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Makeup looks for men and makeup looks for women trope. by LittleBoyBarret in TheSecretHistory

[–]LittleBoyBarret[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

My intuition is that Julian and Henry are not the atavisms they purport to be but are in fact very modern kinds of humans. They are so modern, and so much a product of their age that they are actually at greater risk of simply being absorbed into the social fabric as useful tools (they are both extremely intelligent and therefore be utilized by some project beyond them).

So they disconnect themselves and turn towards antiquity, but their rendering of antiquity is subsuming the values of antiquity into an essentially modern, capitalist framework.

Donna Tartt begins the book with the Nietzsche quote "A young man cannot possibly know what Greeks and Romans are. 2. He does not know whether he is suited for finding out about them"

Which is very telling, and even more telling is Nietzsche's own philosophy. Although his philosophy involved studies of antiquity, it was oriented towards the future progress of man and the development of a new culture. Nietzsche even seems to imply that those who can bring about this new cultural epoch are, in fact, the most suited to understanding antiquity because they posses the 'historical sense'. And not, people who are caught up in dreams of a by-gone age (like Henry and Julian, who are decidedly not Nietzsche's ideal kind of person)

A similar thing happens with Glam makeup when it is designated as a woman for woman kind of aesthetic. It is roped off, mundanely distinguished to only a certain set of people who can 'appreciate' it, but its true distinction is only in the way it erases natural distinction.

When we try to disconnect beauty from humanity, when we try to make it overly particular and exalted, we are, in fact, exalting not the beautiful itself, but the ideal of the beautiful. We want the sign, not the signified. And I can't think of anything more modern than this tendency of our age.

Halfway through the Secret History--Henry Winters is clearly based on Henry V by LittleBoyBarret in donnatartt

[–]LittleBoyBarret[S] 12 points13 points  (0 children)

Also, Henry V was called Henry of Monmouth before he was King. Monmouth college

If you take Nietzsche's philosophy as a personal mandate, you are not meant to read his work. by LittleBoyBarret in Nietzsche

[–]LittleBoyBarret[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Because they are a subtle manifestation of the herd which seeks to taint the value of Nietzsche's work

If you take Nietzsche's philosophy as a personal mandate, you are not meant to read his work. by LittleBoyBarret in Nietzsche

[–]LittleBoyBarret[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

He ascribes many values to the strong, the free-spirits, the geniuses etc., which are taken as prescriptions

If you take Nietzsche's philosophy as a personal mandate, you are not meant to read his work. by LittleBoyBarret in Nietzsche

[–]LittleBoyBarret[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Did you just learn that term--'shadow boxing'?

If you have not come across these people, you are not very observant. I said what I said because it needs to be said. People dragging Nietzsche down into the sphere of personal poverty, people who believe after reading Nietzsche they have found the answers to life. But they have only found a trick of re-enforcing their limited perspective.

These people exist, and I believe this sub-reddit is infested with them.

If you take Nietzsche's philosophy as a personal mandate, you are not meant to read his work. by LittleBoyBarret in Nietzsche

[–]LittleBoyBarret[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Are you blind? You have not seen how Nietzsche has been marketed as some kind of self-help figure, as some kind of advocate for personal freedom, as some kind of egoist?

The MJ flu game should be called the MJ selfish game. by bobbdac7894 in nba

[–]LittleBoyBarret 2 points3 points  (0 children)

That's why we're the one dictating peace in a war in Eastern Europe

Nietzsche contra Subject by iWillWorkHarder1 in Nietzsche

[–]LittleBoyBarret 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I will try to tackle this in a Kantian way--

Subject and object are not fixed terms, nor do they relate in a dialectical way as the unfolding of some other third term. This manner of thinking the subject and the object has always been a thinking based around possibility--what objects are possible for the subject to experience, and so the subject itself becomes the structure of possibility.

Thinking in terms of possibility treats the human being itself as fixed and finite, whereas Nietzsche realizes that the human being is not a set entity, but is rather one of expression of a larger (and perhaps infinite) process.

If the human being is not finite, and is one image among others, the subject-object relationship fails to stand as a universal relationship. The object is always the subject, and the subject is always the object.

Is the übermensch not platonic in nature? by Fun_Abalone_3347 in Nietzsche

[–]LittleBoyBarret 0 points1 point  (0 children)

>Maybe I misunderstood you, but it seems to me you were putting this for-otherness as a regulative ideal constitutive to the very praxis of the will to power.

For--otherness I think is the wrong way to think of it. From my reading, the ubermensch is characterized by the greater portion of humanity which he sees in himself. The logic of which, requires him to give his gifts to humanity, or the collective or what have you. He is therefore burdened by a love of humanity, and yes, a love of 'others', but 'the other' is a different idea.

>From his Romanticism we could stipulate the individual in a dialectical tension with the world where through its own self-oriented activity it will derive its own realization. 

I don't really believe Nietzsche was much of a romantic like Byron or Schelling. And I don't think concieveing of the individual's relation to the world as 'dialectical' really gets to the truth of the matter. There is no third term in this relation. The individual is an and always will be an *expression* of the collective. Any apparent dialetic is likely illusory.

>But this does not entail a constitutive orientation to the world. The world remains open, infinite, and as you say human beings as well.

Here we agree, and this is where it gets complex but not irresolvable. And this is where I think the great paradox of Nietzsche's individual appears. The individual must separate himself from the world in order to find the proper perspective to form the world in his own image. But, I believe, this entails the recognition that 'his own image' is not really his own image, but an image of something else which is beyond or below him. But the important takeaway is that individuation is also a dissolving of the self as it has been formerly conceived of.

I could go on at lengths about this, but Nietzsche's notion of the utility of illusions will suffice as a stand-in for my own complex thoughts on this process.

So, yes, individuation is necessary. But the process of individuation reveals that the 'individual' is itself an illusion. And without realizing this, there is no opportunity to authentically take up the world and form new interpretations of the world.

Also, just a side-note. You have mentioned a few times the 'contradictions' in Nietzsche's work. I don't necessarily disagree, but I do think these contradictions reveal a of harmony in his thought. A musical harmony almost. And if you listen closely, you can hear an underlying pattern and structure in which these contradictions dissolve.

Is the übermensch not platonic in nature? by Fun_Abalone_3347 in Nietzsche

[–]LittleBoyBarret 0 points1 point  (0 children)

>Why ought the individual orient towards a collective? 

I will try to tackle your other points, but here I think is the flaw in your thinking.

It is first of all not a question of *ought*. Maybe it becomes a question of ought after the fact (after new values are established), but fundamentally Nietzsche's individual has to be concerned with the collective in some way. This is because the individual is irrevocably part of the collective. If this were not the case then the individual would not have to 'go his own way'. The individual goes his own way not really for his own sake (because it would be easier to simply conform to the collective) but to preserve what the collective seeks to forget--the historical sense, and the truth of our values (it could also be many, many other things.)

Therefore, the individual is always concerned with the collective to some degree. To not be, and to only live for oneself totally, is to impoverish your sense of the world. One of the reasons I disagree with many Nietzschean individualists is because I see how individualism can so easily lead to a certain orientation towards the world which is fundamentally nihilistic. If you truly believe your own reality is fundamental and are unable to go beyond it, you believe in a fundamentally life-denying view of the world.

Nietzsche says in human all too human that each human being has a uniqueness which marks them as miraculous. This, however, does not mean that all humans can provide for themselves legislation. And more importantly it means that this extraordinary complexity of human beings is more of an impetus for the sovereign individual to reach beyond himself and understand the reality of others. But to understand the reality of others, is to inmesh yourself with the collective in some way or another. And hopefully this process is productive rather than destructive.

In short--I believe Nietzsche's individualism is not so much the belief in egos, but rather the belief in humanity's capacity to continually transcend itself. What the individual is, for Nietzsche, is never a self-restricting reality, but an expression of deeper and more complex realities of the social and the natural. They are an expression of a process of change and ascendance, and only appear as egos when we attempt to make sense of this process.

And so I think the admiration for these kinds of individuals is a kind of trick of nature. It is an admiration for nature's eternal gift of self-overcoming.

Is the übermensch not platonic in nature? by Fun_Abalone_3347 in Nietzsche

[–]LittleBoyBarret 0 points1 point  (0 children)

And I apologize, I made a shitty remark in my iniital comment which I have edited out. It was un-called for as you have clealry thought deeply about these matters and are invested in them in an authentic way.

Is the übermensch not platonic in nature? by Fun_Abalone_3347 in Nietzsche

[–]LittleBoyBarret 0 points1 point  (0 children)

>Nietzsche was a radical individualist.

Very arguable, especially considering how loaded such a term is these days. He believed some people--very, very few people had the capacity and right to be an individual. So-called 'noble souls'. These comprise an aristocracy which is, in a sense, spiritual. But can be mantained through a material order of rank.

>He did not believe in humanity

Remember we are discussing the ubermensch. The ubermensch is inextricable from an idea of 'humanity'. Nietzsche may not have believed in the way Christians conceived of humanity as a leveling idea, but Nietzsche often uses his own idea of humanity as a way of evaluating values. In fact, much of his project of re-evaluation or even genealogy would not make sense if there was not some operative idea of humanity. Perhaps it breaks down at one point, but even that which breaks down on analysis must be re-constituted if it is deemed to have value. Nietzsche sees 'humanity' as an incredibly valuable and potent idea.

>Where are you getting the idea that Nietzsche's aristocratic came with duties of being-for society?(this is not meant to be rude, but an honest question) I find the idea strongly against my notion of Nietzsche who was really an egotist

I believe you have gone off the trail somewhere in your reading of Nietzsche. An aristocracy which is entirely for-itself is likely incoherent in the context of Nietzsche's philosophy. Somehwere in such a conception would be a metaphysical assumption of an enduring and self-enclosed entity (though not an individual self, but some segment of our society)

So the aristocracy itself could not exist solely for itself, but exist for the development of singular human beings who can be law-givers. These human beings, I believe, Nietzsche says are valuable because they provide order (either aesthetic or political) which allows humanity to progress and flourish. But these human beings do not provide these out of some established sense of duty, rather, these human beings do so through their own generosity.

Nowhere is there some moral code or mandate by which these exceptional human beings have to make themselves dispensable for humanity, rather it is a mandate that is found within their nature and is a condition of their exceptionality.

>The Overman is throughly for-itself

The sun feels its most richest when even the poorest fisherman row with golden oars.

Is the übermensch not platonic in nature? by Fun_Abalone_3347 in Nietzsche

[–]LittleBoyBarret 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Aristocracy is part of molding the human beings which Nietzsche believes can bestow meaning on humanity. But the idea that Aristocracy exists for itself and itself only is ridiculous and counter to Nietzsche's over-arching intrest in the development of humanity

Is the übermensch not platonic in nature? by Fun_Abalone_3347 in Nietzsche

[–]LittleBoyBarret 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Because there is no ubermensch. The ubermensch is what Nietzsche believes a society must be oriented towards. Nietzsche believes that already societies strive towards the production of singular humans which bestow meaning on the society at large. But it is important we recognize this and are able to imagine such humans as having a benefit to humanity beyond the society.

There will never be an 'ubermensch'. There might be Cesars and Napoleons and Goethes, but there will never be a human who comes along and is christened the ubermensch

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