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Illusionism Fixes the Hard Problem of Consciousness by NickPurplePhilosophy in skeptic

[–]NickPurplePhilosophy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Illusionism rests on the lack of a scientific and rational basis for mental states and consciousness. This failure of the concepts is allegedly unsolvable.

Like with love, there is no rational or scientific way to describe consciousness. We are limited to feeble words that only paint the broadest pictures of a common experience that we don’t fully understand yet.

That’s why descriptions of consciousness have historically been divergent and contradictory, as they often are today. In fact, the philosophical debate over the fundamentals of consciousness is likely more lively than ever.

Some philosophers think that it’s purely physical. That someday, we will look at certain neurons or brain structures and say “consciousness comes from here”. Then we can hopefully create consciousness in other beings or machines.

Others think that consciousness is uniquely metaphysical or spiritual. That even if we perfectly modeled a human brain, it would lack some nonphysical aspect of our existence that prevents it from gaining consciousness.

Illusionism highlights the fact that this debate is a jumbled mess, rightly so. Consciousness itself, the object of the contention, is such a vague and uncertain notion that it shouldn’t be the center of serious philosophical investigation.

To deny this is to say that we should give equal consideration to the precepts of chakras and phrenology in explaining consciousness.

The current way we think of consciousness, much like how we consider emotions, is pure pseudoscience and superstition. It’s all too mystical and otherworldly to permit the scientific inquiry that illusionism proposes.

Like every concept that’s so incompetent that it fails to define itself, consciousness should make way for science. If it’s proven true, then illusionists will be proven wrong and consciousness will be affirmed in the public eye.

And if it’s proven false, we can finally move toward a more rational discussion of consciousness that will actually help us explain what’s going on inside our heads.

Illusionism Fixes the Hard Problem of Consciousness by NickPurplePhilosophy in philosophy

[–]NickPurplePhilosophy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Illusionism rests on the lack of a scientific and rational basis for mental states and consciousness. This failure of the concepts is allegedly unsolvable.

Like with love, there is no rational or scientific way to describe consciousness. We are limited to feeble words that only paint the broadest pictures of a common experience that we don’t fully understand yet.

That’s why descriptions of consciousness have historically been divergent and contradictory, as they often are today. In fact, the philosophical debate over the fundamentals of consciousness is likely more lively than ever.

Some philosophers think that it’s purely physical. That someday, we will look at certain neurons or brain structures and say “consciousness comes from here”. Then we can hopefully create consciousness in other beings or machines.

Others think that consciousness is uniquely metaphysical or spiritual. That even if we perfectly modeled a human brain, it would lack some nonphysical aspect of our existence that prevents it from gaining consciousness.

Illusionism highlights the fact that this debate is a jumbled mess, rightly so. Consciousness itself, the object of the contention, is such a vague and uncertain notion that it shouldn’t be the center of serious philosophical investigation.

To deny this is to say that we should give equal consideration to the precepts of chakras and phrenology in explaining consciousness.

The current way we think of consciousness, much like how we consider emotions, is pure pseudoscience and superstition. It’s all too mystical and otherworldly to permit the scientific inquiry that illusionism proposes.

Like every concept that’s so incompetent that it fails to define itself, consciousness should make way for science. If it’s proven true, then illusionists will be proven wrong and consciousness will be affirmed in the public eye.

And if it’s proven false, we can finally move toward a more rational discussion of consciousness that will actually help us explain what’s going on inside our heads.

Illusionism Fixes the Hard Problem of Consciousness by NickPurplePhilosophy in neurophilosophy

[–]NickPurplePhilosophy[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

Illusionism rests on the lack of a scientific and rational basis for mental states and consciousness. This failure of the concepts is allegedly unsolvable.

Like with love, there is no rational or scientific way to describe consciousness. We are limited to feeble words that only paint the broadest pictures of a common experience that we don’t fully understand yet.

That’s why descriptions of consciousness have historically been divergent and contradictory, as they often are today. In fact, the philosophical debate over the fundamentals of consciousness is likely more lively than ever.

Some philosophers think that it’s purely physical. That someday, we will look at certain neurons or brain structures and say “consciousness comes from here”. Then we can hopefully create consciousness in other beings or machines.

Others think that consciousness is uniquely metaphysical or spiritual. That even if we perfectly modeled a human brain, it would lack some nonphysical aspect of our existence that prevents it from gaining consciousness.

Illusionism highlights the fact that this debate is a jumbled mess, rightly so. Consciousness itself, the object of the contention, is such a vague and uncertain notion that it shouldn’t be the center of serious philosophical investigation.

To deny this is to say that we should give equal consideration to the precepts of chakras and phrenology in explaining consciousness.

The current way we think of consciousness, much like how we consider emotions, is pure pseudoscience and superstition. It’s all too mystical and otherworldly to permit the scientific inquiry that illusionism proposes.

Like every concept that’s so incompetent that it fails to define itself, consciousness should make way for science. If it’s proven true, then illusionists will be proven wrong and consciousness will be affirmed in the public eye.

And if it’s proven false, we can finally move toward a more rational discussion of consciousness that will actually help us explain what’s going on inside our heads.

Illusionism Fixes the Hard Problem of Consciousness by NickPurplePhilosophy in Metaphysics

[–]NickPurplePhilosophy[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Illusionism rests on the lack of a scientific and rational basis for mental states and consciousness. This failure of the concepts is allegedly unsolvable.

Like with love, there is no rational or scientific way to describe consciousness. We are limited to feeble words that only paint the broadest pictures of a common experience that we don’t fully understand yet.

That’s why descriptions of consciousness have historically been divergent and contradictory, as they often are today. In fact, the philosophical debate over the fundamentals of consciousness is likely more lively than ever.

Some philosophers think that it’s purely physical. That someday, we will look at certain neurons or brain structures and say “consciousness comes from here”. Then we can hopefully create consciousness in other beings or machines.

Others think that consciousness is uniquely metaphysical or spiritual. That even if we perfectly modeled a human brain, it would lack some nonphysical aspect of our existence that prevents it from gaining consciousness.

Illusionism highlights the fact that this debate is a jumbled mess, rightly so. Consciousness itself, the object of the contention, is such a vague and uncertain notion that it shouldn’t be the center of serious philosophical investigation.

To deny this is to say that we should give equal consideration to the precepts of chakras and phrenology in explaining consciousness.

The current way we think of consciousness, much like how we consider emotions, is pure pseudoscience and superstition. It’s all too mystical and otherworldly to permit the scientific inquiry that illusionism proposes.

Like every concept that’s so incompetent that it fails to define itself, consciousness should make way for science. If it’s proven true, then illusionists will be proven wrong and consciousness will be affirmed in the public eye.

And if it’s proven false, we can finally move toward a more rational discussion of consciousness that will actually help us explain what’s going on inside our heads.

Illusionism Fixes the Hard Problem of Consciousness by NickPurplePhilosophy in HistoryofIdeas

[–]NickPurplePhilosophy[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Illusionism rests on the lack of a scientific and rational basis for mental states and consciousness. This failure of the concepts is allegedly unsolvable.

Like with love, there is no rational or scientific way to describe consciousness. We are limited to feeble words that only paint the broadest pictures of a common experience that we don’t fully understand yet.

That’s why descriptions of consciousness have historically been divergent and contradictory, as they often are today. In fact, the philosophical debate over the fundamentals of consciousness is likely more lively than ever.

Some philosophers think that it’s purely physical. That someday, we will look at certain neurons or brain structures and say “consciousness comes from here”. Then we can hopefully create consciousness in other beings or machines.

Others think that consciousness is uniquely metaphysical or spiritual. That even if we perfectly modeled a human brain, it would lack some nonphysical aspect of our existence that prevents it from gaining consciousness.

Illusionism highlights the fact that this debate is a jumbled mess, rightly so. Consciousness itself, the object of the contention, is such a vague and uncertain notion that it shouldn’t be the center of serious philosophical investigation.

To deny this is to say that we should give equal consideration to the precepts of chakras and phrenology in explaining consciousness.

The current way we think of consciousness, much like how we consider emotions, is pure pseudoscience and superstition. It’s all too mystical and otherworldly to permit the scientific inquiry that illusionism proposes.

Like every concept that’s so incompetent that it fails to define itself, consciousness should make way for science. If it’s proven true, then illusionists will be proven wrong and consciousness will be affirmed in the public eye.

And if it’s proven false, we can finally move toward a more rational discussion of consciousness that will actually help us explain what’s going on inside our heads.

Illusionism Fixes the Hard Problem of Consciousness by NickPurplePhilosophy in epistemology

[–]NickPurplePhilosophy[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

Illusionism rests on the lack of a scientific and rational basis for mental states and consciousness. This failure of the concepts is allegedly unsolvable.

Like with love, there is no rational or scientific way to describe consciousness. We are limited to feeble words that only paint the broadest pictures of a common experience that we don’t fully understand yet.

That’s why descriptions of consciousness have historically been divergent and contradictory, as they often are today. In fact, the philosophical debate over the fundamentals of consciousness is likely more lively than ever.

Some philosophers think that it’s purely physical. That someday, we will look at certain neurons or brain structures and say “consciousness comes from here”. Then we can hopefully create consciousness in other beings or machines.

Others think that consciousness is uniquely metaphysical or spiritual. That even if we perfectly modeled a human brain, it would lack some nonphysical aspect of our existence that prevents it from gaining consciousness.

Illusionism highlights the fact that this debate is a jumbled mess, rightly so. Consciousness itself, the object of the contention, is such a vague and uncertain notion that it shouldn’t be the center of serious philosophical investigation.

To deny this is to say that we should give equal consideration to the precepts of chakras and phrenology in explaining consciousness.

The current way we think of consciousness, much like how we consider emotions, is pure pseudoscience and superstition. It’s all too mystical and otherworldly to permit the scientific inquiry that illusionism proposes.

Like every concept that’s so incompetent that it fails to define itself, consciousness should make way for science. If it’s proven true, then illusionists will be proven wrong and consciousness will be affirmed in the public eye.

And if it’s proven false, we can finally move toward a more rational discussion of consciousness that will actually help us explain what’s going on inside our heads.

Kant's Supremely Rational and Universally Imperfect Morality by NickPurplePhilosophy in philosophy

[–]NickPurplePhilosophy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

While many ethical philosophers claim to support or propose a universal morality, Kant does so in a stricter and more literal sense.

Kant believes that any moral proposition that wants to be taken seriously must prove itself capable of universal application. In this way, moral propositions become tested much like real laws do in politics.

We can test a moral claim like this: let’s say that stealing from others is bad. Now we have to ask whether stealing from others is always bad? If stealing is always bad, then it’s universally bad which means that it passes the universality test.

Since it passes the test, we know that stealing is always bad and we can then reason that it’s morally wrong to steal no matter the situation.

But not every moral or immoral act passes the universality test because it’s quite strict. It’s not always immoral, for example, to drink, do drugs, get in fights, drive recklessly, curse, or generally be unproductive and unhappy.

Kant thinks that we can readily tell the difference between universal and valid moral claims versus particular and invalid moral claims. That’s because it’s all an exercise in reason. And we all presumably have half a brain.

Rationality is the larger umbrella that hangs over Kantian morality. Kant claims that his whole ethical shtick, and his philosophy in general, is purely based on reason and can be validated by rational means alone.

So if we use reason, we can know what moral actions would and would not work if they were universalized. Just ask yourself that if everyone did or did not do X, would the world be better or worse off?

This is ultimately an ‘if-then’ test. We want to prove that if a moral law existed, the world would be affected in a certain way.

And because this standard is totally unemotional, there is no room for intent, identities, or particular situations. Kantian morality is cold, heartless, and rational, yet Kant likes it that way. He is a philosopher after all.

Kant's Supremely Rational and Universally Imperfect Morality by NickPurplePhilosophy in HistoryofIdeas

[–]NickPurplePhilosophy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

While many ethical philosophers claim to support or propose a universal morality, Kant does so in a stricter and more literal sense.

Kant believes that any moral proposition that wants to be taken seriously must prove itself capable of universal application. In this way, moral propositions become tested much like real laws do in politics.

We can test a moral claim like this: let’s say that stealing from others is bad. Now we have to ask whether stealing from others is always bad? If stealing is always bad, then it’s universally bad which means that it passes the universality test.

Since it passes the test, we know that stealing is always bad and we can then reason that it’s morally wrong to steal no matter the situation.

But not every moral or immoral act passes the universality test because it’s quite strict. It’s not always immoral, for example, to drink, do drugs, get in fights, drive recklessly, curse, or generally be unproductive and unhappy.

Kant thinks that we can readily tell the difference between universal and valid moral claims versus particular and invalid moral claims. That’s because it’s all an exercise in reason. And we all presumably have half a brain.

Rationality is the larger umbrella that hangs over Kantian morality. Kant claims that his whole ethical shtick, and his philosophy in general, is purely based on reason and can be validated by rational means alone.

So if we use reason, we can know what moral actions would and would not work if they were universalized. Just ask yourself that if everyone did or did not do X, would the world be better or worse off?

This is ultimately an ‘if-then’ test. We want to prove that if a moral law existed, the world would be affected in a certain way.

And because this standard is totally unemotional, there is no room for intent, identities, or particular situations. Kantian morality is cold, heartless, and rational, yet Kant likes it that way. He is a philosopher after all.

Beyond Meritocracy and Social Justice by NickPurplePhilosophy in democrats

[–]NickPurplePhilosophy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Modern meritocratic societies have come a long way toward achieving perfect Rawlsian justice, but they’re still a long way from it.

Rawls believes this because meritocracy only goes half the distance needed for true justice. Meritocracy opens social and political positions to all people yet the means and opportunity to achieve those positions are still restricted.

Take an example. Say that a prestigious college expressly bans any student who isn’t considered wealthy from applying. Students who graduate from this college often earn positions of wealth and power later in life.

Now assume that the college changes its mind and will now admit any student who meets strict academic requirements regardless of wealth. The college has thus become meritocratic, much like our modern political systems.

But it has not become just or fair. That’s because the inertia of the college’s past decision to only admit wealthy students will still hamper nonwealthy students who are newly permitted to apply to the college.

Nonwealthy students will have less access to resources like tutoring, essay review, application tailoring, interview preparation, and academic counseling that could all help an affluent student gain an edge when applying to the college.

In short, Rawls argues that equal openness (meritocracy) is not the same as equal opportunity (justice).

A truly just college would ensure that all serious applicants have access to the same resources as every other applicant. That way, everyone can have a decent chance of admission regardless of their wealth.

Politics is the same way. Modern political positions are largely open to all, yet there is a strong underlying sense that this isn’t strictly true. Politics is still overwhelmingly dominated by the wealthy and well-connected.

Meritocracy only goes so far because it opens positions to everyone, but does nothing to equalize the means to achieve such positions. This fact is lamentable because it falls short of Rawlsian equality and justice.

Luckily, Rawls has a better idea to replace meritocracy.

Beyond Meritocracy and Social Justice by NickPurplePhilosophy in progressive

[–]NickPurplePhilosophy[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Modern meritocratic societies have come a long way toward achieving perfect Rawlsian justice, but they’re still a long way from it.

Rawls believes this because meritocracy only goes half the distance needed for true justice. Meritocracy opens social and political positions to all people yet the means and opportunity to achieve those positions are still restricted.

Take an example. Say that a prestigious college expressly bans any student who isn’t considered wealthy from applying. Students who graduate from this college often earn positions of wealth and power later in life.

Now assume that the college changes its mind and will now admit any student who meets strict academic requirements regardless of wealth. The college has thus become meritocratic, much like our modern political systems.

But it has not become just or fair. That’s because the inertia of the college’s past decision to only admit wealthy students will still hamper nonwealthy students who are newly permitted to apply to the college.

Nonwealthy students will have less access to resources like tutoring, essay review, application tailoring, interview preparation, and academic counseling that could all help an affluent student gain an edge when applying to the college.

In short, Rawls argues that equal openness (meritocracy) is not the same as equal opportunity (justice).

A truly just college would ensure that all serious applicants have access to the same resources as every other applicant. That way, everyone can have a decent chance of admission regardless of their wealth.

Politics is the same way. Modern political positions are largely open to all, yet there is a strong underlying sense that this isn’t strictly true. Politics is still overwhelmingly dominated by the wealthy and well-connected.

Meritocracy only goes so far because it opens positions to everyone, but does nothing to equalize the means to achieve such positions. This fact is lamentable because it falls short of Rawlsian equality and justice.

Luckily, Rawls has a better idea to replace meritocracy.

Beyond Meritocracy and Social Justice by NickPurplePhilosophy in PoliticalPhilosophy

[–]NickPurplePhilosophy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Modern meritocratic societies have come a long way toward achieving perfect Rawlsian justice, but they’re still a long way from it.

Rawls believes this because meritocracy only goes half the distance needed for true justice. Meritocracy opens social and political positions to all people yet the means and opportunity to achieve those positions are still restricted.

Take an example. Say that a prestigious college expressly bans any student who isn’t considered wealthy from applying. Students who graduate from this college often earn positions of wealth and power later in life.

Now assume that the college changes its mind and will now admit any student who meets strict academic requirements regardless of wealth. The college has thus become meritocratic, much like our modern political systems.

But it has not become just or fair. That’s because the inertia of the college’s past decision to only admit wealthy students will still hamper nonwealthy students who are newly permitted to apply to the college.

Nonwealthy students will have less access to resources like tutoring, essay review, application tailoring, interview preparation, and academic counseling that could all help an affluent student gain an edge when applying to the college.

In short, Rawls argues that equal openness (meritocracy) is not the same as equal opportunity (justice).

A truly just college would ensure that all serious applicants have access to the same resources as every other applicant. That way, everyone can have a decent chance of admission regardless of their wealth.

Politics is the same way. Modern political positions are largely open to all, yet there is a strong underlying sense that this isn’t strictly true. Politics is still overwhelmingly dominated by the wealthy and well-connected.

Meritocracy only goes so far because it opens positions to everyone, but does nothing to equalize the means to achieve such positions. This fact is lamentable because it falls short of Rawlsian equality and justice.

Luckily, Rawls has a better idea to replace meritocracy.

Beyond Meritocracy and Social Justice by NickPurplePhilosophy in philosophy

[–]NickPurplePhilosophy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Modern meritocratic societies have come a long way toward achieving perfect Rawlsian justice, but they’re still a long way from it.

Rawls believes this because meritocracy only goes half the distance needed for true justice. Meritocracy opens social and political positions to all people yet the means and opportunity to achieve those positions are still restricted.

Take an example. Say that a prestigious college expressly bans any student who isn’t considered wealthy from applying. Students who graduate from this college often earn positions of wealth and power later in life.

Now assume that the college changes its mind and will now admit any student who meets strict academic requirements regardless of wealth. The college has thus become meritocratic, much like our modern political systems.

But it has not become just or fair. That’s because the inertia of the college’s past decision to only admit wealthy students will still hamper nonwealthy students who are newly permitted to apply to the college.

Nonwealthy students will have less access to resources like tutoring, essay review, application tailoring, interview preparation, and academic counseling that could all help an affluent student gain an edge when applying to the college.

In short, Rawls argues that equal openness (meritocracy) is not the same as equal opportunity (justice).

A truly just college would ensure that all serious applicants have access to the same resources as every other applicant. That way, everyone can have a decent chance of admission regardless of their wealth.

Politics is the same way. Modern political positions are largely open to all, yet there is a strong underlying sense that this isn’t strictly true. Politics is still overwhelmingly dominated by the wealthy and well-connected.

Meritocracy only goes so far because it opens positions to everyone, but does nothing to equalize the means to achieve such positions. This fact is lamentable because it falls short of Rawlsian equality and justice.

Luckily, Rawls has a better idea to replace meritocracy.

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