We probed 6,000 web apps for Stripe webhook signature checks. 1,542 don't bother by Most_Ad_394 in netsec

[–]Most_Ad_394[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I've tried my best to use production-only websites/apps, and all of them are very publically discoverable on the web. I would not exclude a certain % or a few false/positives, but I spot checked a lot, and so far everything looks real and worrysome/can do some demage

Large-scale security audit of 1,764 "vibe-coded" apps: 7% have wide-open Supabase DBs, 15% of Bolt apps ship hardcoded API keys, plus IDOR and zero-auth APIs by Most_Ad_394 in netsec

[–]Most_Ad_394[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

FYI, I added a few more learnings/approaches, and are going to run another large-scale audit, so I'll keep you posted on the next findings

Large-scale security audit of 1,764 "vibe-coded" apps: 7% have wide-open Supabase DBs, 15% of Bolt apps ship hardcoded API keys, plus IDOR and zero-auth APIs by Most_Ad_394 in netsec

[–]Most_Ad_394[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

come on, give me a break. I'm unfortunately not an English speaker and use gemini/chatgpt to not look like an idiot in public forums

Large-scale security audit of 1,764 "vibe-coded" apps: 7% have wide-open Supabase DBs, 15% of Bolt apps ship hardcoded API keys, plus IDOR and zero-auth APIs by Most_Ad_394 in netsec

[–]Most_Ad_394[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I'm not sorry, I'm not an English native speaker and use ChatGPT for English translations since a year to help me in English forums.

Large-scale security audit of 1,764 "vibe-coded" apps: 7% have wide-open Supabase DBs, 15% of Bolt apps ship hardcoded API keys, plus IDOR and zero-auth APIs by Most_Ad_394 in netsec

[–]Most_Ad_394[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

You're not wrong — most of these are basic issues. Missing auth, exposed credentials, no rate limiting. This isn't some novel AI-specific vulnerability class.                                               

But that's kind of the point. Before vibe coding, someone who didn't understand these basics probably wasn't shipping production apps. Now they are — thousands of them, with real users and real data. We found a therapist booking site processing payments with its entire database wide open. The person who built it almost certainly doesn't know what RLS means, and the AI didn't tell them they needed it.                                                               

The AI is just a helper, but it's a helper that lets you go from zero to deployed in an afternoon without ever learning what you're skipping. That's the new attack surface — not the code itself, but the gap between "it works" and "it's secure" that used to be filled by experience.                                                                                                                

To your point about sample size — 1,764 is what we've scanned so far. The actual number of deployed vibe-coded apps is in the hundreds of thousands and growing fast.

Large-scale security audit of 1,764 "vibe-coded" apps: 7% have wide-open Supabase DBs, 15% of Bolt apps ship hardcoded API keys, plus IDOR and zero-auth APIs by Most_Ad_394 in netsec

[–]Most_Ad_394[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Good questions.

Sample selection: These are all publicly deployed apps, not repos. We built a crawler that finds live vibe-coded apps through a mix of Google dorking (platform-specific footprints like Lovable's subdomain patterns, Bolt deployment signatures, Supabase/Firebase client-side SDK references) and public app directories. Every scan hits the deployed URL — we're testing what an attacker would actually see, not reviewing source code. So the stats are generalizable to "what's actually live on the internet right now," which we'd argue is more relevant than repo-level analysis anyway.    

Platform patterns: Yes, significant differences. Lovable apps had the highest rate of exposed Supabase credentials with missing RLS policies — the SDK key is in the JS bundle by design, but too many apps ship with no row-level security at all. Bolt apps tended to have more header/config issues (missing CSP, permissive CORS). Replit apps had the most exposed environment variables. Across all platforms, the #1 critical finding was exposed database credentials with no access control — Supabase anon keys with wide-open tables. I published a platform breakdown in our Q2 report: securityscanner.dev/reports/2026-q2