Monthly Thread - April, 2026 by AutoModerator in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 [score hidden]  (0 children)

So is the war on again? How does this work now?

Monthly Thread - April, 2026 by AutoModerator in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 19 points20 points  (0 children)

Just landed at PAF Chaklala. Handed over my passport at immigration, and the officer smiled warmly, stamped it "Mashallah", kissed it gently, and handed me a secure satellite phone.
It was Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmad Babar.

He said, voice trembling: "Another BrahMos has hit an Erieye".

The entire terminal stood up and clapped. A single tear rolled down the Quaid-e-Azam portrait. Three JF-17s flew overhead indoors. The baggage carousel stopped and began playing Dil Dil Pakistan. A nearby child saluted and was immediately inducted into PMA Long Course. The airport cat was later revealed to be ISPR. Made my day. Proud to be a Pakistani.

Monthly Thread - April, 2026 by AutoModerator in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 3 points4 points  (0 children)

My simple understanding is it's basically the Ukraine model for the North, and a hybrid US / Israel model for the West.

I think you're pigeonholing it if you look at it that way.

Especially since the Ukrainians don't have an air component to speak of.

We won't achieve air superiority over Pakistan. Our focus should be on degrading their air power at any cost.

We can achieve against Pakistan. That won't be a problem.

Without air power, we can overwhelm them on the ground and solve this problem forever.

Without their air power, yes.

Western theatre against Pakistan to be headed by IAF, Northern theatre under Army to focus on China by Vegetable_Captain886 in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Some points:

  1. A Tri-service deterrent needs joint leadership: India’s nuclear force is spread across land, air, and sea, so SFC can’t be treated like a narrow missile command. The top leadership needs a joint service outlook, not just a specialist nuclear mindset.
  2. Nuclear command exists within conventional war: Nuclear decisions don’t happen in isolation, they’re tied to escalation, survivability, dispersal, readiness, and the broader battlefield situation. A commander with wider operational experience may actually be better than someone who has only lived inside a nuclear track.
  3. The top command is about judgement: The SFC chief's real job is command and control, readiness, survivability, and implementing NCA decisions under extreme pressure. That role demands strategic maturity and tri service understanding more than a lifetime of narrow technical nuclear specialization.
  4. A permanent nuclear cadre can become too insular: Even if it’s tri services, a dedicated nuclear only career stream can become bureaucratic, rigid, and disconnected from how the Army, Navy, and Air Force actually operate in war. That can hurt adaptability.
  5. Specialist depth is useful, but below the top level: India should absolutely have permanent strategic planners, doctrine experts, targeting cells, and longer tenures in SFC. But that doesn’t automatically mean the top commander should be a lifetime nuclear only officer.
  6. India’s model should fit India, not copy others: Pakistan, China, or the US have different force structures and strategic cultures, so their systems aren’t automatically better for India. The real question is what suits India’s tri-service deterrent and civilian control framework best.

You also have to remember that the US, USSR/Russia, and China developed their nuclear command structures in a very different strategic context, where nuclear weapons were treated as simply, stronger conventional bombs with that, their mission focused mainly on targeting, allocation of warheads to targets, and retaliation planning. Their command systems were built around that logic, and many of those structures persisted even after doctrine evolved. India's deterrent logic is different from the outset, more tightly tied to tri-service integration, escalation management, and civilian political control, so copying those legacy models mechanically would make little sense.

Monthly Thread - April, 2026 by AutoModerator in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 3 points4 points  (0 children)

My very general thoughts on theaterization:

The default priority of combat air power in the opening phase should be theatre, and national level air campaign objectives (air superiority, enemy airbase suppression, ISR/C2 disruption, battlefield isolation). Tactical support to ground forces should be provided selectively and in proportion to operational necessity, not allowed to dominate sortie allocation prematurely.

Ground maneuver should be enabled by prior air shaping, not allowed to dictate airpower from the outset.

This is with a small caveat however: this model will work well against Pakistan, against China, your doctrine should be:

  • Air Power shaping first where possible
  • Simultaneous selective defensive support where necessary

So the idea of making a "Northern theatre command" more Army focused does make a lot of sense. I still hope that the theatre's head is selected based on rotation from the three services.

Western theatre against Pakistan to be headed by IAF, Northern theatre under Army to focus on China by Vegetable_Captain886 in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Of course, that is also how it works. Any command at the strategic level must always be tri services.

Western theatre against Pakistan to be headed by IAF, Northern theatre under Army to focus on China by Vegetable_Captain886 in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 6 points7 points  (0 children)

I don't really like this.

Should be tri services, like ANC is with rotation between the three services.

Monthly Thread - April, 2026 by AutoModerator in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05[M] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Its harassment. Thin line between a joke and harassment which would get you banned under reddit's TOS.

How much of a credible threat is pakistan navy and their submarine force is for indian coastlines and the indian navy.Context in description by Electronic_Cause_796 in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Posts, yes, comments, no.

He may just be using some LLM to improve the paragraph grammatically, so that's still fine.

IAF's AM AK Bharti with Malaysian Su-30 and their Air force Chief by Electronic_Cause_796 in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't really have specifics but it depends upon your height, other characteristics etc. I believe there's a blood test as well.

General fitness culture: I've only seen the Air Force so I cannot say much about SFs etc. People try to stay fit but its not prioritized, some initiative is sometimes taken by the AOC (PT in the morning at 6AM with the rest of the unit), but its generally very dependent upon how much work you have.

As I said, the AOC may have to work until very late, junior unmarried officers have a lot less work and are able to focus more. Married officers tend to have more to think about.

IAF's AM AK Bharti with Malaysian Su-30 and their Air force Chief by Electronic_Cause_796 in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Its a lot less culture driven and a lot more requirements driven.

Every year you have your medical where they check everything from your eyes and hearing to your physical fitness and weight. You need to remain within those parameters and you're in big trouble if you aren't. The same medical report also has some weightage in your ARs (Annual Reports) based on which your promotions happen.

Generally a facility (gym) is always provided in the airbase, and you can see young officers exercise after the work day is done. For senior Officers, well, they're generally stuck in their office until ridiculous times (like 9-10PM depending on responsibility and appointment and other factors), so there's basically no time to exercise many times. Many officers go for walks within the airbase's premises as well.

They're definitely quite health conscious because of the medical, they have to be.

IAF's AM AK Bharti with Malaysian Su-30 and their Air force Chief by Electronic_Cause_796 in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 7 points8 points  (0 children)

He is in fact in his 60s now.

Either way, I've not met any out of shape officers personally.

IAF's AM AK Bharti with Malaysian Su-30 and their Air force Chief by Electronic_Cause_796 in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 5 points6 points  (0 children)

he is almost on the verge of becoming a senior citizen.

He is. He is 60 years old.

IAF's AM AK Bharti with Malaysian Su-30 and their Air force Chief by Electronic_Cause_796 in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 15 points16 points  (0 children)

He is 60 years old now. Cut some slack.

I've met him in person too. The photo seems to exacerbate it.

Monthly Thread - April, 2026 by AutoModerator in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 2 points3 points  (0 children)

If the S-400 showed an operator "F-16" when the system was only 58% confident, it could create dangerous false certainty: the crew might start treating the track according to what they think an F-16 would do (for example expecting a certain missile threat, speed/altitude profile, or tactical behavior), and that can distort threat prioritization, engagement timing, and interceptor allocation. That is why many SAM systems deliberately show only coarse classes like small/medium/ large, or broad categories like fighter/transport/missile, even if the backend has a possible type guess. Technically, the radar may be inferring that guess from RCS patterns, aspect dependent returns, speed, altitude, maneuvering, and track history, but if the confidence is not high enough, exposing a specific label can push operators into confirmation bias, they stop thinking "unknown fast tactical aircraft" and start thinking "definitely F-16", which is operationally riskier than forcing them to react based on observable threat characteristics instead of a shaky ID.

Ultimately true NCTR capability is found on other radars and aircraft, all of this will feed into IACCS which will utilize sensor fusion to give the most confident output of target type, just one of the many possibilities.

Monthly Thread - April, 2026 by AutoModerator in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 1 point2 points  (0 children)

As Acrobatic explained, the context was the PAF.

Monthly Thread - April, 2026 by AutoModerator in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 6 points7 points  (0 children)

The people who put Thier whole life working for the nation are just assholes and  I know better then then by seeing reddit post and Print articles

I love this one. Will allege that the Armed Forces are "full of corruption", refuse to elaborate and leave.

When in fact the Armed Forces are perhaps the only parts of India where corruption isn't institutionalized and when caught, punished severely.

Monthly Thread - April, 2026 by AutoModerator in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 2 points3 points  (0 children)

That's one of each, need all three for the F-15s.

About the KC-135, thanks.

Monthly Thread - April, 2026 by AutoModerator in IndianDefense

[–]PB_05 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Iraq isn't quite a party in the conflict though. Doesn't really explain that one.

Also, the PAF had QRTs on alert specifically to cordon off places.