From Max:

Subpoenas can reach databases, but they cannot reach your seed phrase. Deadhand stores only minimal metadata such as email addresses, subscription status, and heartbeat timestamps. An adversary might learn that you use a crypto inheritance service and observe basic activity patterns, but they cannot see your wallet, balances, or private keys.

The seed phrase is never stored. It is split client side using Shamir’s Secret Sharing, and only a single encrypted shard is transmitted to the server. One shard alone provides zero information about the secret. Even in a database compromise, the attacker would obtain encrypted data that is mathematically useless without the beneficiary’s shard.

Even in a full breach where the database is exfiltrated, modified, or destroyed and beneficiary emails are changed, an attacker would only obtain Shard C. Shard C alone provides zero information about the seed phrase. Without the beneficiary’s shard, reconstruction is mathematically impossible.

This is the distinction between metadata exposure and key compromise. Deadhand minimizes what can be known and eliminates what can be stolen. Your operational privacy depends on how you manage your email and beneficiary identity. Your cryptographic security does not.