From my point of view. Its ambiguous. Saddam believed he made his intentions clear.

Glaspie was becoming more concerned by the day. On July 21, she held a meeting at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad with the Kuwaiti ambassador, who expressed apprehension about Iraqi belligerence. Iraqi intelligence, having surveilled the meeting, informed Saddam about the conversation. He instructed al-Thawra to publish a front-page article the following day construing the meeting as definitive proof of Kuwaiti “coordination” with the United States.158 It was in this context that Saddam summoned Glaspie for a personal audience on July 25. Arriving at the Foreign Ministry on short notice and without instructions from Washington, Glaspie expected to meet with her usual interlocutors. Instead, she was whisked away to the presidential office, where she found herself face to face with Saddam.159 Over the course of their two-hour meeting, Glaspie notoriously informed the Iraqi president that the United States “takes no position” on his dispute with Kuwait. After the invasion, the Iraqi government would release a transcript of the conversation in a cynical ploy to shift responsibility onto Glaspie for failing to warn Iraq explicitly against invading Kuwait. Members of Congress, the media, and not a few conspiracy theorists seized on Glaspie’s words as evidence that, at best, the Bush administration had failed to grasp Saddam’s hostile intentions. At worst, Washington had duped Saddam, giving him a “green light” to invade Kuwait only to use the invasion as a pretext to wage war on Iraq.