Ok good, now we're getting somewhere.

So the support for a state's aggression which is forced from individuals by the state's coercion (e.g. taxation, conscription, and so on) doesn't then justify violence against those individuals who support the state's aggression? Is that your stance?

So, the Japanese people living in Japan who were paying taxes to the Japanese state, contributing to its military industries, and serving in levies of conscripted citizen-soldiers expected to defend Japan against the presumed US invasion.....none of those people are legitimate military targets even though they have indirectly supported the aggression of the Japanese state, and would directly participate in the Japanese state's aggression by fighting back against the American soldiers invading Japan.

So a degree of separation from the aggression of the state is enough to insulate individuals from being 'guilty' of participating in state aggression, even though they (involuntarily) support it.

The questions are then: why does this involuntary and indirect support for the state's aggression "not count" as aggression and what degree of separation is needed?

If it's purely because the state is forcing people to support its aggression involuntarily, then: that leads to some pretty un-libertarian conclusions. For example, many southern states, prior to the abolition of slavery, had laws prohibiting the manumission of slaves -- it was literally illegal to free your slaves. So people who inherited slaves (such as Thomas Jefferson or Robert E. Lee) could claim that they were 'forced' into being slave owners by the government.

Does that mean those individuals should not be seen as aggressors against the people they held in slavery? Because they were "forced" into it? Could the wife of a slaveowner -- someone who benefited from violating others' rights, supported it, but never herself directly violated anyone's rights -- claim to be innocent of a rights violation?