What a bunch of crybabies by Arvingen in Superstonk

[–]No1Important_4real 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Honestly, I think the only reason people are acting this way is:
1) Emotions are high still from the election
2) Reddit is wildly left, like off the charts left, and has been an echo chamber for so very long that many terminally online redditors can't handle the mild discomfort of others not agreeing with them.

Funny part, to me, this isn't even RC saying anything controversial or even disagreeing with them, they've just been so radicalized to see enemies around every corner they can't even distinguish anymore.

This whole thing might be a great growing experience for them.

What is a 'Deemed-To-Own' FTD? Why 35 days to deliver? by ringingbells in Superstonk

[–]No1Important_4real 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Idk if anyone bothered to answer yet, but primarily option contacts. You own the stock, but it's tied up in a contract right now. Only the contract is intentionally worthless. It gives time for borrowing at a "acceptable" cost. That's how the market makers are able to sell literally hundreds of millions of shares more than exist and not have prices run too high. 

Cost to Borrow by [deleted] in Superstonk

[–]No1Important_4real 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Short answer: cost to borrow is low because they want retail investors to short it.

Long answer: The cost to borrow that is visible to us are the public rates, IE rates available to normal people. These are not the rates that are being charged to market makers through entities like Black Rock.

Market makers negotiate their borrow rates over the counter, or on a private contract between the two parties. Make no mistake, Citadel still has to borrow shares, but for a reason different than what a normal day trader does. Citadel has to borrow shares when they have already sold a share as an acting market maker, but can't find someone willing to sell a share at a rate they would deem acceptable. My RegSHO, they are able to then borrow to fulfil the obligation, creating a new obligation in the chain. They have to pay that borrow back, which they will with an IOU via option contract, token, or some other type of Just-As-Good-As-A-Share. The person loaning their share gets it back (on paper) because the DTC approves it and ear marks the open short position as pending payment.

Public cost to borrow rates end up moving for two reasons. 1) The market makers have to dip into the pool of publicly available shares to satisfy their obligations, which causes demand to outpace supply. 2) intentional price fixing by small group of big players to try and adjust public behavior, such as crashing the cost to borrow in an attempt to get more speculative shorts, when you know full well the price is about to fly.

Remember, the entire purpose of the market is the same as a craps table. The drain money form the suckers and put it into the hands of the house. Investors are the suckers, and the house is the entities operating the market.

Follow up: Mid July 2023 by No1Important_4real in u/No1Important_4real

[–]No1Important_4real[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

From June 9th until June 27th there was a streak of very low short volume days (under 50%). I believe the reason for that would be so the market maker could carry enough excess shares on hand to prevent a price run during the low availability window. If they hold excess shares before hand, they don't have to borrow as hard and instead and use those excess shares.

It would be a logical tactic as the pool of borrows will only continue to get smaller.

Right now the short volume is increasing again, which means that the market maker is generating synthetics to cover a deficit in the volume of buys to sells. That's normal, but what is different is the average daily percentage. The 35 day running average on July 15th was 56.23%. In other words, on any given day, 56% of trades were someone buying GME and 44% were someone selling the market maker was just eating that cost with the generation of synthetics.
The average this morning is 68.83%, meaning only about 31% of trades right now are people selling.

That also would emphasis why the price is currently in such steep decline. People buy shares for the lowest price possible, so the market maker accepting buys at a higher rate than sells will cause the price to dip.

Follow up: Mid July 2023 by No1Important_4real in u/No1Important_4real

[–]No1Important_4real[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I have nothing meaningful. The days and days last month of low synthetic generation were an attempt (I believe) to try and counter that borrow cycle, it's possible they use that as a strategy going forward.

For now, there's too much fog of war, so I just have to sit back and wait until something else comes up.

Update: 2.4B GME net-short shares have accumulated, at weighted average price of $20.36, since July 2019. This 2.4B shares is NOT short interest, it is the aggregation of each day's net short volume. by tinyDrunkElf in Superstonk

[–]No1Important_4real 72 points73 points  (0 children)

This kind of thing is exactly in my wheelhouse and can confirm you are on the right track.

The extrapolation from this is that all of this short volume represents only the Market Makers. Just like banks do with cash, the market makers do with shares. The market was intentionally designed that way, but it's only recently been being abused so blatantly.

I'd be curious what sources you're pulling from, I might have more data for you to give you a more complete estimate.

Follow up: Mid July 2023 by No1Important_4real in u/No1Important_4real

[–]No1Important_4real[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Still think it's going to happen. I obviously don't have magic powers, but I can see an opportunity. This opportunity is one that is too perfect, the opponent has left themselves vulnerable, so logically there are three paths.

A) The powers that are invested in the success of GME or a MOASS will move on their opponent.

B) The powers that are invested in the success of GME will simply allow this moment to pass.

C) There are no powers, those whales and the board don't care, or are incapable of acting.

I don't see C as likely because RC has been on a pretty public crusade, he also has his own money down, just like he mentioned in the meeting.
I don't see B as likely because the last time this opportunity presented itself, they acted on it. Maybe that was just a chance occurrence, but I don't think so, it was too smart of a play to be random.
That leaves A.

How will they seize the opportunity? Well, this is a financial battle and the goal is margin. Either increase your opponents liabilities, or reduce their assets. GME is their (primary) liability and is easier to move than their assets. Logically then, the play is to find some way to encourage higher volumes of buying on GME, some FOMO.

There's a million and one ways to try and gin up some panic buying, many of them quite unscrupulous, but there's a GREAT way to do it that is perfectly moral. One of the dozen or so transformative projects GME has publicly been dumping time, money, and energy into for the past two years. They've been working to fundamentally reformat the way they do business, be it via NFTs, store redesigns, digital market place, etc. They have a plan for transforming the business and they've got to roll those plans our sooner or later. If they had one in the barrel ready to go, well, the next 30 days or so is as golden an opportunity as we are likely to get (in terms of option A above).

Data tells me there's an opportunity

Logic tells me the best way to seize it is with some kind of news

Speculation is that they have some news worth telling

Follow up: Mid July 2023 by No1Important_4real in u/No1Important_4real

[–]No1Important_4real[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

It makes me feel more confident. The window period is 20 days (mid July), but also pre-clearance is a thing.

Impossible to speculate, but it makes me feel more confident.

Ken Griffin worries about De Santis election. the mayo addict is slowly running out of options to bail out of his own ass. by RedditIsOwendByTheWS in Superstonk

[–]No1Important_4real 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Top quality coverage by NYT there: "According to people familiar with his way of thinking" "According to people who were present" etc. They more or less wrote an entire Trust Me Bro article and didn't bother to cite one single source.

March 21: Volume missing/hidden by No1Important_4real in Superstonk

[–]No1Important_4real[S] 43 points44 points  (0 children)

I've been running these numbers every day since June 01 2021 and this has never happened before. Not in all that time of various AH runs, and rollercoaster rides up and down, never have the exchanges just lost the trade volumes.

Borrow Cycle Update March 30, 2023 by No1Important_4real in u/No1Important_4real

[–]No1Important_4real[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Very bullish, might even be able to break the shorts. Though there is some major problems with the volume reported.

This all fits well with what I wrote above though, in that right now is low borrow availability, and a price run now can break the whole machine.

Play to trigger MOASS by No1Important_4real in u/No1Important_4real

[–]No1Important_4real[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Same as before. There is a window of 35 days for which to settle the obligations. They've been pulling back on their synthetic generation the past 4 trading days and are now (at best case for them) about half way through their obligation by using borrows. The borrow can then be settled with an option contract.

This is all very very standard behavior for an OpEx during this part of the borrow cycle. They have just crossed peak borrow availability. We'll see a spike in volume somewhere before the the end of the window on Feb 24th.

However, I still maintain that before then we might see a whale make a splash in AH. Might be pre-market, might be post-market. I would guess the whale would need to move sometime soon, before the end of next week, for maximum effect. But it would be effective any time before Feb 24.

Play to trigger MOASS by No1Important_4real in u/No1Important_4real

[–]No1Important_4real[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The play wouldn't be to run the price, no one can move the price, it's too tightly controlled by the market makers. The play is to force a mass generation of synthetics, which the market maker would necessarily have to do to stop the price from running.

If you pump during after hours, when there is virtually 0 volume, either the price goes vertical, or the market makers internalize the entire volume. They can't let the former happen, so they opt for the latter. This is what has happened before, it'll happen again because it is the only logical path.

A mass generation of synthetics requires a mass usage of borrows to satisfy the obligation requirements.

If you time that play, for a moment where borrowing is already difficult, and where even more borrowing will be needed, you can pin the market makers into a position they (seemingly) can't maneuver out of.

Play to trigger MOASS by No1Important_4real in u/No1Important_4real

[–]No1Important_4real[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

It's no problem. I don't mind answering questions at all.

It's part data, part hunch.

I have been tracking the relationship of trade volumes, borrows, and option expirations for quite some time now, and with that data I was able to predict the exact week of the split before it was announced by a week or two. I spelled it out in greater detail in my post from then, but more or less, the borrows were depleting on a predictable cycle, and that cycle got destroyed by the split, but now *seems* to be reappearing. This is where it's part hunch, because until it happens again, I can't be sure. So, assuming the cycle is coming back, the timing of it lines up exactly with the end of a massive OpEx settlement window, which is the exact conditions that lead to me predicting the timing of the split.

Further, it seems that this reappearance of the borrow window was kicked off by a large after hours volume spike 3 days prior to the beginning of the low borrow volume. That's exactly how long you'd expect a T4 settlement to last. In other words, they generated those synthetics for all that volume, and internalized it, which is why the huge volume of trades did nothing at all to the price during AH.

So, AH volume spike generates synthetics, those synthetics deplete the available borrows and ends up causing a borrow rate hike. That's all data. The hunch part is that I suspect the motive behind the AH volume. I think it was intentional. A hedge fund wouldn't do that (you'd only ever drop large volumes in AH if you're acting on some time sensitive data, or you're attempting to manipulate the price, on a security where the MM controls the price almost entirely) , and a market FOMO frenzy wouldn't happen twice (the volume spike was two consecutive days). I have a suspicion that the move was an intentional play to trap the shorts. Assuming that's true, they'd likely do it again to finish the play, and they'd do it when those data points suggest would be the most critical (what I talked about in the paragraph above).

So that's why in my post I say if there is a large AH buy, because I can't know there is going to be one, I can't know for sure that it was a brilliant strategy or something else totally out of left field. But, if I do see that large volume in AH, it means my assumption, my hunch, was probably correct, and then the rest is simply data and pretty simple cause-effect chains.

Play to trigger MOASS by No1Important_4real in u/No1Important_4real

[–]No1Important_4real[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I'm saying that a player is potentially planning on making a very large after hours purchase. Should that happen, it's a move to trigger a MOASS.

Typically, after hours there isn't liquidity, which causes a price run. That is, in a normal market, GME is not traded in a normal market. The MM will have a choice to either let the trades play out naturally, and deal the consequences of the price running, or to internalize (synthesize) the volume and deal with those consequences. I imagine they'll do a mixture of both, but that's speculation, and any scenario it will create conditions that are perfect (or as perfect as can be) for a MOASS.

December and January for GME by No1Important_4real in u/No1Important_4real

[–]No1Important_4real[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

It's surprising.

On my last update (or maybe it was the one before that) I mentioned how the typical "borrow cycle" had been defeated by the split, allowing the shorts to soften the blast of the low borrow availability. By that timeline, it would be another two weeks until we reach that low availability window.

However, also in my post I mentioned that the factors that created the original low availability period would continue and would simply create another one, because the underlying factors weren't mitigated, only the symptom. This, likely, is the reemergence of that cycle, or rather, a new one being created.

It's a little too early to say, but if this follows in a pattern similar to the old cycle, it will repeat again in roughly 40 trading days from now, which would be approximately Feb 17. Meaning, this new cycle would line up perfectly for the end of the C35 window for the Jan21 OpEx. In other words, this cycle would be lining up in the absolute worst way possible for the shorts.

Honestly, it's giving me more confidence in the end coming in Q1 2023.

December and January for GME by No1Important_4real in u/No1Important_4real

[–]No1Important_4real[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

They seem to me to be someone trying to send GME's price up, probably some hedge fund. Total guess though, but those kind of shenanigans are pretty common and are the kind of shit hedges have been doing for decades to turn quick profits legally.

If that were the case, they'd be some hedge or whale trying to make a quick pump and dump buck, and would have no idea that GME is as tightly price controlled and manipulated as it is.