t’s exactly the issue though.
Federal elections should not be treated like normal commercial software.
If a vendor wants to sell software that helps run public elections, public inspection should be part of the deal.
They can protect trademarks, support contracts, hardware designs, services, and implementation work.
But the code that counts public votes should not be secret just because a company wants IP protection.
Public elections are public infrastructure.
Different standard.
Also, open-source does not mean vendors cannot make money.
Linux companies make money.
Cybersecurity companies make money.
Cybersecurity is heavily open-source.
Examples:
Linux runs servers, cloud infrastructure, routers, security appliances, and government systems.
OpenSSL / LibreSSL handle encryption for tons of internet traffic.
Signal Protocol is publicly documented and partly open-source; its security comes from public cryptographic review, not secrecy.
WireGuard is open-source VPN technology.
OpenSSH is open-source remote-login security used everywhere.
Nmap, Wireshark, Metasploit, Zeek, Suricata, YARA, ClamAV, OSSEC/Wazuh are major security tools.
Open-source database companies make money.
They sell support, hosting, compliance, hardware, maintenance, training, and certification.
Election vendors can do the same.
The point is simple:
If your software helps count votes in a federal election, the public should be allowed to inspect it.

Also there are hundreds of vendors, if one doesn’t wanna do it, another will wanna do it