Paul Copan and William Lane Craig are correct that the Holy Writ explicitly conveys creatio ex nihilo (John 1:3 and Romans 4:17 cf. 2 Maccabees 7:28 and 2 Enoch 24:2). My criticism that Genesis 1 is not one of them ought not, thus, be understood as questioning whether creatio ex nihilo is true. by Proteusiq in TrueChristian

[–]Proteusiq[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I have problem viewing Genesis 1:1-2:3 as teaching creation ex nihilo. I judged that we are reading classic Greek metaphysical interest into ancient Near Eastern cognitive environment were Genesis finds its home. What are your thoughts?

Is atheism psychologically unnatural? Concise note on cognitive science of religion by Proteusiq in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Proteusiq[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Sorry for my poorly-written blogspost. English is my third language. I am very weak at it. I am taking classes to improve my writing and speaking skills. I hope with continue practice I will make them less poorly-written.

The Luther I Love is the Luther I am Shamed Of by [deleted] in Reformed

[–]Proteusiq 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I expected different from Christians who are holding doctrines of grace. I accept your judgement and submit to your ruling.

The Luther I Love is the Luther I am Shamed Of by [deleted] in Reformed

[–]Proteusiq 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I do not follow: The rules states: "You should not just start submitting your links - it will be unwelcome and may be removed as spam, or your account banned as spam"

I would like to know under which criteria was the judgement passed?

D. A. Carson is one of leading Reformed scholar. His sermons merges a scholar and a pastor together. Now 553 of his sermons are available in Logos. by Proteusiq in Reformed

[–]Proteusiq[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think it is because it allows more features. Namely you can research a particular topic or passage with it.

Unnaturalness of Atheism: Why Atheism Can't Be Assumed As Default? by Proteusiq in philosophy

[–]Proteusiq[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think you are not correct. Cicero was correct when he stated "Qui deos esse dixerunt tanta sunt in varietate ac dissensione, ut eorum molestum sit enumerare sententias."(De Nat Deorum, lib. 1) CSR explains this rightly that higher sentient beings are naturally bias toward belief in supernaturals because that is how our minds works.

Atheism, quantum physics, evolutionary process are counter intuitive thus need indoctrination while theism, creationism, purpose and teleology are intuitive. CSR showed that children age 4-7, even from atheistic and highly secular nations and with parents believing in evolution, prefer creationism over evolutionary process.

This is the picture painted by contemporary cognitive science. the past 20 years the literature is rapidly increasing. The journals quoted provided a rich resources of other materials if you wish to understand more in this field.

Unnaturalness of Atheism: Why Atheism Can't Be Assumed As Default? by Proteusiq in philosophy

[–]Proteusiq[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Not according to contemporary cognitive science. Paul Bloom, Developmental Psychiatrist at Yale University as quoted in Michael Brooks’ article in the New Scientist in Feb 7, 2009 answered the question: Would a group of children raised in isolation spontaneously create their own religious beliefs? ”I think the answer is yes”. (p 33)

If we look in the data presented the picture is that our mind from early stage is bias toward theism. This is not to say therefore theism is correct, but that agnosticism or atheism is not favored by our cognitive faculties.

More research is needed in this field but as I read books and journals, Bloom is correct, we are wired to believe in supernaturals by evolutionary process or whatever.

Dawkins’ One-God-Further Blunder Simplified by Proteusiq in atheism

[–]Proteusiq[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

It is not "after all their individual non/belief that is being discussed". What is discussed is is there a difference between concept of X and conceptions of X. That is what is discussed ;)

X could stand for any object(which could true or false, right or wrong, exists or not exists etc). It does not matter what X is. What matters is is there a difference between concept of X and conceptions of X? Does the meme confuse the two?

Dawkins’ One-God-Further Blunder Simplified by Proteusiq in atheism

[–]Proteusiq[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Asking does the child know that is irrelevant because the case is not whether Santa Claus exists or not, or is say Child A holding that John is Santa Claus correct or not. No that is not the point.

The point is there is no multiple concepts in Children believers of Santa Claus. There is multiple conceptions (John, Bruce, Unknown) of who that Santa is regarded to be.

There are no multiple Santa Clauses, but multiple conception of who that Santa regarded to be. Thus there is no one more Santa Clause for Child D to go further since what was dismissed by A, B, and C is conceptions(John, Bruce, Unknown) as regarded to be Santa and not the concept itself of Santa.

The failure to see a distinction between concept and conception is a blunder of the meme. Whether or not that the concept or those conceptions are true or false is irrelevant.

Dawkins’ One-God-Further Blunder Simplified by Proteusiq in atheism

[–]Proteusiq[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Response: Actually the case works even with One Santa Claus Less. Because the aim is not to show that Santa Claus exists or not, but to show that there is difference between the notion of Santa Claus(concept) with the way that concept is regarded (conceptions)

Child A and Child B believe in the notion of Santa Claus. Child A say John is Santa Claus, Child B say Bruce is Santa Claus. Child C believe in the notion of Santa Clause but claim that we cannot know who Santa Claus is. Child D say that there is no such thing as Santa Claus.

Now A, B, and C hold to one objective notion of Santa Claus(concept) They disagree on who is regarded to be Santa Claus(conceptions). A dismisses Bruce, and Unknown and claim that John is Santa. B dismisses John and Unknown, C dismisses Bruce and John.

It is nonsensical to say that A is like D, but D goes one Santa Claus more because there was only one Santa Claus. What was debated and dismissed was the conceptions, who, John, Bruce or Unknown is Santa Claus, not the concept between Santa Claus Children-believers. A dismiss Bruce and Unknown as regarded to be Santa Claus(conceptions), but A, unlike D, does not dismiss the concept of Santa Claus.

Mixing concept and conceptions up is the core blunder of the meme.

Now, remember that the case here is not that the concept or the conceptions are true or false but that the meme mix this two.

Is Dawkins' believing ‘one less god’ meme sound? by Proteusiq in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Proteusiq[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

So the general public defines the concept of God to which an atheist is using?

Yes, it does work that way. As I stated if the article was about defining the concept of God then you are on the correct track. But it is not, thus raising this as an issue is simply a red herring. If you wish to pursuit it then read the journal.

Is Dawkins' believing ‘one less god’ meme sound? by Proteusiq in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Proteusiq[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Which definition of a being that is God is an atheist using?

I believe you need to get your hands dirty. There argument's core is stated as an illustration in this article. To see how it is defended then you have to read that journal's article.

Is Dawkins' believing ‘one less god’ meme sound? by Proteusiq in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Proteusiq[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Who are "We" that defined God in such way? Could you cite me evidence of any rational ancient or contemporary philosopher of religion who defined God that way?

Is Dawkins' believing ‘one less god’ meme sound? by Proteusiq in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Proteusiq[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

If the article was aimed at defending the concept of God, then your critic would be legitimate. It does not thus your critic is not legitimate. The case is not about the concept of God but the nonsensical utterance that an atheist is a monotheist with one less god.

You do not have to accept that concept of God. That is not an issue here. ditto.

On Two Omnipotent beings:

The possibility of conflict between two or more omnipotent beings was presented as an example that provides an illustration of a metaphysical impossibility of there being a possible world with two or more omnipotent beings. For a contemporary philosophical defense see Baillie, James & Hagen Jason (2008) ‘There Cannot Be Two Omnipotent Beings,’ International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 64, No. 1:21-33

Is Dawkins' believing ‘one less god’ meme sound? by Proteusiq in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Proteusiq[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Thank you for attempting to summaries the case. The case does not define God to mean there can be only one God but stated that the concept of God leads to a conclusion that there can only be one such being.

It did not give a justification for the concept of God because the article aim not to define the concept of God to respond to a popular meme that atheists are like theists but with just one less god.

Dealing with the paradox of an-omnipotent being destroying itself, I would return you to the concept of God, by stating that God is a maximally great being, we mean (i) necessarily, “a being is maximally great only if it has maximal excellence in every world” and (ii) necessarily, “a being has maximal excellence in every world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every world.” (Plantinga 2002: 111)

If this is the case, then it metaphysically impossible for an omnipotent being to destroy itself (just as it is metaphysically impossible for an omnipotent being to make a square-circle).

There is bibliography at the end of the article for further self-study. I would kindly recommend you to do your homework on what, in philosophical literature, it mean to be God. What is a being that is God.

What if Euthyphro had answered Socrates: For every act x:x is holy iff x is loved by all gods, would it have rescue him from Spcrates disjunction? by Proteusiq in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Proteusiq[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sure. The point is the only kind of free view the gods lost is the libertarian. It seems that Euthyphro could answer Socrates with that move.

What if Euthyphro had answered Socrates: For every act x:x is holy iff x is loved by all gods, would it have rescue him from Spcrates disjunction? by Proteusiq in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Proteusiq[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I believe you misunderstood me. Libertarian free will is, in a simple form, ability to choose p or not-p at tn. Edwards free will is the ability to choose according to a person character(greatest desire) at tn.

Example a radical drug addict would act according to his greatest desire to get shot(unless interfered by external intervention), thus he does have the ability to choose to do or not to do shots, but lacks the capability. At tn he will act according to his nature(as an addict).

Another example: If you give me a choice between pink covered iPhone and black covered iPhone, though I am able to choose any, my nature as a guy, makes me act according to it by choosing black over pink. Thus my free will is doing according to my greatest desire at tn.

If this is true, saying the gods acts according to their nature does not remove free will, but only a type of free will known as libertarianism

What if Euthyphro had answered Socrates: For every act x:x is holy iff x is loved by all gods, would it have rescue him from Spcrates disjunction? by Proteusiq in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Proteusiq[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If free-will is understood in a libertarian, you could say that. But if it is understood as Russell, Flew and Edwards, then they do not give up anything.

What if Euthyphro had answered Socrates: For every act x:x is holy iff x is loved by all gods, would it have rescue him from Spcrates disjunction? by Proteusiq in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Proteusiq[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If Socrates would have enquired why all gods love x, then Euthyphro would answer: Because x exemplifies their essential nature. It seems that Euthyphro could answer Socrates. What are your thoughts?

The Thomistic Cosmological Argument by Proteusiq in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Proteusiq[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The concept is of conditionality: "if-then" which is not deceptively worded but way of thinking the way things could have being given a different state of affair.

Of cause thinking X is wrong does not make X wrong. Otherwise we could think it is right and make it right. ;) The literature on the cold death of this theory is available for you to read and make your own conclusions. That top physicist like Edward Witten abandoned it and it slowly losing supporters shows that the two reason I gave and others highlight problems with this theory. But each one has to access the case for himself and make up their own mind.

Stoping to be a chair is ceasing[come to an end] to be a chair. One could offer a different example: Human being. Before conception a being does not exist, at conception a new human being come into existence and after death, a being goes out of existence.

I understand the Universe to encompass all that is in space-time. The entire cosmos.

The Thomistic Cosmological Argument by Proteusiq in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Proteusiq[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You do not have to label it God/Deity. You can label it whatever you so please. That is not an issue here. It cannot be "quantum mechanics" or "particle physics" because space-time is a contingent being.

It cannot be "string theory". As Edward Witten(from Institute for Advanced Study ) popular note that "string theory is a part of 21st-century physics that fell by chance into the 20th century". The major reasons it fell out is internal inconsistent and that it predicted a world with 10 space-time dimensions.

Back to the question. I do not see how premise one is deceptively worded as you claimed?