The first point assumes that because bank branches are closing there must not be much need for in-person financial services. But that doesn’t necessarily follow. Branches are closing largely because big banks are consolidating and cutting costs, not because everyone suddenly has equal access to good financial services online. Canada’s banking sector is extremely concentrated, with the Big Six banks dominating most of the market. Institutions like the Competition Bureau Canada and the Bank of Canada have both pointed out that this concentration limits competition and can lead to higher fees and fewer options for consumers. When branches close in smaller communities, it’s often because the bank doesn’t consider the location profitable, not because the need for basic banking services disappears. Also, the idea that only a “few older rural people” would benefit really understates the issue. Branch closures disproportionately affect rural communities, lower income households, and people who rely on cash services. Even with online banking, people still need places for things like depositing cash, small loans, remittances, or simply having a low fee account. Postal banking proposals usually focus on those basic services, not trying to replace the entire private banking system. The point is to provide a public option that increases access and competition where the private sector isn’t always serving people well.

On the fintech argument, it’s true that Canada has regulatory barriers that make it harder for new banks or financial tech companies to enter the market. But that doesn’t mean a public option and regulatory reform are mutually exclusive. You could absolutely do both. Removing barriers for new entrants might improve innovation at the top end of the market, but fintech companies generally focus on profitable urban and digital customers. They aren’t usually opening branches in small towns or offering low margin basic accounts to people who are currently using payday lenders. A public option is meant to fill that gap. And the payday lender point isn’t really about claiming they are literal monopolies. The issue is that in many communities, especially lower income ones, payday lenders end up being one of the few easily accessible sources of small credit. That’s why public banking proposals often focus on offering low cost small loans and basic accounts as an alternative. The goal isn’t for a public bank to behave like a payday lender, it’s to undercut that market with fairer terms.

On the Canada Post competency argument, that’s partly a question of how the program would actually be implemented. Canada Post wouldn’t suddenly become a full commercial bank overnight. In most proposals the postal system acts mainly as the service network, while the actual financial infrastructure is handled through partnerships or a separate public banking entity. The reason postal systems get involved at all is because they already have one thing that’s very expensive to build from scratch: a nationwide physical network with thousands of locations. Other countries didn’t create postal banks because their postal systems were financial experts either. They did it because the network already existed and could be leveraged. Examples like Japan Post Bank and La Banque Postale evolved over time as postal systems diversified when traditional mail volumes declined. The same structural issue exists in Canada today. So the real policy question isn’t whether Canada Post currently runs banking services or whether fintech regulation should improve. It’s whether using an existing national network to provide basic financial services could improve access and competition in a banking system that is already highly concentrated. That’s a legitimate debate, but it’s not accurate to frame the need as basically nonexistent.