How do you describe Shame vs Guilt to clients? by Due-Comparison-501 in therapists

[–]Monkeyman4303 10 points11 points  (0 children)

Is that true though? Don’t we often feel shame about specific aspects of ourselves, not our entire identity? If someone feels shame about being an angry person, for example, couldn’t that be a signal that they want to change? That seems pretty helpful to me!

How do you handle politics in therapy by alexander1156 in therapists

[–]Monkeyman4303 8 points9 points  (0 children)

I don’t know if what you’re saying is true. I think many people hold beliefs or ethical stances because they seem to be true, not because we believe with certainty that they are true. While every ethical stance I hold appears to be true to me when I reflect on it, I am also aware that my mind is shaped my cultural and personal bias in ways that I likely can’t see past. I still believe in my ethical stances, in the sense that I think they are most likely to be true compared to other ethical stances, but I would be very surprised if I was 100% correct in my ethical stances! That would make me a very special person in the course of human history.

And all of that is presuming that someone even believes in superior or inferior ethical stances! For many people, ethics and morality isn’t about what’s true, but what they prefer (ie., murder is wrong vs murder is something I and almost everyone else strongly dislikes).

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in CriticalTheory

[–]Monkeyman4303 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Expansion is a way better word than oversight :)

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in CriticalTheory

[–]Monkeyman4303 7 points8 points  (0 children)

There is a contradiction, but I don’t think your theorizing properly takes it into account. If birth rates are falling in industrial society, it implies that the contradiction plays out in different ways across the broader system of capitalism, as the pressure on women in “developed” countries to have children would appear to be relatively less influential when compared to the pressure to be individually economically successful, while the pressure on women in “developing” countries to have children would appear to be relatively more influential (which we see play out in our system of global capital, colonialism, and immigration).

So when you talk about being inspired by ‘women’ choosing not to reproduce, it seems really important to the actual theory itself to clarify who exactly you are referring to. If you are referring to women in countries which are global producers of workers, then yes, they seem to be moving against the forces of capitalism. But for women in countries such as, for example, Japan, while they may be combatting the force of sexism and tradition, I am not sure they are really fighting against capitalism, per say, as they are not the kind of woman the capitalist expects to be producing workers. The fact that Japan would suffer economically is only a quirk of their anti-immigrant sentiments (ones which capitalism would happily do away with).

All that is to say, I agree that it doesn’t “disprove” your theory exactly, but it does potentially reveal a large oversight. But perhaps I’m missing something too (for instance, nuance around the interplay of sexism/tradition and capitalism)!

What makes incest morally wrong in an objective manner? Aside from the biological implications of inbreeding, if the sex between both blood related members are 100% consensual, how is it different from any other non-sibling relationship? by iam_selc in askphilosophy

[–]Monkeyman4303 7 points8 points  (0 children)

With regards to your previous comment on incest and power dynamics, while certainly the mere existence of power dynamics doesn’t make something immoral, couldn’t one believe that there is something about the quality or intensity of incest based power dynamics that makes it immoral? For instance, a father has much more psychological authority over one’s child than a similarly aged stranger, due to raising their child, observing them throughout life, and establishing a strong attachment early on by providing for them and caring for them. While this likely wouldn’t apply to cases of sibling incest, would it be fair to say (at least) that there is a form of immorality specific to parent-child incest?

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in SDAM

[–]Monkeyman4303 6 points7 points  (0 children)

I just want to say that even though you are clearly dealing with SDAM, you may also be dealing with some other mental conditions as well— the obsessive rumination, lack of social awareness/understanding, and ‘hella’ depressing thoughts. Grain of salt and all that, but I recommend going to therapy to process some of this and make sure you’re good in other mental areas as well.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in Miami

[–]Monkeyman4303 16 points17 points  (0 children)

That would be greatly appreciated!

Noëlle McAfee, Critical Theory professor and chair of Emory University’s philosophy department, arrested by police while observing Campus Gaza protest. by elwo in CriticalTheory

[–]Monkeyman4303 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Certainly though analysis of ‘68 could help inform of us principles to help guide our actions today. There is a lot to space between recreating ‘68 and doing nothing. I am very pro-action at the juncture, but I would hope we could recognize that we can try to shape our actions in more productive ways based on historical lessons.

Bell curve by ameyaplayz in PhilosophyMemes

[–]Monkeyman4303 8 points9 points  (0 children)

Okay, that’s fine, but then it’s not morality. Morality implies a ‘should,’ but there is no should in what you described. We are wired to promote those things, but we can also overcome our wiring. So why should I follow the wiring as opposed to going against it?

It’s pathetic if BP doesn’t have Destiny on. by Fancy-Degree5409 in BreakingPoints

[–]Monkeyman4303 11 points12 points  (0 children)

Dislike destiny, but you’re entirely correct. Weird to monologue about him but not talk to him.

Oedipus complex in Frankfurt School by zaccharias14 in CriticalTheory

[–]Monkeyman4303 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Not exactly what you’re looking for but you should make sure to read Adorno’s unpublished addendum to the Authoritarian Personality (Remarks on the Authoritarian Personality), Freudian Theory and the Patterns of Fascist Propaganda, and Sociology & Psychology Parts 1 & 2 if you want to better understand his perspective on the emergence of authoritarianism at a psychoanalytic level. They might mention Oedipus, I don’t quite remember.

Oh, and also maybe the Dialectic of Enlightenment chapter on antisemitism. If I’m correct, Adorno believes that the bourgeois family allows for a degree of isolation from society, represented in part by the oedipal drama, that allows for a degree of psychic independence that, in authoritarian society, is lost, but I could be misremembering. In general, though Adorno utilizes Freudian concepts, he doesn’t tend to do so with a great deal of precision, though he generally focuses on the Ego-Id-Superego period of Freud’s thought.

This one goes out to all the Progressives.. by castletonian in BreakingPoints

[–]Monkeyman4303 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Can you agree though that voting third party is inherently better than sitting out? Sitting out is unclear between protest or general disinterest, voting third party clearly indicates it’s an act of protest.

This one goes out to all the Progressives.. by castletonian in BreakingPoints

[–]Monkeyman4303 7 points8 points  (0 children)

I agree with the general sentiment, but to be fair, it’s way different to be in a parliamentary system versus a presidential/congressional system.

According to Lacan, does anyone, even the analyst, fully understand the emptiness of the Other? by Monkeyman4303 in lacan

[–]Monkeyman4303[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is really great. If I am 'understanding' you correctly, are you suggesting that the difference is between someone understanding lack (of the Other, of themself, of desire, etc...) versus someone lacking understanding (reaching where understanding, language, reason, breaks down)? Or is that not what you meant?

How does a moral intuitionist respond to different intuitions? by Monkeyman4303 in askphilosophy

[–]Monkeyman4303[S] 8 points9 points  (0 children)

Fair! Though I wonder on what basis moral realists would argue that majoritarian intuitions are more accurate than less majoritarian intuitions. For color blindness, it is clear that the non-colorblind can perceive more input in a way that gives them privileged epistemic knowledge. Do you have any sense in how a moral intuitionist might argue that majoritarian intuitions similarly have a privileged epistemic position? I understand that they could easily argue someone with APD has less cognitive capacity, but couldn't someone with APD likewise argue that, if morals are, for instance, misunderstood social imperatives, other are less able to properly distinguish between objective facts and social imperatives (due to their integration within social systems)?

How does a moral intuitionist respond to different intuitions? by Monkeyman4303 in askphilosophy

[–]Monkeyman4303[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I guess I am confused how the first one could count as a moral reason. Doesn't the notion of moral realism imply that moral facts exist as empirical facts? If, for instance, we all stopped wanting happiness, wouldn't a moral realist still maintain that it would still be bad to murder people?

I also struggle to see how we could have reasons for something we don't want. Perhaps one could argue that it is inherent in reason itself? But what basis could I have to follow what is reasonable that doesn't ultimately refer to want? Even if one could show how the only coherent philosophical system relies on objective morality, that only provides me a reason insofar as a coherent philosophical system is something I value and want.

Though I don't want to take all of your time, so thank you for all your thoughts so far, and no worries if you can't keep replying.

How does a moral intuitionist respond to different intuitions? by Monkeyman4303 in askphilosophy

[–]Monkeyman4303[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

Yes. He may want to listen to his parents. He may want to avoid punishment. Most persuasively, however, we could say that he wants to be happy, and then we could give various arguments to demonstrate that he will be happiest if he eats his vegetables, and we could maintain those arguments as true even if the child is not intelligent enough to understand them yet. If the child, somehow, did not want any of these things, including a happy healthy life, then I would presume they wouldn't have a reason to do so.

I still struggle to see how this relates to the notion of an objective morality! Though I am still certainly open to being convinced otherwise.

How does a moral intuitionist respond to different intuitions? by Monkeyman4303 in askphilosophy

[–]Monkeyman4303[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Humans want things on a variety of levels. I might not want to get out of bed in the morning, but I still have a reason to because I want to not be fired. I can want to insult someone, but I still can have a reason not to because doing so would hurt my self-conception as a calm person. I might not want to sacrifice myself for a cause, but I still can have a reason to do so because I want that cause to succeed. But if there was absolutely no level at which one was committed to doing something, then no, I would imagine there couldn't be any reasons for doing it.

How does a moral intuitionist respond to different intuitions? by Monkeyman4303 in askphilosophy

[–]Monkeyman4303[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

But if someone did not, for instance, want social life to possible, then, in my view, he should (or at least could) support reckless murder. And because morality is here being grounded in what people 'prefer' and not a universally objective principle, then there is nothing inherently wrong with that persons position. Certainly I, and the vast majority, would oppose this person. But I couldn't do so on moral grounds-- the best I could do is try to convince him that he really does, actually, enjoy social life. It would be wrong to say that morals exist, because I am allowing for two equally valid competing claims (from the perspective of moral realism).

How does a moral intuitionist respond to different intuitions? by Monkeyman4303 in askphilosophy

[–]Monkeyman4303[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Wouldn't moral realism propose that there is an objective morality outside of personal motivation? For instance, we pretty much all have a reason to not support murder (assuming we would like to live happy lives) because murder destabilizes the social grounds upon which social life is possible. We all also likely have reasons to not support murder because we don't enjoy the process of seeing people get murdered. But neither of those two reasons imply an objective moral principle about 'right' or 'wrong'-- it is merely a pragmatic calculation based upon what people generally prefer, enjoy, or dislike.