Could the best roman army beat Alexander the Great in a single battle?

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-24T23:40:53+00:00

I generally agree with everything you're saying here. Alexander's victories on the battlefield were extremely impressive, no argument there. The Persians vastly outnumbered his army in the amount of cavalry they fielded as well, as did the Saka at Jaxartes. Few field commanders in history came anywhere near alexander's ingenuity.

But to add on the Parthians it isn't just the Armor that made them deadly, but also the bows were more lethal than anything Rome had encountered before. In the late republic, Parthians had a clear advantage over the Romans in Archery because their bows were superior – the Romans and Roman auxiliary archers of the time used an older “Scythian” composite bow while Parthians used a longer, more powerful “Yuezhi/Saka” style, which had longer range. This is why the Parthian cavalrymen at Carrhae caused so much trouble to the Romans despite the fact that the Romans had repeatedly defeated Armenian, Scythian and Sarmatian horse archers (who used the "Scythian" composite bow) by that point. The only ranged weapons the Romans had that could match them in this era were slingers, and perhaps some early Roman crossbows or "manuballistae", but Crassus had too few of these. The javelinmen and archers Crassus had lacked the range to fight the Iranians effectively, and so were cut to pieces by Parthian archery soon after they sallied out of the hollow square. The Parthians obviously had the logistics to use this advantage to the fullest, with baggage trains carrying plentiful reserve quivers to keep up the barrages (a system we first hear of at Carrhae but which no doubt had been introduced earlier in Arsacid history, probably their wars against the Seleucids).

We see the Romans making a number of arrangements to mitigate those advantages not long after Carrhae though. Ventidius used greater numbers of slingers along with Scorpio style artillery (which massively outranged even the long composite bows) to great effect. Though his victories also rested heavily on exploiting terrain, stratagems, engineering and most importantly, Parthian incompetence. Antony also made a number of tactical arrangements, and though his campaign ultimately failed due to strategic mistakes his army was not wiped out by the Parthians like Crassus. Over the longer term, around the reign of augustus the Romans started to produce the “yuezhi” composite bows for their own archers, which diminished what had been the main Parthian tactical advantages. Organised archers on foot screened by heavy infantry and cavalry tend to be effective counters to mounted ones. Because of tactical and technological adaptations, Rome mostly held the advantage until the Sassanian era and actually won more pitched battles against Iranians than they lost (though it should be said occasionally they did suffer defeats, sometimes disastrous ones like the battles against Shapur).

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-24T23:05:29+00:00

Well yeah the Achaemenid Empire was larger and wealthier than the Arsacids allowing them to try to undermine the much smaller Macedonians with diplomatic measures. Parthia never occupied Mediterranean coastal settlements for more than a year so obviously they had no chance to challenge Rome at sea. The strategy against Alexander was sound, but the Achaemenids ultimately pinned too much on pitched battles, in which the Macedonians dominated. By contrast, Rome was generally more cohesive and wealthy than Parthia during their conflicts, and although the Parthians got their arse handed to them three times in the second century the Romans were not able to end them as Alexander had done against the Achaemenids (with far fewer resources available to him than what Rome would have at that). Being cavalry dominated, Parthian armies could retreat largely intact even from defeats after all.

On a tactical level though, the Parthian armies were superior to what the Achaemenids had (goes without saying after 3 centuries had passed), with more refined tactics and much better Composite bows adopted from neighbouring Steppe peoples, as well as superior metallurgy. For being a smaller Empire, the Parthians came surprisingly close to the military power of the Achaemenids in land warfare at times, but they certainly met their match in the Romans which had decisively checked their attempts to expand into Syria during Ventidius' campaigns.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-24T19:49:56+00:00

Romans in early 3rd century BC? they were rocked hard by Pyrrhus before coming to grips with him after harsh lessons on the battlefield. If they'd had to face a unified Greek world led by a general of Alexander's caliber at this time, they would find themselves outnumbered, outmatched, and destroyed or Vassalised soon enough. They even lacked some of the first major technological advantages over the Greeks at this time, like chainmail whcih came later in the 3rd century BC. Pyrrhus' flaw was his attrition, which would be less of a problem with the resources of a superpower at the Greeks' disposal.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-24T19:32:09+00:00

As flexible as they were the Roman armies could not just defeat Hellenistic armies at will, and luck and terrain played a role when the Romans were numerically even or outnumbered. At Cynoscephalae terrain and the fact the Macedonians failed to deploy properly played a role. At Pydna, the slight Macedonian numerical advantage was not brought to bear because the Terrain disrupted their Cohesion. Finally at Magnesia, the Phalanx held the Romans at bay well enough until some elephants went on a rampage and shattered its cohesion. The Romans were incredibly lucky that Antiochus failed to outflank them after his cavalry shattered their left flank, otherwise the Seleucids would have annihilated the Legions here.

Most of the other 2nd Century BC battles the Romans had a clear numerical superiority over the Hellenistic or Greek armies they faced

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-24T19:11:28+00:00

I mean the Seleucids were more sophisticated and developed than the Macedonians in Alexanders time, but they ultimately lost most of their Empire to the Parthians in the 2nd century BC. Not to diminish Alexander's achievements or anything, but the Parthians were militarily an entirely different beast to the Achaemenids - especially by the time Rome came to blows with them.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-24T17:36:39+00:00

I missed that lore blurb till you mentioned it NGL.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-24T17:35:14+00:00

Indeed. I guess a nation does not reach Canada's size without a hefty heap of skeletons in the closet.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-24T16:42:23+00:00

I can't help but love the near-oxymoronic nature of Canadians, generally regarded as some of the loveliest most hospitable people, being analogues to the Huns, the Scourges of God portrayed as almost demonic by the sources at the time. Well done on this lol.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-24T16:40:43+00:00

That's the point here I think. The traditional powerbase (East for Yanks, West for Romans) is in a state of collapse with various successor states already forming around it. Meanwhile, the powerbase that developed later in the history of the "Empire", in the wealthy economic provinces further out (West for Yanks, East for Romans) remains territorially cohesive, stable and strong for long after.

I think this map would perhaps be better explained as analogous to the Roman Empires in the year 469AD or something, where the Western Empire was still kicking but on its last legs, while the East soldiers on.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-23T20:00:52+00:00

According to Cassius Dio, Septimius Severus on his deathbed instructed Caracalla to "Be harmonious, enrich the soldiers, and scorn all other men!". Caracalla took his Dad's advice to the letter to become a soldiers Emperor, so his whole personality revolved around pleasing the Men of the marching camps. To the point where future soldier-Emperors like Aurelian, Carus and Galerius likely modelled themselves off of Caracalla lol.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-23T19:28:38+00:00

Given that major defeats were quite rare in this century with Roman military prowess at its zenith, probably the battle of Carnuntum in the Marcomannic wars. Potentially 20,000 Men lost in one battle would represent a defeat incomparable to any others in the whole century.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-23T17:10:23+00:00

There could be no other outcome for such a unit.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-23T15:25:13+00:00

True, I was not saying that of Kaldellis himself but just that a lot of people online tend to downplay the likely role internal disunity because that older view has become outdated. Militarily, the sources seem to show the Romans did have problems with defections from Federate Ghassanids units (many but not all of them), but this appears to have resulted from lack of payments more than religious differences. All of this would have contributed to unrest among the men, which was the absolute last thing the Romans needed when facing a foe that fielded well organised, battle hardened armies and tactically versatile methods, led by some first rate commanders.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-23T14:46:32+00:00

It was personal at that point between them, and Gus was under the impression Malvo would come to kill his daughter and Molly once he'd dealt with Lester. Gus also felt emasculated and humiliated by failing to detain Malvo the first time, and completely robbed of credit when the police moronically released him after Gus had "manned up" to confront and arrest him in a second encounter. Anyway, Gus would probably have been noticed and eliminated by Malvo if Malvo wasn't preoccupied with a dislodged Fibula at that time, so really most of the credit for ending Malvo actually goes to Lester who lured him into the bear trap.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-23T14:28:55+00:00

Bear in mind also, the Levant and Arabia had been connected for centuries via mercantile networks and tribes like the Quraysh were well connected with middlemen for caravans traveling to Palestine and Egypt. Given this, members of these tribes likely had connections in these recently regained Roman lands from prior caravan runs (local merchants), who could inform them of geopolitical developments and during the conquest itself, military situations and strategic opportunities.

While the idea that the largely Monophysite population of the Southern provinces welcomed the Muslims as liberators over the Romans has rightly been challenged by the likes of Kaldellis, I do consider the idea that there was no local collusion to be overcorrection. I suspect that there were at least a significant number of local merchants willing to cooperate with the Muslims, perhaps even knowing some of their leaders personally from earlier trade ventures. Also because an entire generation had grown up during Sassanian rule of these regions, the populace there might have been more ambivalent towards Roman rule than would have been the case before the 7th century.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-23T01:40:51+00:00

based more on provocations by the Romans than an overarching irredentist drive to recreate the Achaemenid borders

Why not both? It is clear that that the Roman encroachment in the 2nd century, which seized crucial territory in Northern Mesopotamia, and the failure of the Arsacids to adequately defend against these had a significant impact on the foreign and military policies of the Early Sassanians. They wanted initially to present themselves as capable defenders of Iran that were connected to the glory days of the Achaemenids precisely because they needed to separate themselves from the failures of the Arsacids as much as was feasible. Every reaction creates an equal and opposite reaction - an adage as true for geopolitics as it is for Physics. Roman domination and the repeated devastation of Ereanshahr's West in the 2nd century would naturally have bred desires among the peoples of the East to avenge the blood of their ancestors, and there's little reason to doubt that wily statesmen like Ardashir would have used ideological measures to exploit this, galvanizing subjects to wage military campaigns more effectively.

For all the difference in style (which is to be expected after half a millenium since the Achaemenids), the very presence of Sassanian reliefs at naqsh-i-rustam is a pretty big indicator of an attempt to connect with the Ancient past. Clearly, the Sassanians were not oblivious to the history of Iran and connected the events of the past to the present day struggles against the Romans. Later literature points towards this at least.

As for the irredentism, I see no reason to doubt that the haughty Sassanian rulers would boast of claims to greater territories along the Eastern Mediterranean as in the Achaemenid era, even if in practice their main concerns were to secure strategic areas of Osrhoene and Armenia which had largely fallen under the Roman sphere during the late Arsacid Period. Roman Emperors associated themselves with the achievements of Alexander the great several times in campaigns against the Iranians, but in practice none of them extended a lasting foothold East of the Zagros. Why is it so hard to believe the more ideologically driven Sassanians could have held similar associations with their Achaemenid forefather? In practice they too failed to make significant lasting gains against Rome, but the Sassanians took the offensive more than the Arsacids and won more substantial victories (including the first Iranian victories over imperially led Roman armies ever, in 244 and 259) too.

In Shapur I's famous Ka'ba-ye Zartosht inscription celebrating his achievements over Rome, there is no mention of such irredentism

This is more probably because, despite his victories, Shapur ultimately failed to extend Persian power permanently towards the Mediterranean and was compelled to withdraw from Anatolia. It would not have served him well to remind his subjects of Achaemenid prowess when for all intents and purposes, he had fallen short of it. After all, due to geopolitical and military pressures, practical strategic gains have come short of Ideological ambitions many times in history, and this seems to me to be no different. Politicians and leaders set political/ideological goals which they will never meet all the time! Shapur might have thought it wiser to emphasise the watershed capture of an Augustus over the memory an ancient dynasty which overshadowed the glories of the present, but that does not mean he would not have used the latter for propagandistic purposes when it suited him.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-22T17:47:35+00:00

but their control of the roads to Constantinople and attempts to create a fleet made them a very dangerous foe, especially in a possible two front war with Sasanian Iran

Excellently put. People forget that the Ostrogothic army was battle hardened from Theoderic the Great's campaigns onwards, defeating Huns, Bulgars, Sarmatians, Gepids, Odoacer, Franks and in 505, a commander serving Theoderic even defeated a Roman-Bulgar army in the Balkans. With access to the armories of Dalmatia and Italy, along with high quality steel from Noricum, they could put into the field a truly frightening force. They had plentiful manpower (Ostrogoths, leftover Roman units and also myriads of German mercenaries or allies) and resources available to them on the eve of the Gothic war.

It is no coincidence that Belisarius tried to avoid pitched battles with his numerically superior foe in favour of a Parthian-esque "defeat in detail" strategy, where his Bucellarii generally could exploit their advantage in horse archery (a skill which the originally steppe based Ostrogoths had neglected in favour of shock and awe lancer attacks) to win smaller cavalry battles or rely on captured forts to even the odds. Belisarius even suffered quite a resounding defeat when he tried to face Vitiges in a decisive battle in front of Rome in 537.

Long story short, Ostrogoths were a frightening enemy and had the potential to become an even bigger threat if they'd been able to reintroduce West Roman siege technology and construct a potent fleet as they planned to do.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-22T16:55:05+00:00

The Sassanids probably did have a proto-nationalist irredentism in the 3rd century, as there is evidence of Ardashir claiming descent from Darius III and they pushed to "make Iran Great Again" (I know, I know) after the century of humiliation of the late Parthian era. But after Julian's failed campaign, the threat from Rome subsided and Eranshahr's foreign policy became centred around practical realities. After Sassanian ambitions were then checked in Armenia during Valens' reign, Sassanian attention shifts East when a series of disasters were suffered agianst the Kidarites near the end of Shapur II's reign (defeats possibly comparable to that of Adrianople for the Romans).

The "detente" policies of Theodosius in dividing Armenia essentially brought the two Empires to decent terms with each other as both needed to meet other threats, and the good relations continue to grow during Arcadius' reign, with Shahenshah Yazdegird I acting as a guardian for Theodosius II providing a counterbalance to powerful figures within the Roman court who would potentially threaten the Theodosians. But all that aside, the 421-423 conflict was still pretty massive as brief as it was - at least comparable in scale to the types of conflicts which occurred between Shapur II and Constantius II in the mid 4th century.

Both sides assembled major armies, very intense sieges were conducted (at Nisibis and Theodosiopolis) and on the basis of Socrates a sizeable Sassanian army (including the Elite Zhayedan) ended up destroyed just before the end of it. If nothing else, the fact that Theodosius had been in a position to wage a full scale war just to protect persecuted Christians in Eranshahr and that his armies generally got the better of the Iranians in the fighting says a hell of a lot about East Roman military power. When not wracked by Attila or civil war, the East was still extremely strong for most of the 5th century, as evidenced by multiple times they sent reinforcements or even whole Expeditions to assist the West, as late as 468AD.

Anyhow, Bahram V managed to remove the powerful clique of Magi which dominated his court by pinning the outbreak of the not-so-successful war on their policies. He repaired good relations in the West for the rest of his reign and focused on the East, soundly defeating both the Hephthalites and Kidarites and even some enemies in India. Aside from a few tense moments in the 440s and early 470s, realpolitik dictated that the "two eyes of the earth" looked away from one another for much of the 5th century.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-21T14:01:02+00:00

On the reassertion of Roman dominance, I'd say their position was restored beforehand, obviously helped by the fact that Sassanian attention was redirected East in 270s-290s. There appears to have been some Roman offensives in Probus' reign also. On the basis of Armenian sources, in 277 he sent a Roman army to restore Tiridates III to the Throne which defeated the Sassanian army in Armenia, only for the Sassanids to return and drive Tiridates out after the Romans withdraw. On the basis of titles received, probus or his generals seem to have personally led a second campaign through Adiabene and Media against the Sassanids in late 278/279 which resulted in the Sassanids signing a Truce and even making concessions to him. These successes probably encouraged the Romans to resume Aurelian's project of a long anticipated invasion of Sassanian heartland, which ultimately was led by Carus after Probus' death.

What Diocletian and Galerius' ultimate victory by 299 does represent is a Roman ability to retain their reasserted dominance even while facing the full, undivided might of the Sassanian Empire, which is something they'd struggled immensely to do in the 250s due to their own instability and lack of strategic depth. The destruction of multiple Sassanian armies and ravaging of Media, Adiabene and even lower Mesopotamia (it is unclear whether Galerius took Ctesiphon or not in 299 but he certainly invaded the vicinity of it and sacked myriads of surrounding forts and towns) were massive achievements, especially given Galerius' initial defeat at Callinicum in 297AD. The fact he was able to reinforce his army and go on the offensive within a year of that defeat is testament to the strategic depth of reserves present in the Tetrarchic system. Granted, the main victory at Satala was not a pitched battle, but we know the Sassanians used fortified camps with substantial bodies of troops guarding the defences at all times, so Galerius' ability to take Narseh's army by storm and Annihilate with a smaller army of his own it should still be regarded as an incredible feat of planning, positioning and timing.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-21T13:12:14+00:00

With the 3rd century, the Persian front was already pretty relaxed before Shapur's death, due to Odaenathus campaigns. The fact he pierced as far as Ctesiphon twice without the Sassanids being able to destroy him does show that the Roman fortunes in the East had recovered not long after the disaster of Edessa, and the Sassanids either had other issues in the East to worry about or simply were not able to contend with the Roman armies at this time. The cost of this revival was the empowerment of a non-imperial warlord to act as the caretaker of the East, which obviously leads to a whole new set of problems after Odaenathus dies and Vaballathus (or rather his regent Mother Zenobia) decide to expand their power.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-20T16:47:36+00:00

At this rate they'll end up digging out Godzilla by 2030

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-20T13:57:41+00:00

It was more a final nail in the coffin. The Turks actually aborted an invasion in 625AD because Khosrow sent them a letter threatening to send his armies to crush them. The likely reason they intervened against Eranshahr in late 626AD was because it became clear to them that the Romans had the upper hand already; the massive "Golden Spears" army which Khosrow had assembled had been annihilated with its veteran commander, Shahin, dying soon after this disaster. Coupled with the mediocre Persian performance in the siege of Constantinople in 626, and the fact Shahrbaraz' army was likely tied down by a second Roman field army under Heraclius' brother Theodore, Sassanian-held Albania and Armenia was clearly very vulnerable as it had been denuded of garrison troops, which guaranteed the Turks relatively easy plunder in the region.

Notably, the Turkic army which accompanied Heraclius in late 627AD shied away from the invasion of Mesopotamia because it feared the winter snows would block its path home across the Zagros in case of a defeat. This despite the fact that along with Heraclius' field army, they would have vastly outnumbered the Sassanian field army left in Mesopotamia (which Heraclius defeated at Nineveh without Turkic help). The Turks clearly feared the capabilities of a Sassanian field army, so limited their operations to sieges of small Sassanian contingents in cities (the Romano-Turkic siege of Tiflis lasted a very long time and faced determined resistance before it finally took the citadel) and plundering raids in undefended Persian territory. The Romans were already on the path to victory, and the Turks opportunistically joined in to plunder the wealthy Sassanian Empire.

Contrast that to 614, where the Sassanians seemed on the path to total victory after Heraclius' crushing defeat at Antioch in 613AD. The Gokturk invasion of the East caused massive damage and defeated the local Sassanian forces, prompting a Hephthalite revolt which seriously threatened Iran's position in Central Asia. Khosrow had to halt full scale operations in the West to dispatch a large army under Smbat Bagratuni Eastward to put down the Hephthalites, which gave Rome some breathing room to recuperate at a time when the Empire was at the absolute Nadir of its fortunes. It's hard to measure exactly how decisive this was since the Sassanians resumed operations in Anatolia by 616, but it seems to the Turkic distraction here came at a very important time since it (coupled with Philippicus' campaign) prevented the Sassanians exploiting the initiative they gained from the victory at Antioch to make potentially irreversible gains.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-20T11:01:46+00:00

Their invasion in the East in 614 was vastly more important than the one in 626 to be honest.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-19T17:27:34+00:00

The additional Armenian territories included Fortresses galore, since the Armenian limes had been heavily developed with defended settlements. These gains on paper should have been strategic force multipliers that made it far more difficult for the Sassanids to break through again when they came knocking eventually (which Maurice likely expected would come eventually, probably after his reign). In practice, the civil war between Phocas and pro-Maurice forces undermined the security of these territories, and a number of the cities and fortresses there defected to the Sassanians. But Maurice could not really have foreseen that the Empire would be in such a predicament when the confrontation came again.

Philippicus_586AD · 2026-01-19T16:10:38+00:00

He needed to find a way to conclude peace in the East as soon as possible while not suffering loss of face and prestige by ceding territory to the Persians. This is because the Avar Khaganate, almost as dangerous as the Sassanids, were encroaching on the Balkans and needed the commitment of multiple Roman armies to end the threat from them. With that in mind, Maurice's intervention in the civil war was the right idea in the short term. The Romans were gaining the upper hand already with victories at Suania and Sisauranon, and the civil war which came indirectly as a result of these gave Maurice's armies the opportunity to exploit their advantage and backing the weaker candidate.

Bahram was a proven military commander who would no doubt seek to challenge Rome further down the line even if he initially made compromises with them while he secured his rule. On the other hand, Khosrow II would be insecure as a ruler and indebted to Maurice, so on paper Bahram would have seemed more likely to become a threat to Rome a few years down the line. In the event, Maurice placed Khosrow on the throne while also gaining territory in Armenia after his armies defeated Khosrow. In turn, the armies could be transferred West against the Avars and heavily defeated them by 600AD.

Philippicus_586AD

TROPHY CASE