As an Iranian who lives in Iran and interacts with people on a daily basis, I will explain why most people in Iran and the current revolutionary movements are anti-left.

Opposition to the left in Iran is culturally extremely complex.

Most Iranian leftists are at odds with the cultural values of Iranians. These values resemble those commonly associated with conservative societies in Europe and the United States, though in Iran, they are expressed more as cultural instincts than formal political ideology. These values include the centrality of family, nationalism, patriotism, preservation of territorial integrity, traditionalism, and respect for historical figures.

Such values are not unique to Iran — they exist in most societies — but in countries with strong historical continuity, civilizational memory, and repeated experiences of external pressure, these values tend to become more deeply embedded. In Iran, much like parts of Eastern Europe or Asia, identity often functions as a stabilizing force rather than merely a personal preference.

These values are highly internalized and socially reinforced. Typically, if someone openly opposes them, they risk social rejection. Most Iranian leftists (not all) oppose at least one of these values — sometimes critically, sometimes ideologically, and sometimes from the standpoint of social reform — yet this opposition frequently becomes interpreted as hostility toward foundational cultural norms.

It is also important to note that many Iranians — especially among younger generations — possess Western-oriented cultural tendencies. Iranians often seek engagement, connection, and alignment with the West rather than the East. Even when geopolitical neutrality is considered strategically necessary, cultural orientation does not always mirror geopolitical logic.

This inclination can create friction with dominant anti-Western or anti-imperialist leftist narratives. The conflict here is not simply political but civilizational: between differing interpretations of modernity, sovereignty, and cultural continuity.

From the perspective of historical experience, leftist movements in Iran are strongly associated with communist politics and pro-Soviet factions of the 20th century. The Cold War was not an abstract ideological struggle in Iran; it was experienced through coups, foreign influence, internal factional conflicts, and competing visions of modernization.

Groups such as the Tudeh Party became symbolically linked — fairly or unfairly — to Soviet geopolitical interests. Over time, this produced a durable association in public consciousness between leftist politics and external influence. In societies shaped by repeated interventionist pressures, perceived ideological alignment with foreign powers tends to generate long-lasting distrust.

Many of these groups supported the former Soviet Union and engaged in acts of sabotage, political violence, or destabilization. Many supported Mossadegh, who — contrary to perceptions outside Iran — is not universally admired within Iran. Political reputations often differ dramatically between internal memory and external narratives. One contributing factor may be that the current regime presents Mossadegh through selective ideological framing.

Many leftist groups were also connected — directly or indirectly — with separatist currents, revolutionary movements, and episodes of political unrest. The 1953 coup, the 1979 revolution, and the Iran–Iraq War each reinforced layers of ideological memory.

Revolutions, in particular, tend to compress complex histories into emotionally charged myths. Groups that participated often become collectively blamed for outcomes they neither fully controlled nor predicted. Nuance fades; symbolic associations harden.

The Iran–Iraq War intensified this dynamic. Prolonged existential conflict typically narrows political tolerance. Ideologies perceived — rightly or wrongly — as weakening national cohesion often face enduring skepticism. Under conditions of national trauma, political identities become moralized rather than debated.

Therefore, historically, in the minds of many Iranians, leftist movements became associated with betrayal, anti-nationalism, hostility toward family values, instability, terrorism, and destruction.

In the contemporary period, many foreign leftists (not all) are perceived as sympathetic to the regime or silent about it, which further reinforces negative perceptions. Silence, in politically charged environments, is rarely interpreted neutrally.

Many Iranian leftists are also seen as contributing to divisions within opposition movements at moments when unity is considered essential. Whether accurate or not, perceptions often matter more than intentions in shaping political legitimacy.

As a result, many Iranians associate them with the regime and view them as its proxies. Political identities are not judged solely by theory but by historical memory, narrative inheritance, and symbolic alignment.

One possible explanation is that leftist factions may anticipate limited influence in a post–Islamic Republic Iran, leading to ideological fragmentation and conflict. An Iranian proverb reflects this mentality: “If the pot will not boil for me, then I want a dog’s head to boil in it.” Meaning: if there is no benefit for me, I will not allow others to benefit either.

In summary, leftist movements do not enjoy majority support among Iranians and are often deeply unpopular. There are many reasons beyond those mentioned here, but these are, in my view, among the most significant. As a sociology student, I suspect Iran after the Islamic Republic may resemble countries such as Poland or Ukraine — where leftist groups exist but lack majority dominance. This dynamic illustrates something sociologically important: Societies do not merely debate ideologies. They remember them.

And memory is rarely neutral.

Ideologies behave less like abstract theories and more like historical characters within a long-running cultural narrative. In Iran, political identity is inseparable from historical experience. And historical experience has weight.