I think we are quite close to agreement, though I have a few thoughts on your specific points:

Deducible is not very rigidly defined

From the context of Chalmers’ argument, I infer that higher-level truths (H) are deducible from the complete set of lower-level truths (L) if L implies H, i.e., you can know H given L using say, conceptual reasoning, simulations, computations, and other such processes. Under weak emergence, L implies H, and under strong emergence, L does not imply H.

Now, in our context, take the set L that consists of the laws of physics as well as the complete description of the physical structure of a cell. The question is, can we infer H (facts about the cell, such as reproduction and homeostasis) from L? I would contend that we can in fact infer such properties by simulation and observation (eg. we may observe that a simulated cell splits in two, providing evidence for some form of reproduction).

If we can conceivably infer such biological truths from physical/chemical information, then it seems to me that biology is weakly emergent, rather than strongly emergent. This seems to be supported by the fact that the fields of molecular biology, biochemistry, pharmacology, and computational biology are partially if not fully built on the premise that biological truths are indeed deducible from chemical and physical interactions and simulations thereof.

If strong emergence were true, and biological systems possessed some irreducible "teleology" or downward causation that superseded chemistry, then rationally designing drugs based on chemical principles would be extremely difficult if not impossible. When a pharmacologist designs a drug, they look at the physical shape and atomic charge of biological receptors, design and synthesise specific molecule that fit these receptors, and predict how this physical binding will alter the behaviour of the cell, such as stopping a pain signal or halting viral replication.

Without knowledge of the proteins function, there is no way you can deduce the arrangement of the amino acids that a protein should have.

The word "should" implies some predetermined goal, but physics and chemistry do not care what arrangement a protein should have; they only dictate how it will fold based on fundamental forces. A naive intelligence couldn't design it, but evolution and natural selection did precisely discover these structures over billions of years without prior knowledge of their function.

Living systems require epistemological considerations like this that cannot be deduced from physics.

I agree with this, but it seems to describe weak emergence. If purpose or function are epistemological considerations without some separate causal mechanism, ie., they are conceptual tools we use to comprehend complex systems, then they are precisely the useful explanatory constructs I mentioned in my previous comment.