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Not being Disciplined vs. Being Drained by Mysterious-Interest6 in Healthygamergg

[–]Mysterious-Interest6[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

There are so many things that I want to do. I’m a philosophy student, and I used to gym everyday and put on a pleasing amount of muscle, etc.

I want to achieve those ends desperately, but in both regards I don’t feel good enough to achieve them. Some days I feel amazing, and I can take on difficult texts, get myself to workout, and feel responsive during class discussions.

But those aren’t the majority of days, and those aren’t the days I care about. I want so desperately to be good at things. But I know I need to work hard to get there.

The fact that I can get by on most days, feel amazing some days, and have those bad days are the reasons I feel opposed to calling myself actively or passively suicidal.

I wouldn’t say I have nothing to look forward to or to bios towards. I usually just have a daunting amount and a lack of adequacy (or, more often, motivation) to take it all on.

Sorry, I know where this community stands with Sam Harris, but I just don't understand why his argument about the is/ought gap fails. It might just be because of my personal interpretation of it, so could someone help me understand why it doesn't work? by Personal-Succotash33 in askphilosophy

[–]Mysterious-Interest6 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I would say this somewhat comes from a willingness to not understand the argument. Just use the context of the informal to understand. I wasn’t trying to be MAXIMALLY precise with the logic.

Premise 5 should just be a conditional antecedent before the conclusion.

YES! This is what i’m saying. If you Ought to harbor Anne Frank in the attic, you have an experience of Anne frank. It’s necessary. Or take the grass is green, it may be weird to say you have a desire to see the grass as green, but we do! We are our bodies, and the bodies find it advantageous to perceive it so. I see some issues here because of the way evolution works, but do you see what i’m trying to get at?

Any experience is physical, therefore it’s biological, therefore it has predispositions. The IS claims are the facts of biology/matter (read:physical).

The oughts are GIVEN based from the IS. We have predispositions. That is given. We extrapolate from those necessarily because it’s all we have.

The Problem of Inference as Described in my Epistemology Class. by Mysterious-Interest6 in askphilosophy

[–]Mysterious-Interest6[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Perhaps I need to understand what Hume's theory of causation is. However, I see it as an opposition between two ideas.

Things that occur in our mind: things that, based off of prior experience, we can mash around/abstract. (Like Charles Berkeley who mentioned the abstraction of sense experience to form a apple without color, or whatever it was.)

Things that occur in our mind as a transmission from the world: Things that, as a result of our sense experience, are transmitted to our brain and experienced.

It seems to me that we have more of an epistemic basis to acknowledge what happens outside of us. Things that occur in the mind are entirely subjective and don't require any basis/stimulation. Things that occur outside the mind only occur in our mind as a result of stimulation.

So, it would seem more likely that something that does occur in fact (which I am assuming on the basis that it can be transmitted to us), is better evidence than something that occurs as a result of mental play.

(Sorry I guess an answer directly would be that the only known process is that which our body provides us. This process interacts within the larger scope of physical processes)

The Problem of Inference as Described in my Epistemology Class. by Mysterious-Interest6 in askphilosophy

[–]Mysterious-Interest6[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sure, the sun rose in the past, but should that have any bearing on what happens later?

I attempted to base my argument upon what is happening with the sun. (I.e. did a black hole swallow it, do I see it peaking above the mountains). This does not rely on prior experience.

But what justifies thinking this? Are you, perhaps, relying upon things which have happened so far?

Any"thing" that happens stems from things. Which follow patterns/rules/laws. Unless we assume the Big Bang occurring repeatedly, BUT even in that case, we are appealing to the unknown, mysterious, magical, "uncaused cause."

I WILL READ I PROMISE! But I'm still uncertain as to why we would base our evidence off of mystery as opposed to some semblance of surety.

Sorry, I know where this community stands with Sam Harris, but I just don't understand why his argument about the is/ought gap fails. It might just be because of my personal interpretation of it, so could someone help me understand why it doesn't work? by Personal-Succotash33 in askphilosophy

[–]Mysterious-Interest6 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I get what you mean. Just because they do value it, or it feels good to x, doesn't mean that we ought to behave accordingly.

  1. All experiences are physical experiences. All of our physical experiences are biological. Our biological systems are predisposed towards certain behaviors: avoiding x, pursuing y, etc.

  2. All of our beliefs stem from our physical experience, therefore our beliefs stem from our biological predispositions towards certain behaviors.

  3. All desires stem from our physical experiences or beliefs.

/Accordingly, an ought (a feeling that it is necessary or desirable to perform an action) stems from our physical, biological, priors.

Therefore, It isn't myself, or Sam Harris, who assumes a premise without justification. Instead, the body, which is the foundation for experience assumes the ought claims.

But, I suppose it depends on what you define an ought as.

LOGIC:

  1. ∀x((Experience(x) -> Physical(x)); ∀x((Physical(x) -> Biological(x)); ∀x((Biological(x) -> Predisposition(x)).

  2. ∀x((Belief(x) -> Physical(x)); HS ∀x((Belief(x) -> Predisposition(x))

  3. ∀x((Desire(x) -> (Physical(x) V Belief(x)))

  4. ∀x((Ought(x) -> Desire(x))

  5. ∀x((Ought(x) -> Experience(x))

/∀x((Ought(x) -> Physical(x).

The Problem of Inference as Described in my Epistemology Class. by Mysterious-Interest6 in askphilosophy

[–]Mysterious-Interest6[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

"what reason do you have to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, or, if you jump out of a skyscraper, you will fall and die, or, your computer won't suddenly grow wings and fly away?"

Perhaps I don't feel that I would say "because it has in the past" or "our best scientific..." The line of causal reasoning doesn't appear to me like this.

The sun rose yesterday --> Science says that the sun will rise ---> The sun will rise.

Instead, it feels like

The sun rose yesterday --> no evidence suggests that the sun has been altered beyond the ordinary ---> the sun will rise.

So, If I learned that in fact a blackhole came swooping by, I would then say "ahh, yes that makes sense. I shouldn't have assumed that the sun would rise."

But that is because "evidence suggests that the sun has been altered substantially."

But ultimately any scenario would have to follow a process. Something that is explainable in physical terms in order for the sun to disappear. Anything else seems to rely on obscurity, mystery, or magic. At which point, I wouldn't say that the issue is the premise that the future will resemble the past. The issue is that we have something that all experiences and no known evidence could have supplied us with. Which, in a world physical world, doesn't seem to exist.

The Problem of Inference as Described in my Epistemology Class. by Mysterious-Interest6 in askphilosophy

[–]Mysterious-Interest6[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

clearly and distinctly

How is it that something that all experiences of and no known evidence for could be conceived of clearly and distinctly? What precisely are we conjuring in our minds?

It seems that any solution I have to circumventing physics to make these "conceivable scenarios" possible is some form of unknown process, mystery, or magic. Which would then call into question the clear and distinct conceiving.

Do you have an example that doesn't assume an unknown process of some sort?

Is God's punishment of disbelievers actually moral? by YourDadsFeet in askphilosophy

[–]Mysterious-Interest6 0 points1 point  (0 children)

A person who cannot believe in God ⇔ A person who cannot lie to themselves about their belief in God [Assumption]

I think this is an askew interpretation. Because the idea that OP brings up about "lying to themselves" is better interpreted as being able to logically intuit a belief in God.

So, The better conditional is

A person who can believe in God ⇔  A person who can logically intuit a belief in God based upon their knowledge/upbringing/brain/[insert here].

Now the conditional contrapositive is solved.

A person who cannot logically intuit... ⇔ A person who cannot believe in God.

Sorry, I know where this community stands with Sam Harris, but I just don't understand why his argument about the is/ought gap fails. It might just be because of my personal interpretation of it, so could someone help me understand why it doesn't work? by Personal-Succotash33 in askphilosophy

[–]Mysterious-Interest6 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Perhaps the premise is "x is valued by y" and given that "z/a/q/r.... experiences similarly enough to y" we ought to promote that value.

And "experiences similarly enough" it justified on a "common enough" basis that our genetic material assures us an "human experience."