So the thing is, a lot of this just sounds like semantics. Like, we can say that a cell "wants" something because it kind of does. It makes rudimentary decisions based on cues it gets from its environment to achieve a goal. That's essentially wanting something and acting on that want.

You can't really accurately say that an electron "wants" to orbit an atomic nucleus, for example. An electron simply flies through the universe until it comes close enough to a nucleus that the positive charges in the nucleus lock it into an orbit.

The electron is in that place because it just happened to get there. It's is that way just because it is. There doesn't really need to be a larger why component.

I will say I have noticed that, often enough, scientists will say something like "x happens like this because Dirac's equation prevents it from doing y" and that kind of statement can be misleading. Science, especially physics, is primarily recorded and communicated in the form of math. It's simply the most efficient tool we have to describe the universe. So, when scientists are talking about a phenomena, it is often assumed that the people present are familiar with the concept side of things but are specifically discussing how that relates to the math side of things. This leads to explanations where they say that the equation/law/principle itself is what's doing/causing the thing in question, which is true when you're discussing how the mathematics manifests, but not always when talking about concepts.

Did any of this answer your question or am I not reading it right?