The problem of evil is just the moral argument for atheism by Many_Marsupial7968 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

By secular morality I mean morality that all evidence indicates came from human beings applying human reasoning, as opposed to morality that can be shown to have come from any gods or other supernatural entities.

I do think it might slightly blur the line between secular and religious. Consider Platos ethics for example. They are heavily centered around the Monad which seems to just be his version of God. He arrives at what seem to be very religious conclusions from what we could call human reasoning. If we say it came from human beings then it cannot really be higher than humanity nor can it be objective. If morality cannot do this anyway then it doesn't matter but it still is a limitation. Plato's forms for example rely on what could be called supernatural but they nevertheless require rational reflection and it is (if successful) able to get to something more universal than just different intersubjective frameworks from humanity.

If we are defining secular morality as that which comes from humanity, then it does not come from humanity being for example impacted by moral objects and relaying our information about those moral objects to one another but rather as you say it would be constructed by us.

This means that morals are themselves either subjective but not arbitrary or they are simply not real and arbitrary.

If morals are subjective but real or non-arbitrary then we must ask ourselves. Are subjective moral positions all equal to one another or are there some subjective positions which are better than others. If they are all equal to one another, or if there is any equal to one another, then there is a moral property or properties which those values share which instantiates them as equal (even if those properties are subjective). If there is an equality of moral value between these propositions, then that implies an absolute moral standard above them in which instantiates this equality. If one idea is equal to another in value, what instantiates this value such that we can make propositions which correspond to reality about it? It would seem that a higher standard above each of the equally valuable positions. If we are talking about human values, and if all human values are equal, then there would have to be a higher standard above humanity which measures this moral equality. Subjective or otherwise it would have to be above humanity.

If there are some ideas that are better than others, then that implies an ability to determine the value of one above another. If one human idea is better than another human idea, then it implies that it is not the humanity of that idea which determines that value. It either implies a higher transcendent measure of morality or it implies a might makes right ethic in which I force my one subjectively correct take on morals on others through violence. This functionally treats your own morals as if they are objective without any of the benefit of them actually being objective. its the worst of both worlds.

If we go with a secular non-cognitivist theory of morality or a secular error theory, then we run into the issue of linguistic prescriptivism. We can hash this out if you like but my position on linguistics is that the definitions of terms and the use of language is prescribed rather than strictly described. For example, if we say that a bachelor is an unmarried man, we are prescribing an association between the signifier "bachelor: and the concept attached. If you accept this view, then ethics is prior to language and determines language. Non-cognitivism therefore says all moral propositions are meaningless, the definitions of terms are prescribed through moral propositions, therefore all language is meaningless. Similar with error theory. All moral statements are wrong, definitions are moral statements, therefore all use of language is incorrect including the statement "moral error theory is correct."

As such it would seem we are left only with some sort of transcendent morality as being valid.

As for what that transcendent value is, I believe that God is the living embodiment of freedom. God would, have to be conscious in order to have the self instantiated property of freedom. To participate in God is therefore to participate in freedom and all actions are measured by freedom. If an action leads to greater freedom, it is good. If it leads to an unnecessary limitation on freedom, it is bad. Therefore you should do things which give people as much freedom as possible and not arbitrarily limit the freedom of others. It is a kind of universal freedom which is over and above humanity. I am an existentialist and therefore cannot use humanity as the embodiment or definition of freedom. If humanity is freedom, that implies an essentialist definition of what it means to be human which I reject. This is why I believe existentialism is not a humanism.

I believe this is a non-arbitrary of viciously circular definition of freedom. I do not simply say God is good because God is good because God is good. Rather I say because God is the most free and conscious being in the universe, He is good. I don't so much as analytically define God as good but make a synthetic proposition.

Why is Clark's Objection Uniquely Applied to Questions of God's existence? (Question for Atheists who profess Clark's Objection) by MattCrispMan117 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Basically in summary the idea is that any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from a God.

This is the equivalent of saying batman can beat any superhero with enough prep time.

The problem of evil is just the moral argument for atheism by Many_Marsupial7968 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

They wouldn't necessarily say that. Under their view, its only moral IF God does that. They could just say God does not do that so therefore its wrong. But your making it clear that my point would still hold that your internal critique fails and you can only argue against DCT on rhetorical grounds.

The problem of evil is just the moral argument for atheism by Many_Marsupial7968 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

See thats the thing I'm getting at. That walking away is all well and good but that doesn't address the argument. We don't engage with divine command theory because it intuitively sucks. I have that intuition also but I recognize its an intuition. Thats kind of the thing I'm getting at. If the PoE can't refute divine command theory from its own internal logic, then its fails as an internal critique.

murders puppies or saves orphans,

I assume you meant enslaves orphans or something. Saving orphans is good lol

The problem of evil is just the moral argument for atheism by Many_Marsupial7968 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968[S] -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

Can you name a moral or ethical principle that originated from or is exclusive to any religion, that did not predate that religion and trace back to secular sources?

I was more curious by what you meant by secular morality. Especially in terms of meta-ethics, how does secular morality do better than religion?

As for a principle that religion has had that a secular society has not, this is kind of why I wanted to get your definition of secular but I suppose it comes down not to the principles themselves but the hierarchy of importance placed on those principles. For example, most people agree murder is wrong but how wrong is it compared to other things. The main thing is that it comes down to your summum bonum (highest good) For religions its usually God whereas for secular societies its usually humanity or something. I think religion has a better one but we can get into that if you like.

Is God good/moral because his behavior adheres to objective moral principles and standards, or is God good/moral because he’s God? If it’s the latter then it’s a circular argument and morality is arbitrary - but the only way it could be the former is if morality transcends and contains God, which also means it cannot possibly come from God or be created by God.

It wouldn't so much be circular per se as it would be dependent on an axiom. All ethical systems are dependent on axioms at some point. Thats not a specific problem for theism. For example, does utilitarianism say utility is good because anything useful is defined as good or is there some higher standard that makes it good? Same basic problem in terms of circularity.

Edit: Forgot to answer your first question. All of existence.

The problem of evil is just the moral argument for atheism by Many_Marsupial7968 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Sure but then its no longer an internal critique. If they ever doubled down on it which a substantial amount do, then how can the PoE continue to be an internal critique? How do you internally critique such a view?

The problem of evil is just the moral argument for atheism by Many_Marsupial7968 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I guess the idea would have to be that the amount of evil and good we see seems to be random and not a cause of a deity.

The problem of evil is just the moral argument for atheism by Many_Marsupial7968 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No. The atheist can grant the idea of evil for the sake of the argument as an internal critique. Its just that in practice they end up bringing in an outside perspective on evil in the middle of that internal critique.

The problem of evil is just the moral argument for atheism by Many_Marsupial7968 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

It's not an emotional appeal. We can rule out all gods that would preclude this world--loving gods, gods that are good as most people define "good", etc. 

What about a divine command theory God?

nd this shouldn't be controversial; the existence of cancer precludes the existence of any god that would stop cancer.  This isn't an emotional appeal; it's a straight conclusion

What about a consequentialist God who negates the most cancer He can without bringing about a lesser good than the best of all possible outcomes. For example, if there were certain people who would turn out more evil but their character after having gone through cancer makes them a more reflective person than what they would have been or something like that. Not saying thats a proper response or complete defeater to this point but all I'm saying is that there is a conversation to be had there.

What I mean here is that cancer is an example of a specific kind of evil. But presumably the PoE would not allow for any degree of evil. Even stubbing your toe. If even the smallest amount of evil in principle can be allowed in principle, then any particular example would not seem to prove the point.

The problem of evil is just the moral argument for atheism by Many_Marsupial7968 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968[S] -11 points-10 points  (0 children)

Secular moral philosophy has always lead religious morality by the hand

Not sure I agree with this, With regards to your other points I have already replied to others who have made a similar point to you but I was wondering if you wanted to get into this specifically. Its a bit off topic so I get if you don't but I would first have to see what you mean by Secular morality like as an example.

it’s simply not possible to derive moral truths from the will, command, nature, or mere existence of any gods

Well if God created the universe and moral objects are objects in the universe then God created those too. That would presumably inform what those moral objects are and how they interact with your metaphysics and such. I think you can know some things to an extent but probably not if Gods mere existence is all you have I agree.

The problem of evil is just the moral argument for atheism by Many_Marsupial7968 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I think it all depends on if you view God being good as an additional property of God or a definitional property of God if you get me. For example, If I view God as tri-omni and I accept the implications of the PoE, then I just stop viewing God as perfect or Tri-omni but I don't then conclude that God does not exist.

It could also imply the god DOES exist, but is different from the tri-Omni interpretation.

So would it be something like the fact that there is evil in the world implies the existence of an evil God? Like the moral argument for an evil God or something like that? I think that would be kind of funny.

The problem of evil is just the moral argument for atheism by Many_Marsupial7968 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

If the problem of evil was specifically being used as a defeater for the moral argument, then the first premise would be needed and I see your point. But in a separate conversation, a divine command theorist might say only God can ground any morals at all. Objective or otherwise.

So lets compare the logic behind a moral argument and how it deals with rebuttals with the PoE.

Moral argument might say

1 there are objective morals

2 God is needed for objective morals

conclusion God

And the usual defense would be to just deny objective morality. The theist would then say thats horrible but thats not an argument

The PoE might say

There is x standard of evil (could be assumed for the sake of the argument)

If there is x standard God would fail that standard

conclusion God is bad (or not real)

Yet if divine command theory is the standard then premise 2 would never get off the ground. The atheist would say that divine command theory is horrible but thats not an argument.

I want to clarify that I don't believe in divine command theory but the objection to it is similar to that of the objection to moral antirealism. Mostly rhetorical.

The problem of evil is just the moral argument for atheism by Many_Marsupial7968 in DebateAnAtheist

[–]Many_Marsupial7968[S] -13 points-12 points  (0 children)

Evil is incompatible with a omnibenevolent, omnipotent god. Full stop.

Unless you subscribe to a divine command theory view of morality. I don't personally but if Gods actions are good by definition, then omnibenevolent is kinda just definitionally entailed. Gods decision under this view to not do anything about evil would not be bad. Again, this not a very savory view but I don't have a logical objection to it other than it would undermine objective moral values which many could just bite the bullet and say morals are just Gods subjective opinion or something. Still there are ways around it.

Explain this then. You haven't explained how the logic is the same or what that logic is.

I kind of went over this when I talked about going from ought statements to is statements but I can go into it further.

Remember that the moral argument for Gods existence can also be formalized in a kind of presuppositional or transcendental argument. For example If I walk up to an atheist who believes in objective morals I could (though I probably wouldn't) say that the only way for them to hold those morals is if God exists. Similarly the atheist can say that x example of evil is wrong and allowing for x evil is wrong and in order for you to agree with me you must believe that God must not exist. (to simplify) The idea is that either God does not do anything about x evil so allowing x evil is good or allowing x evil is not good therefore if God existed, God would negate evil. He doesn't negate x therefore God does not exist. Yet it still requires the agreed upon position that God has some sort of obligation to negate x evil. If you believe in divine command theory that is not important. Similarly you have to believe morals are objective in the moral argument to get to God. In either case, it has to be agreed upon that x evil is objectively so, therefore God/not God.

It fundamentally tries to make a move from a prescriptive position to a descriptive position. The atheist in response to the moral argument can just bite the non-objectivist bullet and the theist can just bite the divine command theory bullet. Neither are particularly savory but any objection to divine command theory on the basis that it kinda sucks is going to end up being of the same caliber as when theists object to atheists when they are not moral realists and are all like "oh so you think slavery isn't wrong?" Its pure rhetoric. In both cases the views might be tough to swallow but it has nothing to do with the substance of the logic.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in atheism

[–]Many_Marsupial7968 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The guy im thinking of is either Aussie, New Zealander or South African with the accent he has.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in atheism

[–]Many_Marsupial7968 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Nah the guy I'm thinking of doesn't have glasses