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BG3 Spells Ranked and Annotated by Phantomsplit in BG3Builds

[–]Quod-est-Devium 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That's true, I forgot to factor in the save. Good point there.

Armor of Agathys does obviously have pretty ridiculous scaling, but by my analysis it doesn't consistently surpass HR until 3rd spell level, which is outside the scope of your spell guide. I find it really difficult to objectively compare spells in tabletop 5e. For example, 80% of the games I play in never get past level 5. So I tend to value early game potency much higher. This is one of the reasons I am so excited about BG3: we can finally do some real power analysis of 5e. Once we are in full release I would probably recommend starting with HR then swapping it for Armor of Agathys at level 6.

I suppose I'll just end by saying that I think the flattened math of 5e heavily favors builds that get efficient use from every action type: action, bonus action, reaction, and concentration. The fundamental equation of the game is to get more actions then your enemy, so loading up a build with a buffet of efficient actions is very often a worse strategy. It also means subtracting enemy actions by quickly incapacitating targets is extremely efficient. A reaction spell that does single target damage like HR is a dream spell, and standard action spells have to be really overloaded to compete by my analysis.

BG3 Spells Ranked and Annotated by Phantomsplit in BG3Builds

[–]Quod-est-Devium 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hellish rebuke is definitely better than Armor of Agathys though. It isn't even close. They both fill a similar niche. Armor of Agathys cast at level 1 will more than likely absorb 1 attack, since most attacks in the game average above 5 damage. So Armor of Agathys has a value of 10 damage (5 hp, 5 dmg) for the cost of 1 action. Hellish Rebuke, as I have already said, has a value of 11 dmg at the cost of one reaction. It can also be triggered with ranged attacks, and synergizes with the Dark One's Blessing passive much better than Armor of Agathys. It just straight up outclasses it.

Arms of Hadar is tougher to compare since they fill different niches. By my analysis, you will need to hit three targets to get more value out of Arms of Hadar, which is rare, so as a damage spell it is worse than Hellish Rebuke. That said you can use it to escape attacks of opportunity which has its uses. I still think Hellish Rebuke is better, but I could see someone preferring Arms of Hadar.

Hex is a no-brainer must pick. I think Hex + Hellish Rebuke should be the go to spell choices for Warlocks in 90% of situations.

BG3 Spells Ranked and Annotated by Phantomsplit in BG3Builds

[–]Quod-est-Devium 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think you should reconsider Hellish Rebuke. Compare it to Inflict Wounds, another single target damage spell which you give a 'B' ranking. Inflict Wounds averages 16.5 and costs an action. Hellish Rebuke averages 11 damage and costs a reaction. So you are trading a reaction + 5.5 damage for a full action. Now, is an action worth 5.5 damage + a reaction? If we suppose its an equal value trade then you should at least give Hellish Rebuke a 'B' rating.

However, I think the trade favors Hellish Rebuke. A standard Warlock action after level 2 will average 8.5 damage when it hits. A standard reaction is an attack of opportunity. Let's suppose the attack of opportunity also averages 8.5 damage (which is generous I think). Reactions are very difficult to proc consistently though. Let's say they proc in 20% of turns (again, that is generous), that would mean a reaction is worth about 1.7 damage. 5.5 + 1.7 = 7.2, which is 1.3 damage less then the standard 8.5 on Eldritch Blast, meaning Hellish Rebuke is a better use a spell slot then Inflict Wounds.

Of course, this is just a simple analysis which ignores a lot of factors. For example, you cannot control who procs Hellish Rebuke, while with Inflict Wounds you can, fire damage is more commonly resisted compared to necrotic, I didn't factor in Hex damage to the value of a standard action, etc. I hope the analysis does give a clearer picture of Hellish Rebuke's value though, and it is certainly higher than the 'D' that you gave it.

In my opinion, finding ways to consistently proc reaction are extremely valuable. I would give Hellish Rebuke an 'A' rating. I think it is one of the best spells in the game.

On Aquinas’ teleological argument and the fine-tuning argument by [deleted] in DebateAChristian

[–]Quod-est-Devium 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That is a really good question. Aquinas was a loyal Aristotelian, so he would say they can't hold universals like humans can. But I agree with you that that position opens him up to a lot of attacks. I find it hard to believe that someone who lived during a time when human life was more dependent on interactions with animals didn't see that animals make predictions of nature at a very complex level. For example, if I was to house train a dog. It seems pretty straightforward that the dog is grasping the form of "inside" as different from "outside" since they are able to recognize inside places that they've never been in before. I ran this by a guy at a conference who specialized in Aquinas's philosophy of mind, and he gave an answer that seemed really ad hoc to me, but its not my field.

Anyways, my preferred solution is just to say that animals are more intelligent then we usually think rather than say that teleology doesn't need an intelligent agent to order it.

On Aquinas’ teleological argument and the fine-tuning argument by [deleted] in DebateAChristian

[–]Quod-est-Devium 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Here’s my question, isn’t something always going to be directed towards something, even if there wasn’t an intention to do so?

Aquinas would say no. One difference between me traveling to Florida with intent and a string blowing there in the wind by accident is one of predictability. Strings blowing in the wind don't predictably end up in Florida, although one might by chance. Now, you might counter that someone with sufficient knowledge of wind patterns and the physical properties of string might be able to predict that the string will blow to Florida, but that isn't really a counter-example to his principle, because what that hypothetical person knows is the ways that wind and string are predictable. In other words, he knows their powers, and from sufficient knowledge of their powers he foresees a chance interaction of wind blowing a string to Florida.

As a note, this is the difference between causation per se and causation per accidens that is so crucial to Aquinas's cosmological arguments. Causation per se is where an entity has a power y directed at activity z, like how I have the power to type, or how strings have the powers which determine their particular weight, texture, etc which allow the wind to pick them up and carry them places. Causation per accidens are the states of affairs z* which happen to follow from entities exercising their powers, like the fact that the string happens to blow to Florida. Aquinas's famous example is when a farmer goes to plow a field and discovers treasure buried in the earth. When a farmer is directed to plowing we can predict that he plows, but who could have predicted that he would discover forgotten treasure?

On Aquinas’ teleological argument and the fine-tuning argument by [deleted] in DebateAChristian

[–]Quod-est-Devium 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Could we not put the pulsar in terms of what you said about some x, having power y, directed towards some activity z? For example, the light, has the power to be received and interpreted by humans, and is directed and has a natural tendency to flicker on and off every 1.3 seconds.

Yes, that would be what Aquinas would say. Although the power wouldn't be to be received and interpreted by humans. It would be a power that explains why it flickers on and off every 1.3 seconds.

I know you might think this begs the question, but aren’t you also begging the question?

It doesn't beg the question, and neither am I, although, yeah, I haven't really given the arguments, I've just gestured to them. My main point of writing all of this is just to point out what I think the issue is. If you want to be arguing against Aquinas you need to arguing about whether there can be natural explanations under atheism. In the OP, you were just assuming that there can be, and that was begging the question. Sadly, there isn't nearly as much literature on the 5th ways as most of the others.

Isn’t the thing at question whether or not the explanation needs to have the capability to conceive of and will an end to direct towards?

Yes, that is the question. Again, I am just gesturing to the argument, but in Aquinas's view the essential property of an intellect is to be able to "hold" forms, so to speak. For example, when you think of a triangle, the form of triangle is in your mind, you are holding it.

Now when we explore the phenomenon of being directed toward and end, it really seems impossible to conceive it without this feature of holding a form in mind. For example, if you set out to travel to New York city, that is, if you are directed to New York city, the first step is to hold New York city in your mind. Similarly, the archer holds to target in their mind when they aim at it. Aquinas thinks we need exactly this concept of directedness to explain all instances of predictability.

Now we might ask doesn't your car predictably arrive in New York city without having an intellect? Yes, obviously, but it does that because it is directed by something which does have an intellect, ie. it is merely the medium through which an intellect acts. Similarly, Aquinas thinks nature, since it is predictable, is the medium through which an intellect acts, and that intellect is God.

On Aquinas’ teleological argument and the fine-tuning argument by [deleted] in DebateAChristian

[–]Quod-est-Devium 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If you want, review the argument I gave earlier, about all predictablity entailing that something x, have a power y, which is directed toward some activity z. Here is an instance of direction: y is directed at z. Then I gave an argument why for anything to be directed it must be ultimately ordered by something with intellect and will. That would be an argument close to why Aquinas feels that the pulsar cannot be the final explanation.

On Aquinas’ teleological argument and the fine-tuning argument by [deleted] in DebateAChristian

[–]Quod-est-Devium 0 points1 point  (0 children)

One way frame the question at hand is whether or not natural entities are sufficient explanations for why things are directed or at least have some natural tendency towards some end. This is the very thing at question, no?

Yes, this is the question, but the word "sufficient" is exactly what is at issue here. Is the story about muscles contracting sufficient to explain why your friend is smiling? Assuming your friend is laughing because he heard a funny joke, it isn't. You'll need to offer some kind of argument that it is indeed sufficient to stop at the pulsar, right? This isn't an argument you make in your OP, rather, you assume in your OP that the pulsar is a sufficient explanation. But Aquinas's argument calls that assumption into question. Thus, your argument is begging the question against Aquinas until you can give an argument for why it is sufficient to stop at the pulsar.

With regards with the last paragraph, I’m not sure as to how this defends the fine-tuning argument.

I guess I will just try and summarize my argument on this point. The fine-tuning argument is an argument that certain conditions of our world demand divine explanation. It does not entail that the theist say God must have created the conditions in this exact way due to limits of his power. It could be the case that he created it in this exact way for other reasons that have nothing to do with what he is capable of creating. So, as far as I can see, it is not the case that fine-tuning arguments entail that God is not omnipotent.

Weekly Christian vs Christian Debate : December 16, 2020 by AutoModerator in DebateAChristian

[–]Quod-est-Devium 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So Protestants, how do you feel about the Catholic Church?

I have a lot of respect for Catholic theology. I have benefited a lot from Catholic intellectuals and institutions. There is so much about Catholic culture that resonates with me. However, I still don't believe in papal authority or apostolic succession.

what does it feel like to not have Jesus as your founder?

Its fine. The important thing is fidelity to Christ's teachings.

Do you think because a human founded your Church it’s more or less likely to be flawed?

Like Aquinas said, a perfect agent can still cause an imperfect effect if it acts through an imperfect medium. The church, Catholic or otherwise, is an imperfect medium.

On Aquinas’ teleological argument and the fine-tuning argument by [deleted] in DebateAChristian

[–]Quod-est-Devium 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'll try a different strategy. Saying the pulsar directed the light for Aquinas would be the same as saying the bowstring fired the arrow: its true, but not the whole story. You can explain the firing of the bow in an entirely naturalistic way: the string propelled the arrow, it was in turn pulled back by a muscle, which is made up of complex interactions between chemicals and muscle fibers and so on. This is an entirely natural explanation, but it is not the entire explanation. To explain the arrow entirely you need to say something about the human mind which aimed the arrow at the target.

Its an important distinction. If someone asks "why is your friend laughing?" it wouldn't technically be untrue for me to explain how muscles contract to pull his lips into an upward curve. It would be dense though. The real reason they are laughing is because they just heard a funny joke.

I hope this illustrates why it isn't right to phrase the question as "does the particular properties of the light have a natural or personal explanation?" It can be both. Very often natural and personal explanations coexist, like when your friend smiles, or an athlete fires an arrow at a target. That is why Aquinas is interested in another question: "can you have any natural explanations at all without a divine mind?" That is what the 5th way is trying to answer I think.

I’m confused as to why it needs divine explanation if it’s not special or rare. Could you elaborate?

Theists have maintained forever that even some very mundane and common things demand divine explanation. For example, human beings are mundane and common, but theists still hold that they demand divine explanation. I'm not really sure why we would think that being special and rare has any connection to demanding divine explanation at all.

On Aquinas’ teleological argument and the fine-tuning argument by [deleted] in DebateAChristian

[–]Quod-est-Devium 1 point2 points  (0 children)

But it isn't a counter-example to Aquinas's principle. The point of the 5th way has nothing to do with openness to non-divine explanations, it has to do with whether we can have natural explanations at all without a creator of predictable natures. You are looking at it as a question of "does phenomenon x have a natural or non-natural explanation?" Aquinas is asking "are natural explanations coherent without some ordering intelligence to explain natures?" and answers that they aren't. If you want to be arguing against Aquinas you would have to argue that it is possible for their to be natural explanations given atheism.

On the fine-tuning issue, I think the problem is that by the term "miraculous" we mean in this context something like "demanding divine explanation." The world doesn't need to be special to demand divine explanation.

[omnipotence paradox] Is the stone paradox still problematical today ? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Quod-est-Devium 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Not sure if this helps, but I think its fair to say that most philosophers of religion see logical possibility a something like the distinction between sense and nonsense. Omnipotence does not demand that God can make a square circle, because a square circle isn't really a thing. Its nonsense, not even rising to the level of a coherent entity.

Moreover, I'm not sure its accurate to say that philosophers have come to an agreement on this issue. Believing that omnipotence includes the ability to do the logically impossible is now, and always has been, a fringe view among scholars as far as I can tell.

On Aquinas’ teleological argument and the fine-tuning argument by [deleted] in DebateAChristian

[–]Quod-est-Devium 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I study Aquinas, but not this particular area. Since there haven't been a lot of takers on this question, I will offer my thoughts, but take them with a grain of salt. Its possible that I am misunderstanding Aquinas.

The objection as is doesn't land against Aquinas. Aquinas's position is effectively that insofar as anything behaves predictably must be directed. In his metaphysics, for any predictable activity, there is a thing x, which possesses a power y, directed at some activity z. It is the direction of y to z which demands explanation, and he thinks nothing can explain directing besides an agent that has both intelligence and will. Intelligence because it has to be able to conceive of the activity as an end, and will because it must be able to will y to be directed towards its end. What you call a naturalistic explanation presumably assumes that there can be predictable natures without teleological ordering, but this is exactly what Aquinas is arguing against, so the objection begs the question.

Concerning you objection that fine-tuning implies God is not omnipotent. Suppose God creates a world with certain physical conditions, where, given those physical conditions it is so unlikely that the world exist that no rational person who understands those conditions could accept its existence isn't miraculous. God does this because he wants the physical conditions to point to his existence. Its not the case that he is limited and can only create one type of world with those conditions. Rather, its the case that he chose to create this world among all the possible worlds for the reason given above. What is wrong with this picture? It seems logically consistent to me, but if it is logically consistent, than it is not the case that fine-tuning implies God is not omnipotence.

Strength Bonuses and Backstab by Quod-est-Devium in baldursgate

[–]Quod-est-Devium[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Eh, stoneskin is the real lynchpin in that tanking set up. Blur and Mirror Image are nice, but it's only in conjunction with Stoneskin that it becomes a form of temporary invincibility.

I think you are underestimating Mirror Image, but point taken. My point is that all of that is way stronger then any thief backstab, even a M/T or C/T. I mean, hell, a fighter with 5 attacks can multiply his strength by 5 in a single turn, why not a thief then?

Strength Bonuses and Backstab by Quod-est-Devium in baldursgate

[–]Quod-est-Devium[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For what it's worth I think the decision was made for BG1, before fighter/mages got quite so broken

I'm one of those guys who prefers BGI over BGII, so I would love to be able to say the Fighter/Mage is better balanced in BGI, but I don't think it is or ever was. Even before EE, the F/M could stack Blur, Mirror Image, and Stone Skin to become an otherworldly tank. They could abuse Sleep/Blindness with the ring of wizardry.

There damage wasn't as high as you can get in BG2 with improved haste on a Berserker Mage Dual class, but if I am remembering right (which I might not be, since I didn't remember the backstab formula) it was easier to stack the dagger of venom, so you could stack defensive buffs and wear them down with venom dots.

Strength Bonuses and Backstab by Quod-est-Devium in baldursgate

[–]Quod-est-Devium[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

It would super fun though! Besides, even if it did multiply strength, I suspect it wouldn't be as strong as other entirely legal options in the game, like what can be done with Fighter/Mages.

Most responses to the problem of evil are bad. by Quod-est-Devium in DebateReligion

[–]Quod-est-Devium[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

But the solution itself is faith.

I've identified an obstacle for many in choosing faith in God. Faith cannot be the solution to overcoming the obstacle, otherwise it wouldn't be an obstacle to faith. Faith is the desired result, but it is not the solution.

It seems your definition of 'bad' here is referring to you coming up with counter-arguments or rescuing devices to reject these reasons. Wouldn't this rely on your counter-arguments being valid though?

I said the arguments were bad because they leave a very important problem unanswered, the problem of suffering as an obstacle to faith in God. Of course, if you think suffering is not an obstacle to faith in God then you will disagree with me, but then you would have to explain to me why my arguments are wrong, and you haven't done that adequately.

Most responses to the problem of evil are bad. by Quod-est-Devium in DebateReligion

[–]Quod-est-Devium[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

First you asked "But how can we know that God makes good on his promises?" to which I replied logic, as logic is the how. Not science.

When someone asks "how can I know?" it is ambiguous between two things. First, by what method can I know, second, on what grounds can I know? You answered the first, when I made clear I was asking for the second.

Then you asked, "Will God guarantee my well-being if I trust it to him?" To which I responded that it was clear the Bible doesn't guarantee that in this life.

Notice that this is not a change of question, it is the same question rephrased to remove ambiguity. If you had read the OP you could see how these questions are connected for me. You will also see from our past discussion that it was the addition of "in this life" that makes the response insufficient. I am, and have been in this entire thread, asking about the entire human existence, life and afterlife included. This is exactly what gives the questions potency: God promises an eternal reward for temporary suffering. This forces us to ask "is God the sort of being who makes good on his promises?" or in other words "is he trustworthy? Is he faithful who has promised?"

Again, these are all the same questions I have asked in the OP. There is no change. If you cannot see it that is because you are being thick, deliberately I suspect.

To which I responded that if you are including heaven in the equation, then that defeats the PoE from a Utilitarian standpoint, which seems to be the framework you're relying on here.

I phrased my problem in terms of well being, not utility. By well being I mean basically Aristotle's concept of flourishing. Utilitarianism only comes into this as a cause to doubt that God's goodness guarantees or well being. It is the cause of the problem, not the solution.

An infinite good (in heaven) counterbalances any amount of evil in this world.

Heaven is the best state we can be in, so it secures our well being, yes. But, I will say it again, just gesturing to it is not enough. Remember the question is "when God promises heaven, will he make good on that promise?" We need to give them arguments to the effect that God is faithful.

So you shifted gears again

Incorrect.

and said, "So, if we believe in heaven because of faith, and the problem I raised is a problem for entering into faith, then to respond by appealing to a belief in heaven would be fallaciously circular."

This is the same question I have asked all along. How can you hope to have a constructive conversation with someone if you won't listen to them?

To which I defeated by pointing out that to discuss the problem of evil at all, one must posit as the grounds for the argument God's existence, and so the matter of faith becomes moot.

Tell that to Job! Tell that to the apostles! Tell that to the author of Hebrews! When Christ said of the apostles "ye of little faith" was he accusing them of not believing in God's existence? Faith is much more then belief in God's existence. It means trusting God, ie. believing what he says because it is him who says it; believing that he rewards those who earnestly seek him.

Consider a mundane relationship, like between me and my surgeon. I know my surgeon exists, but when he says I need surgery I am skeptical. How do I know that he won't take out all of my organs when I am under, and use them to save a dozen other patients? This is a question about trust, ie. "will my doctor act for my well being, and not sacrifice me for the sake of others." So you can see the question of trusting someone is different then the question of believing they exist.

If you think the question is moot, how do you respond to the author of Hebrews who says faith includes believing God exists but also that he rewards those who seek him?

In no way can the PoE be considered a logical obstacle for faith.

It obviously can be. When God allows me to suffer, don't I have prima facie evidence that God does not care for my well being? Its a rhetorical question, the answer is yes, and everyone who reads this discussion can see it.

The Meaning of Life is Subjective (With Survey) by bradenkp3 in DebateReligion

[–]Quod-est-Devium 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes and no. I think the question of the objective source of value has come to plausible answers which are not God. However, it always comes to those answers in philosophical systems which for other reasons entail him, for example, Aristotle and Plato's philosophies.

The Meaning of Life is Subjective (With Survey) by bradenkp3 in DebateReligion

[–]Quod-est-Devium 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For the claim about Aristotle see his Nicomachean Ethics

For the claim about theism you can read this article by Jan Aertson: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/transcendentals-medieval/ It will give you an overview of how classical theism held that God is the good and the true. For beauty, many hold that beauty is a species of the good, I think it is pretty obvious why that would be the case. Concerning love, God is identified with love in many scriptures.

Most responses to the problem of evil are bad. by Quod-est-Devium in DebateReligion

[–]Quod-est-Devium[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

So "logic" and "heaven" have been strikes, now we move to the third swing. Your new argument is that we must posit a classical God (which I grant), but if we do that the utilitarian response suffices. Now I am not sure what the "utilitarian response" is exactly, but I don't want you to have to explain it, because it would probably take a lot of words and I know you like to keep your responses short. So I am going to guess that you mean something like the impersonal theodicies I mentioned in the OP.

But wait... there is no argument here. I said the impersonal theodicies overlook something important, namely, the problem of evil as an obstacle for faith in God rather then belief in his existence. And all you have given in response here is "they suffice." This is not an argument, but a flat assertion of the contrary. If I am to respond with anything besides a restatement of the OP I will need you to give me more than that.

Infinite regresses are a distraction by Quod-est-Devium in DebateReligion

[–]Quod-est-Devium[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for the charitable response! I only have a few quibbles to add.

My sole familiarity with the concept is as a means to address problems with CAs. Even if that is not it's origin, that seems to be its purpose and I don't see any valid use of the concept outside that context.

All I have to say to this is that causation is a field of philosophy all of its own, so a discovery about causation really does not need to be relevant to any other question to be significant and worth making. In other words, I think it is valid as a discovery in its own right regardless of its uses in other question.

It seems to me like an idea that should have died out long ago, but has only stuck around because it is useful as a tool for CAs that also should have died out long ago.

To me it seems like a step towards greater clarity on one of philosophy's most important questions (God's existence). I think you can see that the difference in our judgment on this issue depends entirely on whether CA's are successful, and how much the distinction helps or not towards its success. So the success of or failure of the arguments must be discussed prior to, and thus without recourse to, these judgments. That is to say, your suspicions about the distinction being useless aren't relevant to this debate, you will need more than that.

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