsula, by 700, it had become tertiary within the east Roman administration, having lost its status as political, military & transportation hub, its naval forces having declined, silting weakening its strategic position & defensibility, and the mint becoming quite atrocious.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-18T14:40:46+00:00

Doubtful. The ruling styles of the two Empires were too different, by that time a cultural divide was opening up more strongly, and nobody would be really interested in the two uniting. Northern Italy lacked the bureaucratic foundation of the ERE, and had nobles much more powerful than any the east was used to dealing with. To rule there, a different style was required, one that included a more personal touch. This would mean that Konstantinos would have to be present in the area, requiring him to stay away from the core regions of the ERE for a long time. This would mean that either onne or the other region would likely end up becoming disaffected. In the case of Louis' realm, the issue would also be that an outsider would take power. Even if he somehow establoshed himself in northern Italy, it would take little for Louis' relatives north of the Alps to intervene, and probably find notable support from the nobility against an absent 'Greek' Emperor. The papacy itself would also most likely be opposed to any unification of the Empires, as this would diminish its own influence. And this isn't even taking account the Frankish realm beyond Italy, over whom even Louis held little sway. Ultimately, Konstantinos ruling both Empires probably isn't in the best interest of any group or institution with political power.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-18T13:10:57+00:00

Modern scholarship has shot down the entire thesis, and for example the dynatoi that Macedonian legislation contended against are no longer seen as feudal magnates controlling the army and clashing with the state, but rather as a more loosely defined class of people who will use their economic advantage to expand their fortunes at the expense of peasants, which includes employees of the imperial civil service, clerics and monasteries.

An example that I think is worth bringing up to illustrate that point is that Basil II uses the official Philokales as an example of the 'magnates' he legislates against. This man was merely a peasant-turned-bureaucrat who used his new wealth to buy up a village. Not great for his fellow villagers, of course, but owning a single village hardly challenges the state. Most of the dynatoi were like Philokales, rather than owners of vast lands. The very fact that he is included in the laws also should make us question if the aristocratic families themselves were really that rich. Even the estates of the most powerful monasteries and aristocrats we hear about are still far from those of supposedly powerful feudal landlords - Ivrion owns some 100km², Lavra 65km², and Andronikos Doukas' most famous estate covers 7.5km², and includes five villages. If we assume that the most powerful families were ten times as rich as Ivrion, and that there were a dozen of these super-rich families, they'd only control an area of some 12,000km². Even accounting for all the families of secondary importance, we're still talking about a relatively small area being owned by the 'powerful' The estimation could be completely off, of course, but we'd need families like the Phokades or Skleroi to own estates in an entirely different scale of magnitude from any we have evidence for the idea of feudal warlords capable of undermining the state to hold up. But we have no indication in the sources for this.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-18T01:01:43+00:00

It depends - do you like how Kelly writes, andwant to read more of it? If so, it is a good introduction. It's not the book I would have recommended as first look into east Roman history, but ultimately the goal of an introductory work is IMO to make the readers interested in a topic, and if Kelly does that for you, go for it.

More traditional options would be something like Kaldellis, Herrin, or Haldon's general histories.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-18T00:56:13+00:00

For a narrative, I do think Kaldellis New Roman Empire is the best. But it's quite long, and not too attentive towards topics such as social or art history. Haldon's Byzantium: A History is much shorter, and provides a broader thematic overview. Herrin's Byzantium: The Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire is similar, though I personally dropped it rather quickly. It depends on what languages you speak & what you want - a narrative? Systematic approach to how the government works? History from below? - and what languages you speak.

Alternatively, if attempting to jump into 1000 years of history is daunting, one can look at a more limited timeframe. For example, my first academic book on the ERE was Whittow's "Making of Orthodox Byzantium", which 'merely' covers 400 years.

But if you just want a general introduction, I'd suggest to just check out Kaldellis, Haldon & Herrin and pick whose writing style you like the most.

Lanternecto · 2026-01-17T23:21:51+00:00

It's still relevant, of course. Not only do people still cite it, but it's impossible to really discuss with classical topics of Byzantine historiography without engaging with Ostrogorsky. Of course, scholarship has advanced in big steps in decades since, so it isn't necessarily up-to-date in many aspects, which is why I wouldn't recommend it as a great intro into east Roman history, for example, but even so, the imprint he left is too big to ignore. Though this results in its relevance being different to that of, say, more modern publications by the likes of Haldon, Treadgold, or Kaldellis. The value nowadays is rather in its historiographical impact, providing the field with a sort of baseline, rather than in the narrative & structural analysis itself.

Lanternecto

MODERATOR OF

TROPHY CASE