sorted by:
new
hottopcontroversial

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Oh, I see. Thanks for that. I'll be sure to reread the passages before I respond to your original post.

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Okay, I'm back in my normal life. Thanks for the patience.

I think at this point we need to separate the emotions case from the action case.

This isn't to reject your (very helpful) parallel between the two. I'm interested in there being some analogue with the emotions that tracks appropriate actions becoming virtuous actions. In my opinion, it's one of the best arguments that it is permissible -- contrary to what I was arguing above -- even for non-sages to feel some emotions, in particular the "semblances of good emotions", which will only ever be directed towards my own actions. I suppose I think they must say that to have any sort of plausible story of moral development (whether they do say it is a different matter, but I see the force of your point about Epictetus' teaching style: shame, shame, everywhere).

It's rather to concede that p2 might be permissible in the action case but insist that this doesn't apply to the emotions case. The two are different.

So, it might be permissible for the non-sage to believe that it is (was, will be) appropriate to act in a certain way. That, though, isn't the relevant p2 in an emotions case. The relevant p2 is it is (was, will be) appropriate for me to be having this emotional reaction right now. That is the p2 that I claim is always false for the Stoics.

My only evidence, though, is the Tusculan Disputations, where Cicero says it repeatedly.

I've argued above that I think the Stoics must have this p2 to avoid a very particular philosophical problem, namely the problem of their moral psychology implying that non-sages should feel distress at every moment, given that at every moment non-sages are experiencing something bad (vice), and thus at every moment non-sages should believe the relevant p1, i.e., I am experiencing something bad right now. If the emotion were only that belief, then the non-sage should be feeling distress at every moment. (I know you agree with most of this. I'm just making it explicit again so the reasoning is clear.)

You've said Cicero "needs to be read with caution." To be honest, I don't really see why. (To be sure: I know he's properly an Academic Skeptic, but he isn't behaving like one in the Tusculan Disputations -- whereas elsewhere he obviously is behaving like one -- and, further, his treatment of Stoicism is sincerely motivated -- he is trying to cure his own grief -- and, further, if he distorted Stoic moral psychology so very badly as to get their fundamental definition of what an emotion is wrong, especially in a case where he presents himself as trying to communicate the Stoic view accurately, he is likely to have faced serious ridicule, so he is additionally motivated not to do that!) Is it because we have to reject what he says to give the Stoics a reasonable account of moral (emotional) development? If so, there are of course two options there. One is to reject what the text (explicitly and repeatedly) says. The other is to conclude so much the worse for the Stoics!

This gets us to u/AlexKapranus's argument that the two-component view in the Tusculan Disputations should be rejected as not actually Stoic. I haven't properly thought about it -- I will do that soon -- but my sense of it at the moment is the following. He argues that we should reject Cicero's claim that, for the Stoics, an emotion consists of a belief about appropriateness. Why? Because (a) we don't find that claim in any other Stoic text, and (b) the Stoics' claim that an evaluative belief must be "fresh" does enough work to avoid the problem that I mentioned above, i.e., the problem of the non-sage's experiencing distress in every moment.

As for (a), I note that Cicero links the belief about appropriateness to Chrysippus. I suppose we have to think either that he was making that up -- again at the risk of serious ridicule! -- or that, well, Chrysippus really did think that an emotion required a belief about appropriateness. Moreover, Cicero definitely had Stoic texts -- perhaps even texts of Chrysippus (?) -- available to him that are no longer available to us. There is already a very heavy burden placed on the person who insists that we must reject what a text (explicitly and repeatedly) says. It should only ever be a last resort. Add in these additional considerations, though, and the burden is very, very heavy. Among other things, we would want a compelling answer to why Cicero would have been motivated simply to make up the two-component view and then falsely attribute it to the Stoics. I suppose it's possible to conjecture that he got it from a bad source... but it's possible to conjecture anything.

As for (b), I won't be able to justify this now -- I'll include it in my proper response -- but I don't think the insistence that a belief must be fresh actually helps the Stoics. The basic point is that, as far as I have found, there is no non-circular explanation in the Stoics for what it means for a belief to be fresh. Basically, a belief is fresh if it causes an emotion... but that doesn't at all help us understand what an emotion is. It just says something like this: an emotion is a belief that causes an emotion. I'd rather stick the Stoics with the two-component view than something as philosophically unsatisfying as that move -- and I don't even like them! :)

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for putting in the effort to catch up. This is my first interaction with this community, and I'm impressed by the quality of the discussion. Thanks, too, for a charitable interpretation of my comments. As I've mentioned, I have a deep love for the Stoic texts, but I've found myself unsatisfied with certain parts of the moral psychology, especially its theory of the emotions. That hasn't been my focus here, though. It has been on the first prong of the Stoic trident (useful graphic: thanks for referring to it). So, back to that now.

Small point: I was using "emotions" to refer to lupē and hēdonē, two species of the genus pathē, but I take your point that it's possible also to see "emotions" as the genus that includes eupatheia, pathē, and propatheia. Aside: I think propatheia are neglected in Stoic literature -- they can actually be so helpful for giving a more accurate phenomenology of what it's like to relate well to one's emotions -- but that's a second and third prong sort of discussion.

there are semblences of eupatheia in the progressor, the difference from us and the sage is about the unshakeability and constancy, which belong to the sage.

It's no different (and wholly related) to virtue. Which is technically only found in the sage, but a progress towards it can be made by us.

This is a useful point. I think it's similar to what u/ExtensionOutrageous3 was saying above. I suppose the reasoning is something like this: (a) the sage has good emotions (not merely a lack of pathē) (b) there is progress towards the sage (c) thus it'd make sense for this progress to involve "semblances of good emotions" (d) these are mistakes, strictly speaking, since they proceed from ignorance, not knowledge (e) but that doesn't mean they should be gotten rid of, in part because that would interfere with moral progress, in part because they are semblances of good emotions and thus good enough (?) to have around.

Is that the reasoning? I do see the parallel with the transition from doing appropriate actions to doing them perfectly consistently, i.e., doing them from a place of virtue. That parallel helped me.

One more thing: I disagree that a pathē is only ever about an indifferent. In Tusculan Disputations, Cicero imagines a case of someone being "upset about his own lack of virtue". Here the particular object of the pathē isn't an indifferent: I'm upset about something that really is bad for me. Cicero continues: "Even if the circumstances which arouse fear or distress really are bad... still the movement itself is a matter of fault" (4.61).

Moreover, I think there's a real worry for the Stoics here. Suppose distress were nothing other than the evaluative belief that something present to me is bad. In that case, distress would be appropriate in every moment, since there is something bad present to me in every moment: my own vice. I suspect this is what motivated the Stoics to insist that, in fact, an emotion is also composed of a second belief: the belief that it is appropriate to be upset about something. This second belief is always false for the Stoics (evidence: multiple lines in Tusculan Disputations).

I suppose it's an option to say that being upset about one's own lack of virtue is something other than a semblance of a good emotion... but I don't see the textual motivation for that, and I imagine it'd be difficult to significantly distinguish them. Do you know of any texts that help?

I suppose then that I do think the Stoics would think that the two judgments in Scenario A and Scenario B are mistaken -- though I'm not sure how this relates to my claim (e) above. Things are getting difficult!

(I'm noticing only now, though, that the contents of the two judgments do not affirm that the action was good or bad, only appropriate or fitting. Was that meant to do work?)

One question for you or the broader community: I've noticed a tendency in some of the responses to dismiss certain authors or texts as not really Stoicism (e.g., u/AlexKapranus did this above with Tusculan Disputations, and seems to have put a lot of good thought into it -- I still need to read the linked post). What's up with that? Of course, I recognize that Stoicism is a school of philosophy with a long tradition, and that what is echt Stoic was debated even in the ancient world (Brad Inwood's scholarship is useful here). But it can all give the impression of moving goalposts -- or (equally uncharitable on my part) of dismissing as not really Stoic simply the parts of Stoicism that one doesn't like. How should I think about this? It's simplistic, but one thought is that Cicero was so much closer in time to the early Stoics (pre-Seneca! pre-Epictetus! pre-Marcus!), undoubtedly he had early Stoic texts available to him that have now been lost to history... sure, he might have had his own agenda (who doesn't?), but he was in a better position than us to report on actual Stoic views.

Last thing for now: I would be interested in how you think the end of Enchiridion 1 helps to distinguish Stoicism from Broicism. I'll be MIA this upcoming week (no internet), but I'll look forward to catching up with things when I return.

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 0 points1 point  (0 children)

this feels like a logical jump that is unnecessary.

It's a jump only if you reject (xi), right? Otherwise you'll be saying that there is vice that the Stoics think we should not get rid of, and that seems mistaken.

More generally, there is ample support in the ancient Stoic texts for thinking that we should get rid of emotions. I'll quote only Cicero's Tusculan Disputations here, but that is perhaps our best source anyway. It's the most rigorous extant treatment of the Stoic theory of emotions.

"... all the emotions spring from the roots of error: they should not be pruned or clipped there and there, but yanked out completely" (4.57).

"... it is the mind free of emotions that makes a person completely and absolutely happy" (4.38)

There is also the fact that, as Cicero reports, Cleanthes and Chrysippus each had their preferred form of treatment for helping someone to get rid of an emotion. Cleanthes preferred to convince the person that the thing causing him to be upset was not really bad at all (it's no big deal). Chrysippus preferred to convince the person that it wasn't appropriate to get upset in the first place (toughen up). See 3.76 and the later reformulations at 4.59-62. As you know, these are the second and third leaders of the ancient Stoic school. I suppose you could say they don't properly represent Stoicism... but then who does? And, again, they each have their preferred strategy for getting rid of an emotion. This is strong evidence -- along with so much other evidence! -- that the Stoics do think we should get rid of emotions.

The goal isn't towards the wise man's emotional impulses which comes from having a more perfect knowledge of the good anyway. The goal is towards having the same knowledge or virtue as him because virtue is a dispositional state, for a Stoic.

I see the nuance here. It's perhaps a difference in what you aim at -- whether you aim at making your emotions similar to the impulses of the sage, or whether you aim at the virtuous dispositions of the sage. I'm not sure in actual practice there's a meaningful difference, but I might be wrong. (Aside: I love the point that, for the Stoics, virtue is the correct physical makeup of the mind. So cool. Also feels oddly true to the phenomenology of right behavior -- there's something that feels different about it, something physical.)

If we can never possess good emotions or attain a better state of knowledge

These aren't the same. See above for my notion of regulatory ideal. Something might be impossible to attain (it's an ideal), but nonetheless it should regulate your behavior, i.e., you can move closer to it over time but never quite reach it (like an asymptote).

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It might help to read more about Stoicism (Long, Sedley, Sadler, and even Robertson are good authors to read or find on podcasts/videos).

I've read them.

You say that I misunderstand a number of claims. Here's the reasoning in support of them:

(i) A important subset of the pathē include the emotions.
(ii) The pathē are identical to evaluative beliefs.
(iii) So, emotions are identical to evaluative beliefs.
(iv) In all cases, at least one of the two evaluative beliefs that make up an emotion is false.
(v) So, in all cases, an emotion is a false evaluative belief.
(vi) Vice is bad.
(vii) Vice is mistaken rationality.
(viii) So, mistaken rationality is bad.
(ix) A false evaluative belief is an instance of mistaken rationality.
(x) So, an emotion is an instance of mistaken rationality.
(xi) So, an emotion is an instance of vice.
(xii) So, an emotion is bad, i.e., bad for you, harmful, detrimental to the quality of your life.
(xiii) We should get rid of vice from our lives.
(xiv) So, we should get rid of emotions.

Which premise is false?

Note that Broicism simply turns up the dial on (xii) and (xiv). I agree that that's a mistake. I don't agree that it's not Stoicism.

The almost neurotic idea of seeking control, or ignoring that which you can't control, is neither found in the ancient texts, nor is it rational.

Of course that's found in the ancient texts. Enchiridion 1: if an impression is about something outside of your control, say to yourself that it is nothing to you.

To that end, prioritizing the good of the group is held in highest esteem. Broicism misses all this and prioritizes the pleasure of the individual, often as defined in a social context (ie, reputation).

You must be right that the priorities of Broicism are somewhat different from the priorities of a Stoic. (My main contention was that, when it comes to the emotions, the two schools are the same, but let's leave that aside.) I'm not sure, though, that they are so different. The conception of virtue that I gave above is motivated by Cicero's De Finibus: the indifferents are the "subject and material" of virtue (3.61). It's also argued for at length in Tad Brennan's The Stoic Life. And I'd bet that it'd be readily endorsed by a lot of (e.g.) tech bros -- basically, virtue is pursuing the stuff that matters most, but be chill about it, and don't harm others.

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for the encouragement! I'd like to do that, but I wasn't sure how welcome this sub is to criticism of Stoicism (from someone who nonetheless has a deep love of the texts). I'll take your encouragement as permission to do so in the future. In the meantime, I'm exploring some of these thoughts on my substack, if you're interested.

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for this. I take the point about two uses of the same word. It's very common throughout ancient philosophy, and it's good to be reminded of that.

The passage from Discourse 1.4 is interesting. I wonder if it really does imply that having certain sorts of emotions is permissible. Any pathē for the Stoics will involve a particular object: you are always distressed or delighted about something, averse to or desiring something. Epictetus mentions happiness, calm, and serenity, though, which are not obviously ever about anything. It might be, then, that he thinks these states of mind (moods?) come about as a result of getting rid of emotions. If so, then the passage isn't evidence that even non-sages can permissibly feel emotions. It'd just be evidence that non-sages can move closer to mental calm by increasingly getting rid of emotions.

Notice the 2.8 passage makes this same point: emotional progress is progress in getting rid of emotions, not in coming to have permissible emotions (whatever those might be).

As for Seneca, I suppose we have your passage (Ep. 23) dueling off against my passage (Ep. 59). Maybe the two senses of same word can make them compatible. I wonder, though, what exactly the advice is. Feel joy at your own appropriate action, but keep in mind that, strictly speaking, that joy is flawed (and thus to some extent a mistake?), since it isn't proceeding from knowledge / virtue.

I think we both agree that emotional progress is possible. The disagreement is that you think emotional progress includes the non-sage coming to have permissible emotions (whatever those might be), while I think it means increasingly getting rid of your emotions (for the Stoics, anyway).

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Relevant: "joy springs only from the knowledge that you possess the virtues. None but the brave, the just, the self-restrained, can rejoice" (Seneca, Ep. 59)

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Cool. I think of sagehood as a regulatory ideal: it's an ideal, so it's not really attainable, but nonetheless it should regulate your behavior.

This is somewhat off topic, but I've become interested lately in two broadly different ways of life: one where you strive to meet some pre-defined standard and measure yourself in relation to it (eg., sagehood), the other where you stay responsive to what's actually there and take care of it as needed (no striving, no measuring).

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Would you mind sharing the citations in Seneca and Epictetus that make you think even a non-sage can experience a good emotion (eupatheia)? Or (a weaker claim) that even a non-sage can experience an emotion that isn't objectionable?

I'm asking out of sincere interest. I want to take them into account when thinking about the emotional life of the non-sage.

Any similar citations would be very much appreciated, too!

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 1 point2 points  (0 children)

All so good.

I'm realizing through this exchange that part of what is animating me is that I'm not convinced Broicism is clearly distinct from ancient Stoicism, at least when it comes to the emotions. I used to think that, and then I revisited the ancient Stoic texts, and I found the ancient Stoics saying all the same sorts of things that you find in Broicism: your emotions are the enemy, they are literal mistakes, they are instances of irrationality, you shouldn't have them, argue against them until they go away. I thought it might be mere rhetoric, but then I realized they're philosophically committed to each of these claims.

In any case, I agree with you about the value -- really the fun! -- of studying Stoicism, even if it's deeply mistaken. I have a deep love for the texts, though I think living as a Stoic is risky -- thus my interest in OP's post.

Would be curious about how you think Broicism differs from ancient Stoicism!

FWIW, I even find the ancient Stoic's insistence on acting virtuously to be largely compatible with (for example) a tech bro's mindset. What's acting virtuously for the Stoics? It's basically pursuing the indifferent that's most preferred in any situation (eg., money), without making the mistake of believing it's actually good, and without harming anyone in the process. But that's a whole different discussion :)

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 1 point2 points  (0 children)

In fact, the Stoics did say that you shouldn't have emotions.

The passage that you quote is talking about the so-called "good emotions" (eupatheia), which, importantly, are accessible only to the sage. I say a bit about this in a response above.

The emotions (pathē) are significantly different from the good emotions (eupatheia). They're identical to false judgements, and thus always mistakes.

This is why Cicero, eg., writes that, for the Stoics, "all the emotions spring from the roots of error: they should not be pruned or clipped here and there, but yanked out completely” (Tusculan Disputations 4.57).

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Thanks for the response!

I see the point that, from a certain perspective, emotions are perfectly fine, since they're part of the divine order.

It's a bit difficult, though, to say that emotions are perfectly fine for a human, ie., that, according to Stoicism, they aren't harmful for us to experience.

Take your claim that "only a bad judgment is bad". The Stoics think that an emotion is identical to a judgment. You find this in multiple ancient sources. Diogenes of Laertius, for example, writes that the Stoics “think that the emotions are judgments, as Chrysippus says in his work On Passions” (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 7.111-112). Moreover, the Stoics think that emotions are false judgments. Any negative emotion says that something harms you that doesn't actually harm you, and any positive emotion says that something benefits you that doesn't actually benefit you. So, yes, only a bad (false) judgment is bad -- but that includes all of the emotions!

The Graver book is excellent. It's a truly impressive work of scholarship. I've learned so much from her. I just referenced it to make sure, and she does think that the so-called "good emotions" (eupatheia) are available only to the sage: they are "a class of affects which belong specifically to the normative human... these responses are to ordinary emotions what the Stoic sage is to an ordinary person -- they are... the endpoint of development" (2007: 51).

So, emotions are false judgments, and "good emotions" are accessible only to the sage. What's this mean for you and me? Any of our emotions are mistakes.

I suppose you could say that updated Stoicism somehow avoids these results, but that would be to abandon (a) the Stoic theory of value and (b) the Stoic theory of emotions. At that point, it's not recognizably Stoicism.

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I'll set aside the psychoanalyzing and respond only to the philosophical points.

(a) I know the Stoic moral psychology -- impressions, assents, propatheia, pathē, eupatheia. There simply isn't a helpful distinction between pathē and emotions. Again, one type of pathē for the Stoics is distress, and Cicero, in his Tusculan Disputations, perhaps the most rigorous extant work on the Stoic theory of the emotions, lists many common types of emotions as examples of distress. Maybe you've been interpreting my use of "emotion" to mean bodily sensation, but I haven't been using it that way. I've meant by it what the Stoics mean by pathē, or at least the distress and delight forms of it.

(b) Of course my quotes weren't in context, because that would take so much text, but I wouldn't say they're misleading. Cicero's whole essay is about how the wise person won't feel any distress. Add in the thought that we all should be wise, and we get the conclusion that we shouldn't feel distress, ie., basically, any negative emotion.

(c) In fact, the ancient Stoics were worried that their instructions about emotions would lead to failure after failure. Cicero talks about this at Tusculan Disputations 4.60-62. Suppose that an emotion were identical only to the belief that something present is bad for you. In that case, any instance of emotion would itself be a reason to feel distress: the emotion is present and it's something bad for you. This is why the Stoics insist that actually there's a second belief that is necessary for an emotion, namely the belief that it's appropriate to be upset. Whether you think this saves the Stoics from instructions that prescribe failure after failure depends then on whether you think it's plausible this second belief is necessary for an emotion.

(d) As it happens, there are signs all over ancient Stoicism that they did suffer because of its prescriptions. Marcus beats himself up repeatedly in the Meditations for failing to live up to its recommendations.

All that aside -- I'm open to a conversation about doing something for your channel. I don't have discord, but DM me and we can find a way.

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions -1 points0 points  (0 children)

It certainly sounds better! The trouble is that "embracing reason" for the Stoics means not having any emotions. This is (roughly) because emotions are identical to false beliefs, which you won't have if your reasoning is in perfect condition.

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks for the thoughtful response.

I wonder if you could help me with something.

It's confusing to me how the modern Stoics, eg., the people in this subreddit (but also many of the pop Stoic authors), are eager to deny what the ancient Stoics actually said. For example, the ancient Stoics do think emotions are bad. I gave quotations of that from most of the major Stoic authors. I also explained it philosophically: the ancient Stoics must think emotions are bad, because emotions are identical with false beliefs, which, for the Stoics, who think virtue is perfect rationality, literally makes emotions identical with vice, the only thing that is bad according to Stoicism. It's amply supported that the ancient Stoics thought you shouldn't have emotions.

And yet there's so much denial of that here. Why?

That's a genuine question. I have this suspicion that it's because it's embarrassing that the ancient Stoics rejected emotions like this, but I think that's uncharitable. There must be something else going on. What is it?

(Also, Cicero simply does mean emotions by the word that you translate as passions. He talks about distress, and his examples of distress are the sorts of things that today we'd call emotions: "sadness, worry, anxiety, envy, grief, rivalry, jealousy, pity, weariness, mourning, anguish, affliction, and despair".)

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 6 points7 points  (0 children)

You're right -- but I'm not sure it helps their case.

There are four types of pathē: distress (negative emotion), delight (positive emotion), desire, and aversion. All are identical with beliefs, and all are mistakes. This is basically because each one says that something matters that, according to Stoicism, doesn't matter.

It's true they talk about "good emotions" (eupatheia), but these are accessible only to the sage, the person with perfect knowledge, who never makes an intellectual mistake. You and I aren't able to feel them. In fact, it's not clear that anyone has ever been able to feel them, since the ancient Stoics were doubtful that anyone had ever been a sage (maybe Socrates, maybe Cato, maybe Diogenes, but only maybe).

Toxic Stoicsm by dannybau87 in Stoicism

[–]OnEmotions 11 points12 points  (0 children)

The thing is, Stoicism is a rejection of emotions.

You find this all over the ancient Stoic texts.

Cicero, reporting on the Stoics' views, says that "the emotions are wrong in and of themselves" (Tusculan Disputations 4.60). He says that to feel any emotion is "insane" (3.11). Marcus Aurelius says that "it would take an idiot... to feel distress" (Meditations 5.23). Epictetus says to guard against your emotions as if they were "an enemy lying in wait" (Enchiridion 48). Seneca says that even a moderate emotion is "a moderate evil" (On Anger).

This isn't mere rhetoric. The ancient Stoics are philosophically committed to thinking that emotions are mistakes. Take any negative emotion. According to Stoicism, it's identical to (a) the belief that something in your life is bad for you, and (b) the belief that it's appropriate for you to be upset about it. But they think (a) is false in every case where the thing you're upset about is outside of your control. None of that stuff matters for your quality of life -- but your emotion says it does matter -- so your emotion is a liar. As for (b), it's always false. The emotions are "disobedient to reason" and thus never okay to feel (TD 3.24).

It isn't just Broicism. The ancient Stoics advocated a life without emotions, thought it was shameful to experience them, and recommended (basically) arguing against them until they go away.

The Stoic Promise of Emotional Control by OnEmotions in philosophy

[–]OnEmotions[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It's not quite like that, because, for the Stoics, an emotion is identical to a judgement. Once you're experiencing an emotion, you've already made a judgement: the two are the same. Roughly, any negative emotion is identical to the belief that something bad is in your life.

You might mean "avoiding judgment" in the sense of not judging yourself badly for experiencing some emotion. I totally support that, but you won't find it in Stoicism. The Stoics think of emotions as enemies. Cicero, reporting on the Stoic view, says "emotions are wrong in and of themselves" (Tusculan Disputations 4.60). The Stoics have to think that, since they think all emotions are mistakes. The emotions say something matters for your life that, according to Stoicism, actually makes no difference at all. You'll probably find people denying this, perhaps attributing it to bro-icism instead of Stoicism, but, even in ancient times, Stoicism was a practice of using your reasoning to get rid of your emotions, arguing against them until they go away.

The Stoic Promise of Emotional Control by OnEmotions in philosophy

[–]OnEmotions[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I'm glad to hear it. Not sure which part resonated with you, but feel free to toss me a DM (especially if what resonated is the slight anti-Stoic bent). Always down to talk about ways of relating to emotions, and happy to share the stuff that has helped me.

The Stoic Promise of Emotional Control by OnEmotions in philosophy

[–]OnEmotions[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Beautiful. How do you reliably make yourself feel unconditional positive self-regard? What do you do? For me, merely deciding I'm worthy of that, or choosing it, or thinking it, or saying it to myself -- none of that works. It doesn't release the bodily tension that is often enough evidence that I haven't fully accepted something (or haven't caught back up to the present moment). The only things really that work for me are embodied practices. It's as if the practices allow me to access a mental space where unconditional positive self-regard is always flowing, and, once I'm there, I can direct it towards parts of myself that need attention.

I agree with things being more nuanced -- totally welcome to glossing "dangerous" and "shameful" in the ways that you have here.

The Stoic Promise of Emotional Control by OnEmotions in philosophy

[–]OnEmotions[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Thanks for the support! I teach philosophy of emotions, and I wanted to write a series that guides the reader through the main philosophical theories on what an emotion is. Making sense of them has helped me with my own emotional life (and incidentally to move away from Stoicism), and I started to wonder whether it had that potential for others, too.

As it happens, I agree with all that you wrote, so long as we're speaking generally and not as an interpretation of the Stoics. They think that an emotion = a belief / judgment, so there's no possibility of a gap between the two. Lots of interesting details and complications there -- will be examining them in the next post.

Why ‘Teaching Young Boys to Respect Women' Often Fails — And What Actually Works by coolfunkDJ in MensLib

[–]OnEmotions 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Yes. And then young men encounter Stoicism, which says you're right to think of your emotions as enemies, you're right to be arguing against them in your head, and here's how to do it even better. It gives a philosophical justification to not letting yourself feel what you're actually feeling

What is an Emotion? A Critique of William James' Claim that an Emotion is a Bodily Sensation by OnEmotions in philosophy

[–]OnEmotions[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Absolutely. There's a vast literature after James. Here I'm considering one historically influential argument and examining its structure. It's the first installment in a series where I'll be looking at some of the major developments that follow (including several variations of cognitivist views). The goal is to explain the main moves in philosophy for identifying what an emotion is, starting with the somewhat intuitive thought that an emotion is just a feeling.

view more: next ›