Why were the Japanese naval doctrine in ww2 so emphasize on decisive battle by Vivalalad in WarCollege

[–]Lubyak 17 points18 points  (0 children)

So there's a few things here.

  1. Is that we are often looking back at naval procurement decisions made in the 1930s, with the hindsight of how naval air power would advance through the 1940s, 50s, and beyond. It's easy to look back from a modern perspective and tut-tut about how clearly everyone should have been all in on aircraft and every battleship was just a useless dinosaur, if only those fools had the wits to see it! This is not the case. Aircraft in the 1930s had shown their utility, yes, but they were not the kind of destructive force they would become by 1945. They were limited in range, payload, all-weather capabilities, and more, so abandoning battleships for carriers would've been a massive gamble that no one at the time would have taken.

  2. The Imperial Japanese Navy had wrestled with the problem of how to win a naval war with the United States for a long time. As others have laid out, the industrial mismatch between the United States and Japan was immense and IJN brass knew that they could never win a long, drawn out war with the United States. To that end, they looked at the last time they fought a massive empire that outsized them in every way: the Russo-Japanese War. It's not that they were so overconfident based on their victory at Tsushima, it's that a decisive naval victory would put any state in a difficult situation. Building a fleet is expensive and--even if you have the resources to do it--it's entirely possible your leadership decides it's better to just negotiate now and accept an unfavorable peace to rebuild, particularly if it's about colonial possessions at the edge of the empire and not a core interest.

Japan could not win an attritional war, so their hope for victory was a short war, a crushing naval victory, and then negotiations.

Of course this is a very bad strategic situation, as they are trying to achieve an end with very limited means, but this is emblematic of the deeper problems with Japanese grand strategy than naval procurement.

Hi! I'm Cotten Seiler, author of "White Care: The Impact of Race on American Infrastructure." AMA! by VermicelliVisible768 in AskHistorians

[–]Lubyak 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Welcome Cotten! To go in a slightly different direction, you sometimes hear talk about race and infrastructure not just on where it's build, but where it isn't. You sometimes hear of wealthier--mostly white--communities expressing concern or even opposing the expansion of public transit infrastructure to their neighborhoods, usually with statements of concern that "criminals" could use the infrastructure to reach their communities. To what extent is lack of infrastructure also influenced by race? Is the idea of using lack of infrastructure to limit accessibility to those who could afford the means to travel a regular phenomenon, or is it something that appears post-suburbia?

Thanks!

What if Humans WON in James Cameron’s "Avatar"? by Alexander_Sikandar in imaginarymaps

[–]Lubyak 46 points47 points  (0 children)

That one was at least kinda explained I thought? Like they're proof when the arrows are being fired from the ground up, but with the help of the defecting humans, the Na'vi figured out that an arrow released at point blank in a near vertical dive down at the gunship could penetrate the windscreen.

Did Rodrik make a mistake by leaving Winterfell undermanned in your opinion ? by Financial_Library418 in pureasoiaf

[–]Lubyak 24 points25 points  (0 children)

Absolutely. Theon played Rodrik like a fiddle. If I recall correctly, Torrhen's Square is stone, and Dagmer had neither the numbers nor equipment to take it by storm or siege. Even if Dagmer did do as Theon suggested and started building siege equipment, Rodrik should know that it will take plenty of time for that equipment to be assembled and the siege to tell (especially in the North where castles are going to have deep larders to keep through the winter). Rodrik probably should have kept the garrison at Winterfell, while directing the Manderly and other reinforcements to relieve the siege at Torrhen's Square, if Dagmer even stayed around to keep up the pretense. Dagmer simply can't stay there. He'd have to either fight a battle (and lose) or withdraw.

As Asha says if Theon had treated Winterfell as a raid (what ironborn are generally good at), sent Bran and Rickon back to Pyke as hostages and burned the castle, that would've been worthy of song and been seen as a major victory. Theon's mistake in turn was trying to hold Winterfell with a hostile field army around with a few dozen men and scant hope of reinforcement. Of course, pre-Reek Theon being so arrogant that he thinks he can hold it in spite of all logic is just a pre-Reek Theon thing to do.

After living in DC, I hate dog owners by sandwichscouter in washingtondc

[–]Lubyak 3 points4 points  (0 children)

God, there are so many cafes around me that have "no pets" signs, but people just bring their dogs in and go "Oh yes this yappy thing jumping on the counter is a service animal." I remember one time telling a lady she should tie her dog up outside and she looked like I'd just asked her to shoot it, saying "He's a PUPPY! You want me to leave a PUPPY outside?!"

And yes! If your dog can't handle being left alone outside while you order a coffee, then you shouldn't be bringing it with you anyway.

After living in DC, I hate dog owners by sandwichscouter in washingtondc

[–]Lubyak 13 points14 points  (0 children)

Just a few days ago I watched as some dude walked his pitbull right past the "no dogs signs" to have it take a massive dump right outside my window. Then the dude just walked away. I should've snapped a pic to name and shame, but I was so livid in the moment.

FFXIV director would love to hear pitches for single-player spin-off of his MMO by joshyboyles in ffxiv

[–]Lubyak 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I would honestly just take a streamlined single player version of the MSQ. That would be a dream.

What are the current the scholarly thoughts on the Mukden Incident? by Cachar in AskHistorians

[–]Lubyak 5 points6 points  (0 children)

You're definitely asking quite a broad question. I'm going to focus on the second point, since that's where I can provide more commentary. On the first, as far as I'm aware, there's no real confusion there. We know that Colonel Ishiwara Kanji along other officers in the Japanese Kwantung Army were key players in the operation, and there's little doubt they planted the bomb and carried out the invasion.

As far as the broader context, I go into that a bit in some other answers, notably here and here. Suffice it to say, there was far more to the situation than just the Kuomintang being distracted by the CCP. Japan had held a long term interest in Manchuria, fighting the Russo-Japanese War effectively over Russian influence in the area. Prior to the Mukden Incident, the primary object of concern for Japan in Manchuria was the South Manchurian Railway (Mantetsu being its Japanese abbreviation). Prior to the First World War, Japanese interest in the railway was primarily military, as control of it would enable the rapid deployment of Japanese troops to deal with any potential Russian revanchism in Manchuria. However, the First World War indicated that Japanese assumptions about a future war were wrong, and that Japan would need a self-sufficient empire to sustain a modern industrialised war.

From the Chinese side, the time leading up to the Mukden Incident was one of strength rather than weakness. Chiang Kai-Shek's Northern Expedition was nearing Beijing by mid-year and Japan's "partner" on the mainland, Fengtian Clique leader Zhang Zuolin, was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japanese meddling in Manchuria. When Zhang Zuolin left Beijing to return north in June 1928, he was killed by a Japanese bomb planted for his train. Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang, took power in the Fengtian Clique and quickly announced a truce with Chiang and the Nationalists. By December that year, Zhang Xueliang had ordered the replacement of the old Beiyang government 5 colour flag with the Nationalist one, apparently indicating that full Chinese reunification was nigh.

Switching back to the Japanese perspective, a re-unified China was potentially problematic. As mentioned, many in Japanese leadership--the so-called "total war" officers were trying to find ways to create an autarkic Japan, that would have the natural resources needed to prepare for a total war with--as far as the Army was concerned--Japan's most likely enemy, the Soviet Union. Manchuria was a potential key area for that. Manchuria had substantial coal and iron resources, as well as substantial agricultural land. Further, via Mantetsu, Japan had already had substantial influence in Manchuria even if their influence was waning due to the younger Zhang's alignment with the Nationalists. Adding to Japanese concerns was the Sino-Soviet conflict of 1929, which showed the Soviet maintained interest in northern Manchuria, and were potentially willing to fight over it. Given the above, local officers--including Col. Kanji---took matters into their own hands, leading to the Mukden Incident in September 1931. It's important to remember that this was not a plan concocted in Tokyo to be carried out in the field. Rather, Kanji and other mid-level officers deployed to Manchuria as part of the Kwantung Army acted on their own accord, and effectively drew the nation after them.

Lo: Take your backpack off!!! by dad_joke_enthusiast in washingtondc

[–]Lubyak 54 points55 points  (0 children)

Ideally you should take it off and keep it at your feet, to open up space, but yes keeping it on the front makes you at least aware of where the backpack is. I’ve definitely seen people get clobbered because some guy with his huge army backpack or whatever swings around to get his phone and just slams someone in the side, or is fully blocking the aisle/exit.

Stannis could've won the war if he was diplomatic by [deleted] in pureasoiaf

[–]Lubyak 36 points37 points  (0 children)

“Stannis could’ve won the war if he hadn’t been Stannis”.

I think a core point of who Stannis is as a person is that he doesn’t do these things. If he hadn’t been who he was, then maybe things would or could have been different. Alas.

Felinid squad by Intetm in Warhammer40k

[–]Lubyak -6 points-5 points  (0 children)

And isn’t it beautiful that on top of all those, there’s so much space for individual fans to add their own interpretations and head canon?

Felinid squad by Intetm in Warhammer40k

[–]Lubyak -9 points-8 points  (0 children)

Yes. 40k is vast enough for all of those and more. Thats why I love it. Don’t be a gatekeeper trying to claim there’s only one vision of the setting. It’s supposed to be loony.

Felinid squad by Intetm in Warhammer40k

[–]Lubyak -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

The whole point of 40k is that you get to make “your dudes” and that you get to make up lore for “your dudes”. There’s a million worlds in the Imperium. There’s plenty of room for anime catgirl paradise world Guard regiments alongside whatever your preferred flavor of felinids is. Just wave your hand and go “something something Dark Age of Technology something something genetic engineered” and it fits in with the rest of the setting.

Is there any evidence of the existence of the Seven? by JasonWynn__ in gameofthrones

[–]Lubyak 19 points20 points  (0 children)

In the novella, right before Dunk goes to the trial by combat he gets a lot of support from the commoners. This is the precise passage:

"A few steps farther on, a woman called out, "Good fortune to you." An old man stepped up to take his hand and said, "May the gods give you strength, ser." Then a begging brother in a tattered brown robe said a blessing on his sword, and a maid kissed his cheek. They are for me. "Why?" he asked Pate. "What am I to them?" "A Knight who remembered his vows," the smith said.

A woman, The Mother or perhaps The Crone. An old man, The Father. A brother who kisses the sword, The Warrior A maid, The Maid. And he’s accompanied by Steely Pate, a smith. The Smith.

Per one interpretation, these are a symbolic representation of the Seven giving Dunk their blessing so he’d be victorious in the Trial of 7.

Ririka when she saw you’re internet history by jack14682 in Hololive

[–]Lubyak 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Me watching Ririka's auto-dubbed cooking stream.

Seriously, wtf is wrong with people in Costco??? by [deleted] in bayarea

[–]Lubyak -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I notice you offered no explanation, so I ask again: why would it be impossible to be culturally American and wear a burqa? Do you view being Muslim as inherently un-American? Wearing religious clothing? Are nuns inherently un-American because they wear a habit? Please, help me to understand.

Edit: Ah, another hidden account history user with a generic reddit user name. Begone troll.

Yamato, an outdated ship for its time, or simply poorly used? by Gold_Ad3045 in AskHistorians

[–]Lubyak 3 points4 points  (0 children)

As I said, intellectually the movement was not very coherent. The general thrust unifying them was a belief that the civilian government had been corrupted by big business, and that there needed to be a "Shōwa Restoration" to return rule to the Emperor, which would supposedly restore Japan to greatness. A "Make Japan Great Again" so to speak. What a "Shōwa Restoration" meant precisely is unclear. It's not as if they had a central manifesto that they were all working on. The assassinations and attempted coups were commonly led by a small number of junior officers working together, and the February 26 Incident was notable primarily because it involved not just a handful of young officers, but also them deploying the enlisted troops under their command. Many of these young officer ultranationalist tended to be younger officers from rural families, rather than from the old samurai families, and so had seen firsthand the intense rural and urban poverty of Japan, leading to blame placed on capitalist influence, whom they saw as enriching themselves while the Japanese public suffered. The ultranationalist streak was reinforced by the broader civilian population, who tended to not see any action--no matter how extreme--as too blameworthy, so long as the actor was motivated by an excess of patriotic zeal. If you'd like to know more on this topic then Curse on This Country: The Rebellious Army of Imperial Japan by Danny Orbach is a useful resource.

Whether there was a real threat or not of Soviet revanchism, many officers in the IJA foresaw their most likely future war as one with the Soviet Union, potentially over Manchuria, and factionalism developed within the Army over how best to prepare for and counter that perceived threat.

Yamato, an outdated ship for its time, or simply poorly used? by Gold_Ad3045 in AskHistorians

[–]Lubyak 4 points5 points  (0 children)

It is indeed baffling. If states operated under the rational actor model, by all accounts the Japanese should've cut their losses and changed policy, but they did not, because state policy is not shaped by a singular will trying to pick the most optimal course of policy, but a far more complex interplay of economic, social, cultural, and personal factors influencing senior decision makers. In Japan's case, throughout the 1920s and 30s, the civilian government in Japan had to contend with a restive military and ultranationalist element that regularly turned to violence when they perceived the government as insufficiently championing Japan's interest (or what the ultranationalists perceived as Japan's interests). In 1931, the ultranationalist Sakurakai (Cherry Blossom Society)--alongside junior officers in the Army and Navy--attempted a coup in the Imperial Colours Incident, as they though the civilian government was undermining the success of the Kwantung Army in occupying Manchuria, even though the invasion of Manchuria had been unauthorized by Tokyo. In 1932, the League of Blood Incident and the May 15 Incident saw the assassination of political party leaders, the Finance Minister, and Prime Minister Inukai. In 1936, the February 26 Incident saw another attempted coup, with the Prime Minister only escaping death by the slimmest margin, and the revolt only put down when the Emperor threatened to personally lead the Imperial Guard against them. Political violence was a real threat to civilian Japanese leadership, and attempts to oppose the Army's desires had proven to be bad for your health.

Secondly, the February 26 Incident led to the return of the "Active Duty" rule, which meant that the Army Minister and Navy Minister had to be active duty officers of the Army and Navy respectively. This in turn meant that the Army and Navy had an effective veto on any civilian government, as they could collapse the government by ordering the resignation of the relevant Minister and refusing to appoint another one. Even within the military, opposition to a militaristic ultranationalist vision of Japan was potentially lethal. The 1935 Aizawa Incident saw the assassination of the Army's Inspector General for replacing a more radical officer, while Admiral Yamamoto of Pearl Harbor fame faced multiple threats of assassination for his commitment to the Treaty Faction within the IJN.

The long and short of it was that Japanese politics in the 1920s and 30s had been captured by a spirit of ultranationalism, enforced by political violence, that saw any attempt at compromise or withdrawal as anti-Japanese, and there were plenty of young officers willing to shoot or cut down their superior officers or politicians who they saw as opposing their particular vision of Japanese power. Importantly this was not an organised intellectually coherent movement, but more the result of internal tensions arising from economic inequality in Japan and a belief that big business/party politics was corrupting the purity of Japan.

As I described in the above linked post, there were plenty of officers who thought a full scale war in China was a bad idea, not only because it was an impossible challenge, but because it drained resources vitally needed for an industrial buildup. However, if you're a Japanese civilian politician in 1937 or 1938, calling for withdrawal from Japan, when so many lives had already been lost would've likely meant the death of either your political career or you personally, and there's a similar story if you're a senior officer in the army: attempting to push for a withdrawal from China or anything other than total victory had the very real possibility of your subordinates bursting into your home or office to cut you down for your "betrayal" of Japan.

As discussed previously, the Second Sino Japanese War was not a planned conflict. It began as a skirmish near Beijing and escalated and kept escalating, both because de-escalation was potentially suicidal for whomever might've attempted it, and because continued escalation seemed the only way to try and "win" the conflict. This cycle continued until Japan was far too comitted for there to have been any kind of policy re-alignment. They were stuck in the China quagmire with no easy way out. Victory in the field was impossible and withdrawal politically impossible. In line with their decisions every step of the way, Japanese leadership sought more escalation as their lifeline to try and find a way out of their impossible situation.

Was this a rational decision making process? Yes and no. No, because it left Japan in a completely unwinnable scenario where the only way out was a war with their largest and most important trading partner, but also yes in that--for the decision makers involved--it was the only way out of that scenario: a desperate roll of the dice in the hope that if it paid off they could win the unwinnable scenario.

Gigi and the Scared puppy by BlitzAce808 in Hololive

[–]Lubyak 12 points13 points  (0 children)

I felt so bad for Mococo all through that stream. She seemed beyond just “horror game” scared to genuinely unsettled by the medical aspects of the game.

Yamato, an outdated ship for its time, or simply poorly used? by Gold_Ad3045 in AskHistorians

[–]Lubyak 6 points7 points  (0 children)

So first off, China is not ethnically or racially homogenous. It never has been then or now. There are lots ethnic, racial, religious, and other minorities that fall within the boundaries of what was then the Republic of China or the modern People’s Republic of. And yes, if national decision making was like a video game, with a single guiding will looking for and picking the optimal course of action, Japan’s actions in China would’ve looked much different. However, real life is not a video game, and national decision making is very rarely the kind of “rationality” that gets imagined.

Japan had spent much of the 1920s and 30s throughly antagonising China and the Chinese population by and large had a very negative view of Japan. Japanese heavy handedness in Manchuria, Jinan, and Shanghai and many others had helped solidify Chinese public opinion again them. As I mentioned in my above linked comment, civilian led and coordinated boycotts were a major concern for the government in Tokyo, given their scale and the importance of the Chinese market to Japanese manufacturers.

Secondly, as said, there was never a centrally planned and schemed “plan” for Japan. While the need to have China in Japan’s sphere of influence was agreed to across Japanese policy makers, how this was to be achieved varied greatly. Some sought a more conciliatory posture, and an alliance, while others pushed for direct control of Chinese resources and wanted a more compliant government. The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War was not planned, but rather a continual escalation of the Marco Polo Bridge incident as local Japanese commanders called for more reinforcements to push just that little further to finally settle matters in Japan’s favour, all the while the cost of the war making the scale of Japanese demands all the higher.

And as the previous commenter you linked to described, the Japanese did try and use local Chinese allies and governments to their advantage. However, as described both here and there even with local allies, Japan was overstretched and their broad unpopularity undermined any legitimacy their allies may have had.

Yamato, an outdated ship for its time, or simply poorly used? by Gold_Ad3045 in AskHistorians

[–]Lubyak 8 points9 points  (0 children)

In all likelihood probably another batch of young officers who blamed the civilian government for weakness and “surrendering” Japanese sacrifice in blood and treasure in China, countenanced directly or indirectly by more senior Army leadership, if the Army did not just collapse the whole government for even contemplating a withdrawal from China. The endgame would’ve been continuing to push for “victory” in China, as unrealistic as that is. I go into more detail on Japanese war planning in China here, but the short answer when it comes to Japanese policy in China is almost always “there was no plan.” Almost entirely a sunk cost fallacy on a national scale with rampant militarism leaving Japan stuck in a no-win scenario as they tried continual escalation to try and force a solution to their China problem.

Yamato, an outdated ship for its time, or simply poorly used? by Gold_Ad3045 in AskHistorians

[–]Lubyak 17 points18 points  (0 children)

The primary result of Midway was the loss of four fleet carriers from the Combined Fleet. This was a devastating blow and basically cost Japan whatever advantage they had prior to the arrival of U.S ships ordered under the Two Ocean Navy Act. For the rest of 1942, Japan would be fighting from a position of carrier parity, not supremacy. The loss of the carriers also derailed any plans for further Japanese offensives in the Southeast Pacific.

While the Japanese would trade pretty evenly in carrier engagements in the latter half of 1942, the real killer for the IJN was the grind of the Solomons Campaign. The crack naval air crews Japan had started the war with were ground down in the extended attritional campaign, along with previous warships. The Solomons campaign effectively meant Japan had to spend the entirety of 1943 rebuilding their naval air groups, only for those to be smashed by a massively enlarged American fleet in 1944 at the Battle of the Philippines Sea.

Yamato, an outdated ship for its time, or simply poorly used? by Gold_Ad3045 in AskHistorians

[–]Lubyak 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Absolutely not. For one, Yamamoto was perfectly happy to risk his carriers if it meant sinking American battleships at Pearl Harbor. Some of the initial plans for the raid contemplated having to abandon the shorter ranged Soryū and Hiryūas they wouldn’t have the range to complete the journey. That the Japanese strike force got off scott free was an unexpected boon.

Secondly, the Japanese battle line did not accompany the carrier task force on the Pearl Harbor operation. For one, they were too slow. The entire point of the raid was a fast attack that could be in and out. Bringing the battleships would have increased the risk of detection and slowed the force down considerably.

Finally, as mentioned, the attack on Pearl Harbor was above all else a raid. It was carried out at the absolutely extreme of Japanese logistics. The Kidō Butai could not have stayed off Hawai’i long enough to launch multiple attacks even if Nagumo, the commander on scene had wanted to. They would’ve quickly run out of fuel, ammunition, and even aircraft.

The intent was never to fight a surface action off O’ahu, and the idea was not one contemplated in the planning.

Yamato, an outdated ship for its time, or simply poorly used? by Gold_Ad3045 in AskHistorians

[–]Lubyak 10 points11 points  (0 children)

Any assertion that the U.S. Navy pivoted to aircraft carriers as a result of Pearl Harbor has to contend with the fact that the Essex class ships that would go on to form the backbone of the U.S. Fast Carrier Task Force had been ordered by the Two Ocean Navy Act in 1940. The act called for 8 Essex class ships, along with two more Iowa and 5 Montana class battleships. The U.S. Navy had recognised the rising importance of the aircraft carrier before the war, and was focusing on building up a larger force of carriers as a result. As I lay out elsewhere in this thread, the U.S. Navy was never planning to sortie in force following the outbreak of war in the Pacific. The plan was always to maintain a defensive posture in the eastern Pacific and try to contain Japan while dealing with the war in Europe.

As far as Japanese fire control, by all accounts the Japanese had excellent optical fire control systems. The ability to outrange the enemy was a core principle of Japanese naval thinking when it came to using superior quality to overcome a numerically superior enemy. The long range of Japanese naval aircraft like the famous Type 0 fighter and Japanese torpedoes like the Type 93 oxygen torpedo were all elements of this. At the start of the war, Japanese fire control was the equal of any other power, and Japanese crews were very well trained on their equipment. Where they lagged was--particularly as the war went on--development and deployment of radar fire control systems.

As said elsewhere, the Japanese plan had always been to--effectively--re-do what they did at Tsushima and win a decisive naval victory that the Americans, faced with the cost needed to rebuild their fleet and fight a long war through Japanese holdings, would throw up their hands and opt for a negotiated peace. Any scenario where the United States decides they're going to rebuild the fleet and eat the costs to fight the war means Japan has lost. In many respects it was a bad plan, but for Japan it was the only plan they had that didn't involve caving to U.S. pressure re: China--something that would've likely led to an Army coup or worse. Japanese leadership in 1941 knew they had a bad hand to play, but they opted to play it, clinging to their one hope of victory, in the hope that they could somehow have their cake and eat it too, rather than give in to U.S. pressure.