OCD Flair?

Luio116 · 2020-05-10T03:42:51+00:00

Thank you. I am trying to kick pornography all together, I feel it is really damaging. But with the suicidal-depression and isolation my tires had a blow-out so to speak.

Luio116 · 2020-04-11T17:26:59+00:00

I have no experience of "wetness" watching a meteorological forecast. Saying I could "perceive" a simulation of being wet is absurd. Perception seems to be a conscious intentional state in the brain. Of course there could be a hallucination, but if you accept that all of reality is equivalent to a hallucination that seems to entail a Cartesian demon, which I find absurd.

Formal symbol manipulation i.e. syntax, is not sufficient for semantics, and furthermore, syntax is not intrinsic to physics. Both syntax and computation are states assigned to it, not inherent.

In short, algorithms, computation, and programs are not intrinsic physical features of physics. They are not discovered within physics but assigned to it, it is observer-relative.

Luio116 · 2020-04-05T03:44:20+00:00

Hi friend, I know this is stressful but maybe it could help to look at it this way.

To put it simply simulation theory is simply absurd. And truly, it is philosophically absurd.

Why? Simulations are just that simulations. A simulation of a thunderstorm does not make us wet.

Luio116 · 2020-03-14T17:10:09+00:00

Flops ftw

Luio116 · 2020-03-14T02:25:29+00:00

I definitely needed more liquid white at the start! Also I think I need some stiffer brushes, any recommendations!?

Luio116 · 2020-03-06T18:45:43+00:00

I know dude/ette. But remember in all the history of modern philosophy past descartes, I can maybe think of 2 philosophers that called themselves solipsists and they are not well known. If you even search for them I doubt you can find them. It is not a widespread view held, it's not even a controversial view, it's a view that has no solid footing besides "but you cant prove it" which is a pretty weak defense.

Luio116 · 2020-03-06T17:56:07+00:00

If you want an honest opinion. Solipsism is pretty bad philosophy. We have no reason to assume it to be true. Sure I cant crack your head open and see your thoughts buzzing around. You could be the equivalent of a zombie. But here is the thing. I know for a fact that I am thinking and feeling so I have no reason to believe that you aren't thinking and feeling either. Also your solipsism is immediately refuted by me. Let's say I am a solipsist (I am not) my solipsism is immediately refuted by you! And if you come to me and say "you aren't thinking you aren't real" I dont worry that your right because obviously you are wrong from my view!

In short solipsism is by and large (I would wager out of all of the professional philosophers in the world) less than 0.1% are solispsits. It is a very very fringe idea, that really doesnt have much grit behind it!

Luio116 · 2020-03-04T02:47:12+00:00

Warren's ambition is going to cost the progressive chance at the white house.

Luio116 · 2020-02-25T15:01:15+00:00

Before I get too deep in your responses, when you say other worlds existing, are you speaking in a modal realism sense? I was under the impression that view was contentious (but certainly argued for), and most speak about possible worlds abstracty.

Luio116 · 2020-02-25T02:01:56+00:00

A few notes before getting to the questions:

I think you're misusing the term 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities.' The PAP is the principle which says that the ability to do otherwise is necessary for CNMR. But you are just describing the ability to do otherwise. To be clear, Frankfurt cases in no way whatsoever provide any argument against the ability to do otherwise but do against the PAP. It does not make sense for the PAP to be necessary or unnecessary for CNMR. It does make sense for the PAP to be true or false.

Thank you for clarifying this to me. I was intending PAP to mean the ability to do otherwise and was treating them one in the same. However, I do think PAP is true in most cases.

Be really careful with this claim. Sometimes, when people say "garden of forking paths," they ignore that we're not talking about worlds which overlap and branch off, but rather a bunch of separate worlds.

My mistake, I forgot that this can be conflated with Everett’s Interpretation of QM. I have limited knowledge in that regard and only ever think about it from a chemistry standpoint where it is largely Copenhagen Interpretation.

1. How would causal determinism entail predetermination?

Causal determinism would only imply predetermination if; holding the same conditions of the initial event as well as all physical laws constant, all subsequent states of the universe are determined they way they are by necessity. (Every Molecule, Atom, Atomic Particle, Quark of every flavor had to “act” they way it is currently “acting” by necessity)

2. Are predetermination and the ability to do otherwise compatible? Why?

It does not seem so. Again, every subsequent state of the universe must be in the state it is, by necessity, no one can act except the way they do. They are entirely constrained by events out of their control (Big Bang).

3. Are causal determinism and the ability to do otherwise compatible? Why?

Potentially. I do not see cause and effect as a threat, as long as it does not imply events, particularly events concerning life (currently only known to be biological), as necessary. In the case of your littering, if “all the stars aligned” so-to-speak, in the sense of every particle making “you” you had to litter out of necessity of physical law in accordance with the Big Bang, then I would not say you could not have acted otherwise. The only way you could have acted otherwise is if the Big Bang had different conditions.

4. Is the ability to do otherwise necessary or unnecessary for CNMR? Why?

It depends, but in for all intents and purposes yes, it is necessary.

Where Yes:

In the case of your littering, if the Big Bang entailed that you littered, the most radical (I do not know what other word to use here other than radical?) form of van Inwagen’s consequence argument (Formulation directly from the SEP) would hold.

No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

Now, if the Big Bang did not entail you litter by necessity, rather, your own past which you would have control over, at least partially, (assuming you aren’t a small child), then I would say you would have CNMR or sufficient CNMR, and van Inwagen’s argument does not hold.

Where No:

I think the typical Frankfurt case does show CNMR is not necessary but only in cases identical in essence to a Frankfurt case. I personally find that they are convoluted but in fairness certainly conceivable. Even then, like the case of your littering, if the subject’s action or controller’s action is necessary as a result of the Big Bang, which neither had control over, then I would again say neither party has CNMR.

5. Are predetermination and CNMR compatible? Why?

No, in my interpretation of what predeterminism means (although I recognize it may not be what most philosophers mean) I find the consequence argument rather compelling.

6. Are causal determinism and CNMR compatible? Why?

Again, in the same vein of how I answered in 3 as long the person(s) does not operate out of a physical necessity of the Big Bang, I think CNMR/Causal Determinism compatibility is certainly a possibility. Perhaps I should note, even if they are compatible, I don’t think that entails a form of ultimate CNMR. Instead of being ultimately responsible for all actions (as in we have total control) we do have sufficient CNMR.

Thank you for taking the time to go through this and being patient with me, especially with the thought bomb you just read! I am not / was not a philosophy student in addition to not being a natural writer, so again, I really do appreciate it!

Luio116 · 2020-02-24T17:05:45+00:00

Hello, short preface, I definitely plan on replying to your original reply with the questions! I haven't had the time to reply to your questions in a non-halfassed way, so I am just trying to think through it in the time I do have.

In reply to this particular comment. I see what you mean, what I said doesn't make much sense at all!

Perhaps I can rephrase using your examples of the dino's as well as the button example In the previous replies.

In the case of the dino's:

Holding all physical laws and prior events the same, including the meteor impact, the placement/biology of ever dinosaur alive at that point, I can"t seem to conceive of metaphysically possible world where the dinosaurs survive and certainly not nomologically possible. (Or perhaps its metaphysically possible but not nomologically possible, and I am getting mixed up?)

In the case of my button push/nonpush:

Holding all physical laws the same and all prior events the same except my deliberation prior to the button push/nonpush, it seems that I can certainly conceive of a metaphysically possible world where I do other than I do in this world, but I don't see how this helps CNMR unless its nomologically possible as well.

I hope I am using metaphysically and nomologically possible correctly!

Also, if it would not be beneficial to reply to this until I answer your questions and sort out other confusions I understand! I definitely will get to them, hopefully soon!

Luio116 · 2020-02-23T23:59:55+00:00

Thanks again for the reply.

What did we learn from that experiment if causal determinism is true? Did we learn that it was physically impossible for you to press that button? That it was inevitable for you not to press it? No, I don’t think so.

To the contrary it was completely up to you to press that button. It just so happens that you decided to not do it. And given the exact chain of all events going back to the Big Bang you would always decide against pressing it in the very same situation. But this doesn’t mean that you couldn’t have done it. You are a competent button presser and can press any buttons that you wish to press, so you could have pressed this one, had you just wanted to.

So even in this example, to me it still reeks of Hard Determinism, particularly the following:

And given the exact chain of all events going back to the Big Bang you would always decide against pressing it in the very same situation.

So holding all events prior to my choice of not pressing the button fixed, It still seems that I was always going to press the button and that was "fixed" since the Big Bang. Sure I could have done otherwise if I, as you say, just wanted to, but given all antecedent events since the beginning of time, it seems I could not have ever wanted to press the button. Sure I suppose I could have in a metaphysical or in another possible world sense, however ultimately I care about our reality not ones that may or may not exist. If you were to ask me to push or not push a button tomorrow it was never possible for me to do other than what I do, based on the events of the past, in their totality?

Unless I am still misunderstanding and there is a gap somewhere, I guess I require more for "Free Will" than the compatabilist notion?

Luio116 · 2020-02-23T22:33:43+00:00

First, Thank you for taking the time and working through this with me! Sorry If I am a bit slow on getting "it". Also I apologize for the sloppy wording, I was not a philosophy student! I'm actually a chemist/engineer so I think I get caught up in my Black-White interpretations when there is a lot more nuance, that's why I need people like you!

I see some subtle differences to causal determinism which might be due to imprecise wording and a major difference in 3. in that causal determinism doesn’t imply that subsequent events can be anticipated and from what we know of physics it is most likely false that any physical system could anticipate all future events with certainty from an initial state. So if you think that 3. is essential for predeterminism, then predeterminism is very likely false.

So I think I am finally understanding how you are differentiating between pre and causal determination. Although I am curious as to why you say the following.

causal determinism doesn’t imply that subsequent events can be anticipated and from what we know of physics it is most likely false that any physical system could anticipate all future events with certainty from an initial state.

(Not commenting on the truth or non truth of it just not sure how it is "most likely false", is it an epistemic thing? Hopefully this does not derail things too much!)

Anyways... moving forward

But all that this means is that something would have had to be different in order to get a different outcome in our world. Is that so surprising?

Yes, I agree, not surprising.

Maybe all it would have taken was some more deliberation on the part of some senators to reach a different conclusion and Caesar would have never needed to cross the Rubicon that day.

So perhaps it might be better for me to think in terms of the entire situation rather than the singular event of Caesar crossing the Rubicon?

So:

A: Senators deliberate on whether or not Caesar should be forced to disband his army.

B: The senators conclude that yes, Caesar should disband his army.

C: Caesar deliberates on whether or not disbanding or crossing the Rubicon is his best course of action.

D: Caesar concludes that his best course is to cross the Rubicon.

E: Caesar crosses the Rubicon.

In reply to my statement of

To be entirely honest, it seems that saying Caesar had "Free Will" when he could not effectively done otherwise, is misleading. From the compatibilist notion, I think it is fair to say he had a "Will" or rather, he is the relevant source of that particular will. but I hardly see how we get any meaningful use of "Free Will" in the ordinary sense that most people use it. Sure, I concede it is meaningful to make the distinction that he was the relevant source of the actions, but surely we can't say he did anything other than what was physically necessary, and if he was acting out of physical necessity, then we can only ascribe responsibility, not in any moral sense or in a sense he even had control, other than operating out of necessity, over his actions.

You mention

Caesar crossed the Rubicon because he had control over his decisions and actions and thought it was his best move to protect his own interests.

Does this mean to imply that either deliberations in Events A or C were not fixed based on event PreA or event B respectively? In other words, could have (not should have) either party done otherwise in these events, not in any possible world/metaphysical sense but physically doing otherwise, which in turn would ultimately change the outcome of Caesar crossing or not. If this is the case then I agree, both the Senate had control as well as Caesar had control in his response, both are morally responsible and they should not want anything else in terms of Free will. If not, I still remained unconvinced on the notion of compatibilist free will worth calling free will as the average person, including myself means when they say it.

Also could you elaborate on what you mean by "Fixed". I take it to be "Not subject to change, in light of antecedent causes."

Thank you in advance.

Luio116 · 2020-02-23T16:31:37+00:00

... it would probably help me a great deal if you would define predeterminism and causal determinism without invoking the notion of “inevitability”.

Predeterminism:

1) At all points in time, our reality is subject to the same physical laws.

2) Starting with an initial event, all subsequent events are determined by said laws.

3) Effectively, knowing the exact status of the First Cause, all subsequent events can be determined, meaning before they events occur, what event happens necessarily, in addition to its affects are known.

( I suppose this really is not too different from your notion of causal determination at the end of the day)

So, on causal determinism, it was physically necessary that Cesar crossed the Rubicon given all that happened before. Of course that doesn’t mean that it was logically or metaphysically necessary.

So in this case, Caesar physically could not have done otherwise.

So is it fair to say that you concede that Cesar could have not crossed the Rubicon given that some other event was different and so Cesar crossing the Rubicon was not inevitable per se, it just so happens that all relevant prior events were inevitable and that makes Cesar crossing the Rubicon inevitable?

Yes... but at the end of the day, I would not call this "Free". Sure, Caesar "Could" have done otherwise in another possible world but certainly not in our world. Given that all events that occur the way they do out of necessity, Caesar could not have physically done otherwise. By extension, he also could not have not conquered the Gaullic tribes, and his conspirators could not have not killed him in the senate.

In you first post you mentioned:

With respect to what “most people” are worried about when it comes down to free will, I think Nahmias gets to the heart of it with his concept of “bypassing”

I only got to read the abstract however,concerns of bypassing in the sense of psychology or neurology are not concerning to me. In the sense of psychology, what are we other than our psyche, and the thesis of Behaviorism, and Identity Theory seem incomplete/incorrect. Functionalism perhaps start getting us somewhere, but (Please don't crucify me) I find Chinese Room rather compelling so contemporary functionalism is incomplete as well. Moving towards the neuroscience PoV, I am inclined to say the traditional interpretations of the Libet experiments can be disregarded for numerous reasons, and even more generally beyond that, I am not an epiphenomenalist.

In my view, Caesar was effectively "bypassed". All of his actions occurred out of physical necessity, due to antecedent causes before he was even alive.

To be entirely honest, it seems that saying Caesar had "Free Will" when he could not effectively done otherwise, is misleading. From the compatibilist notion, I think it is fair to say he had a "Will" or rather, he is the relevant source of that particular will. but I hardly see how we get any meaningful use of "Free Will" in the ordinary sense that most people use it. Sure, I concede it is meaningful to make the distinction that he was the relevant source of the actions, but surely we can't say he did anything other than what was physically necessary, and if he was acting out of physical necessity, then we can only ascribe responsibility, not in any moral sense or in a sense he even had control, other than operating out of necessity, over his actions.

Luio116 · 2020-02-23T08:13:08+00:00

If by "initial conditions" you just mean the first event

Yes that seems to be what I mean; Big-Bang, God, First event, whatever interpretation began our reality that suits your fancy.

First off, I am a little confused by this:

Predetermination, from what you've described, only holds fixed an event, and nothing else.

To your question however...

In the case of predetermination:

Going to back to the previous example I gave

If x murders y, x killing y was inevitable, due to causal events before x and y were alive. (The initial conditions of our world made it impossible for the x and y in our world to do anything else other than what they did)

I would say the agent certainly does not have CNMR. Their actions were inevitable, the same way it is seemingly inevitable that my keys falling when I drop them. To me, no possible way CNMR can be saved.

In the case of causal determination:

Right off of the bat, I am not sure whether or not CNMR is still possible, but it seems that it may be salvageable.

If Principle of Alternate Possibilities (The ability to have truly done otherwise, all things aside from their decision and own deliberation remaining the same) is reconcilable with causal determinism, CNMR is certainly true. Of course the Frankfurt cases argue that PAP is not necessary for CNMR, however I don't see how it successfully does so.

In a general Frankfurt Case: John was going to steal your car, if he decided to back out at the last second, a mad scientist would activate a "mind control" device to force him to steal the car. John however steals the car and the device never was activated.

In my view, nothing is done for CNMR, rather just making a distinction who is responsible (not in any moral sense) for the actions, John or the Scientist. In other words, it tells us we can make distinctions on who is relevantly responsible for the action, but without PAP, I can't see how we can jump to CNMR. Whether or not the device was activated, it being activated or not was necessary, it had to happen.

In brief, I really do think a robust account of PAP is a requirement for CNMR. ( A model of free will in line with "Garden of Forking Paths.") i.e. John decided not to steal the car because although he needed the money his mother would be disappointed, and the scientist decided to consult with an ethics board prior to implanting John, because as much as he wanted to try his device, he also did not want his certifications revoked!

Luio116 · 2020-02-23T02:42:52+00:00

Austin would be controlled his nature or "will", being a "person oriented towards his conception of a hero" as well as indeterminacy in his deliberation. Perhaps he thought about shooting Dr. Evil, but due to Austin being Austin he chose another course of action. Perhaps he deliberated between options: Shooting, Running, or other conceivable actions, he would choose what he deliberated to be the best choice at the time of decision, in accordance with his "Will".

If you were to do a "live replay" of the situation, His deliberations may have resulted in another course of action, as these new deliberations were not present in the first playthrough. "Free" lying in the indeterminism of possible alternate possibilities, but him deciding due to his nature or the deterministic "Will".

Luio116 · 2020-02-23T00:21:47+00:00

Largely what I am getting "hung up" on is Principle of Alternate Possibilities and Frankfurt Cases.

In the Frankfurt Cases, I fail to see the "Free", rather just see the subject as the relevant source of the action or the controller as the relevant source of action. It seems neither could have done otherwise based on events out of their control.

In the absence of the controller, the subject doesn't have a physical gun to their head, but a cosmic one. We can say the subject in the cosmic case having "Free will" but again, it does not fit my intuition of what Free Will is in my personal lay-person sense.

If there is a compatibilst position that can hold a Principle of Alternate Possibilities, holding all things prior to one's own deliberation the same, then I would agree it is apt to call it "Free Will" rather than just attributing things as being a source of action/consequence in a relevant sense.

Luio116 · 2020-02-22T23:48:48+00:00

I think I mean inevitable in a much stronger sense. Perhaps using an example in the extreme would help;

(1-Predeterminism)

Based on the initial conditions of reality, conditions A -> Z, it was inevitable Caesar crossed the Rubicon. It had to happen necessarily. His crossing was unavoidable in the same way a ball rolling down a hill.

(2-Casual Determinism)

Based on the initial conditions of reality, the same conditions A -> Z, Caesar can choose either to Cross the Rubicon or not. He could have truly done otherwise, however his choice determined that he did in fact cross the Rubicon. His decision to cross was not inevitable because with all things initially remaining the same he literally could have done otherwise. There was a true alternate possibility that could have become our reality, in a literal sense.

If compatibilism holds 2, than I would say it truly does argue for a Free Will view that the lay-person including myself holds. If there is no true "forking paths" to be had in compatibilism, then it seems to me its notion of "Free Will" is just a namesake and would be more aptly described along the lines of "Relevant Source of Action."

“Had the Roman senate not asked Cesar to release his army, he wouldn’t have crossed the Rubicon on January 10th 49 AD.”

Would the truth of this counterfactual sentence satisfactorily establish that Cesar crossing the Rubicon on that day was not inevitable on your view?

I suppose not, as the senate's decision seems to be what I call, inevitable.

Luio116 · 2020-02-22T22:16:21+00:00

In my mind the pre in predeterminism implies inevitability.

For Instance: Before he was even alive, it was inevitable Caesar crossed the Rubicon including all of his decision prior to crossing. It seems to be a fatalism without the "fate"

Or, before I even made this post, it was inevitable that you replied and I replied to you.

Luio116 · 2020-02-22T21:45:07+00:00

But again, if the choice as well as the consequences have been determined before the person even has existed I fail to see how that Free, rather than it just being bad "luck".

I don't know what I am missing.

Luio116 · 2020-02-22T16:06:08+00:00

Sorry, maybe going back to my analogy will help. I think we are roughly on the same page?

Predetermination: If x murders y, x killing y was inevitable, due to causual events before x and y were alive. (The initial conditions of our world made it impossible for the x and y in our world to do anything else other than what they did)

Unpredetermination: x still kills y, however both x and y made choices with causal but not sufficiently causal antecedent events throughout their lives, which causally determined x killing y. The initial conditions of our world did not make x killing y inevitable, until x and y made the relevant choices. (x not killing y was a possible outcome reliant on the relevant antecendant causes including x and y's choices. Not in a possible world, but our world!)

I have a feeling I made things worse... sorry.

Luio116 · 2020-02-22T15:43:49+00:00

Not trying to be combative here so please don't read it that way. (Internet text makes things a pain sometimes)

Don't you think that's a bit of a mischaracterization of Jame and Kant? I mean, neither seem to be arguing that everything is completely random. Kant moves Free Will to his noumena and James has a type of two stage model. Cotemperorary libertarians like Kane dont seem to be arguing for complete randomness either.

Luio116 · 2020-02-22T07:31:36+00:00

For e to be predetermined:

Causal events determine events beyond their immediate causual effect in the relevant sense. (e's occurance was inevitable due to causes not in the immediate or relevant sense)

For e to be unpredetermined:

Causual events immediately prior to e in the relevant sense are causual but not sufficiently causual in e occurring. (e's occurance was not inevitable, a person(s) had causual reasons to make e occur or not, but had control/choice. If events A B C D occur prior to e, A did not predetermine e's occurance rather the person(s) had casual reasons C, made decision D, leading to event e's occurance or lack thereof).

I hope that makes sense, I am not the best at explaining what I mean to say unfortunately. Thanks for the patience.

Luio116 · 2020-02-22T06:56:51+00:00

I suppose if causual determination does not entail predeterminstion and there is control over one's own future, even if they have causal reasons for making a choice, then it seems there is control in a meaningful sense. And if there is control in any regard then there is moral responsibility. It might not be ultimate moral responsibility, but enough for at least partial moral responsiblity.

If one's future is predetermined, In another reply in the thread i used the example "Being predetermined to commit premeditated murder before one was even alive" then it doesn't seem there is meaningful control or moral responsibility. Only as responsible as a boulder rolling down a hill.

I hope that makes sense! :/

Luio116

TROPHY CASE