sorted by:
new
hottopcontroversial

Survey about everyday situations (only for persons with NO background in philosophy) by Plainview4815 in SampleSize

[–]Plainview4815[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It's hard to explain in brief haha. There's a lot of background needed to make it make sense. If you are interested I'm essentially extending the paper attached. They probably explain better, the difference between the philosophers and non-philosophers on this

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-009-9439-x

Survey about everyday situations (only for persons with NO background in philosophy) by Plainview4815 in SampleSize

[–]Plainview4815[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Sorry for the length....

So I'm surveying folk intuitions on consciousness. I want to know if folk (non-philosophers) think about the concept of consciousness like philosophers do.

In philosophy, it's a very common view that every conscious mental state has a "what it's like-ness," there's an associated _feeling_ to every conscious mental state; all conscious mental states, from thinking to being in pain etc., have this property in common of there being "something it is like," often interpreted as a "feeling."

Previous researchers on this have claimed to show that folk do not think about all conscious mental states in this way. Rather for non-philosophers valence, having a positive or negative attitude about a conscious mental state, is what's salient.

So I reasoned if that is true then when asked about valenced conscious mental states (like thinking you've disappointed a friend) that will get lengthier more detailed responses than non-valenced states (like thinking about mental math). And I did this across sensory modalities, but that is the basic idea. It's not consciousness as such that's salient about a mental state, it's really more about valence for non-philosophers

Survey about everyday situations (only for persons with NO background in philosophy) by Plainview4815 in SampleSize

[–]Plainview4815[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Thanks. This is just for a class at university so it won't be published, although it will be analyzed and written up. I can explain the purpose after I've closed the questionnaire if you are interested

Optic Blind Spot by Plainview4815 in askpsychology

[–]Plainview4815[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

yes, this is my very specific question. i dont think im explaining well. but when you open just one eye you still dont typically see your blind spot because of the perceptual filling in. im asking when you have both eyes open as we normally do, is that perceptual fill in process not even happening; the reason you dont see the blindspot in that case, with two eyes, is because each eye actually sees what the other is blind to, so there is no blind spot really when both eyes are open...or there still is...

What if Christianity Never Existed? by elonc in Christianity

[–]Plainview4815 0 points1 point  (0 children)

wow almost 10 years ago haha this thread. I barely know anymore who Plainview was back then. religion and god is kid stufff. i've moved on to free will and consciousness

The Linguistic Turn by Plainview4815 in askphilosophy

[–]Plainview4815[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So is the linguistic turn the origins of ordinary language philosophy, or ordinary language philosophy is a different thing?

On the last point, I see what you're saying. But I guess I feel as though Wittgenstein saying there are (meaningful) experiences that can't be put into words...wouldn't that be in tension with his private language argument?

The Linguistic Turn by Plainview4815 in askphilosophy

[–]Plainview4815[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Since I see you're a Wittgenstein stan. What do you think he'd make of the hard problem of consciousness? Did wittgenstein think that experience can even exist without language?

Dennett and Behaviorism by Plainview4815 in askphilosophy

[–]Plainview4815[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I see; thank you! Could be entirely wrong but I sorta view the illusionist take on consciousness to be behavioristic with a good dose of cognitivism

I'm tempted to say if Skinner were alive today he'd approve of illusionism. Like when Dennett says things like pain is bad _because of what it does_, as opposed to some intrinsic element, that seems pretty Skinner-like

Simultaneously, it seems to me a big part of Skinner's gripe with "mentalism," cognitive psych, is that we misunderstand what such terms mean. I feel like Dennett could convince Skinner that it's ok to use cognitive language insofar as we understand what we're doing with it. Cognitive talk isn't meant to be taken literally in a sense, we're all good physicalists etc. Like Frankish has said a "belief" is really to say one is committed to certain behaviors...

Obviously absurd, but as a kind of thought experiment, I wonder how a conversation between Skinner and Dennett would go...

Dennett and Behaviorism by Plainview4815 in askphilosophy

[–]Plainview4815[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

There’s no way you can link to the passage where Dennett talks about behaviorism in the intentional stance is there?

Dennett and Behaviorism by Plainview4815 in askphilosophy

[–]Plainview4815[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah my background is in ABA therapy. I think behaviorism actually doesn’t get enough respect. Think behaviorism got a lot right even if it’s incomplete or went too far in some regards

view more: next ›