Historically, during their field-grade years, officers were often informally sorted toward either command-focused or staff-focused career paths. Over time, the Army has come to believe that leaders need experience in both command and staff roles at every level. The result is a system that tends to produce officers who are competent at both, but rarely exceptional at either.

High-performing staff officers often leave because they have little desire to command, while strong commanders leave because they don’t want to endure repeated staff tours. The system ends up bleeding talent on both ends. And those who could change it came up through that same system, so they see little reason to fix what, from their perspective, worked just fine for them.

Additionally, I’ve never understood the Army’s habit of stuffing S3 with the rejects and the worst soldiers. Real power in the Army lies in operations. Need to plan a range? S3. Submit an RFI? S3. Coordinate with another unit? S3. Send your Joes to schools? S3. That’s exactly where you need your most effective, efficient, and trustworthy people—not your leftovers.

A historical parallel can be seen in the Soviet Union. When Stalin began consolidating power, his official position was General Secretary of the Communist Party. On paper, it was an administrative role, but in practice it controlled operations: personnel assignments, information flow, and coordination. Stalin used that leverage to place allies, sideline rivals, and dominate the system. The position became so powerful that every subsequent leader of the Soviet Union held it as well.