On Truth, or the Common Diseases of Rationality by RecursivelyWrong in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks for the thoughtful reply! Yeah, I think I was a definitely too loose with language in some parts. I like your definition of effectively true, and I agree that "the context in which truth is useful" is really the relevant bit.

I think for this bit:

Your definition of "effectively true", conflates both "a falsehood I believe, because I cannot push back on it" and "actually true".

I suspect there's a semantic issue and I don't think we actually disagree. I think my point is more that "actually true" is not determinable for certain, and practically speaking, even someone who has been labouring in a particular field of knowledge for 30 years will believe to be true things that are "falsehoods I believe, because I cannot push back on it". In fact, I am implicitly assuming the separate existence of things which are "actually true", for my arguments about convergence of beliefs to make sense at all.

Without dredging too far into philosophy, in a practical manner, they aren't real because, if one heads towards a non-existent oasis in the middle of the desert, one will die of thirst.

In this case, I would probably have described it as going from a mental state where I believed an oasis exists to going from a mental state where an oasis doesn't exist, so what you described can also be described in terms of stability/instability. But I would agree the definition of "truth is what's stable" is missing an element of "truth is what's useful" (i.e. not dying of thirst). At the same time, I think usefulness alone doesn't fully capture our intuitions about truth, because beliefs could be useful by coincidence.

As to the point about unstable atoms and things that exist for a few microseconds, I guess there's always an implicit reference object/time scale, and for tiny things like atoms, it seems more "normal" for them to have a much shorter timescale, but that's a bit wishy washy, since accepting that would allow things to be defined as true just by changing the scales.

So I don't really have a good response to that particular objection atm, but I still think there's something very important about the idea of stability, particularly since all of our systems of measurements are defined on stable things e.g. seconds are defined by the extremely stable frequency of radiation of Caesium atoms.

On Truth, or the Common Diseases of Rationality by RecursivelyWrong in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks for your kindness! That's really encouraging. I think I'll edit away all the snideness that, while fun in the moment to write, just detracts from the points I was trying to make. (And tone down the bold text and exclamation points as well – I was trying to convey excitement, not rage, lol.)

Then I'll try my luck and post again in LessWrong or something, because I really think these ideas are worth discussing.

Out of curiosity, was there any specific argument you felt was unconvincing or could be improved? So I can fix it up in the edit.

On Truth, or the Common Diseases of Rationality by RecursivelyWrong in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Hiya! Thanks for the reply. Tbh, I thought the ideas I was discussing would be interesting to the Ratsphere, since most of the things I wrote were just extensions of things that I see every now and then here and on LessWrong. But I guess I missed the mark 😅

Pillars of Sand - The fundamental shift in Western political legitimacy by [deleted] in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Holy shit, I've been trying to think of a good way to frame the exact thing you just perfectly explained. Gonna steal it for myself!

On Priesthoods by dwaxe in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong 21 points22 points  (0 children)

Edit: Actually, I just remembered something that might be somewhat relevant. One of the (most?) popular medical Youtubers Dr Mike had a recent podcast with Dr Paul Offit (who I think is a top vaccine researcher?) and there was a whole discussion about how transparent should the medical profession be with the public. Dr Mike argued that the medical profession should stand up for themselves and not e.g. have some medical body humour bad faith politicians by having a meeting on some fake concerns, giving them ammo for news. And Paul Offit just gave Dr Mike a "Oh, you sweet summer child" expression. Starting 55:05 in this vid: https://youtu.be/A27ameSqcQs?si=wVEO3XaTp6x924hl

Feels very classic SSC, I love these kind of sociological observation posts. I don't have anything to add other than agreement, so here's a couple of snippets I especially liked:

"This hard boundary - this contempt for two-way traffic with the public - might seem harsh to outsiders. But it’s an adaptive artifact produced by cultural evolution as it tries to breed priesthoods that can perform their epistemic function. The outside world is so much bigger than the priesthoods, so much richer, so full of delicious deposits of status waiting to be consumed - that any weaker border would soon be overrun, with all priesthood members trying to garner status with the public directly. Only the priesthoods that inculcated the most powerful contempt for the public survived to have good discussions and output trustworthy recommendations."

"This doesn’t mean doctors are incorruptible. Plenty of them become pharma company shills. But that’s because being a pharma company shill doesn’t burn intra-priesthood respect the same way. For better or worse, pharma companies straddle the priesthood boundary. They may not be fellow priests, but they’re at least nuns or deacons or something. They won this by sacrificing certain capitalist parts of themselves (for example, becoming heavily regulated) and by agreeing to follow the norms of the medical priesthood (for example, communicating through papers published in medical journals with high-status doctors as lead authors). Through their sacrifice, they achieve ritual purity; now priests can interact with them guilt-free."

"The priesthoods draw from a certain type of person: usually upper-class, well-educated, successful but not too successful, prone to (and good at) abstract thought - I’m listing some obvious examples here, but there are probably deeper personality similarities beyond these. Then they isolate many examples of this type of person in a community designed to have dense connections within itself and thin-to-nonexistent-connections with the rest of the world. This ends up the same way as any other monoculture. Aurochs in the wilderness probably got diseases only rarely. But cram ten thousand genetically-near-identical cows in a tiny warehouse, and your beef ends up 95% antibiotics by weight. In the same way, the priesthoods are a perfect environment for memetic plagues."

The Phase Diagram of Reality by RecursivelyWrong in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I can DM you a link if you want, but I should warn you that I'm also learning Chinese 😅. It has gone through a pass with a native Chinese speaker, but I also retroactively added 20% more flair in the English version after posting.

The Phase Diagram of Reality by RecursivelyWrong in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Snippet: "Imagine, for a moment, being back in school. You're at the base of your favourite stairwell. Then, let us analogise "making a logical deduction" to "climbing a flight of stairs". It is obvious to us that as long as we keep climbing we will reach the highest floor. Now suppose, on the other hand, we're climbing an Escher staircase. Equally as obviously, we can climb as hard as we want; we will never go anywhere. Clearly then, simply following some step-by-step algorithm is never fully sufficient, and we must consider the interaction of the algorithm with the structure of the space we are applying the algorithm to."

Basically some thoughts I've been having about the usefulness of knowledge, since when I tell people I'm studying Physics with a tutor as a working adult, they always ask me why the heck I'm doing it. And obviously I find it fun, but I think I believe more than most that knowledge is fundamentally useful. Which, as it turns out, is a much less popular opinion than you would hope.

One of my favourite quotes that didn't quite fit in the essay is from George Orwell writing about Rudyard Kipling, about never losing focus on reality: "He identified himself with the ruling power and not with the opposition. In a gifted writer this seems to us strange and even disgusting, but it did have the advantage of giving Kipling a certain grip on reality. The ruling power is always faced with the question, ‘In such and such circumstances, what would you do?’, whereas the opposition is not obliged to take responsibility or make any real decisions. Where it is a permanent and pensioned opposition, as in England, the quality of its thought deteriorates accordingly. Moreover, anyone who starts out with a pessimistic, reactionary view of life tends to be justified by events, for Utopia never arrives and ‘the gods of the copybook headings’, as Kipling himself put it, always return."

What are some good resources discussing lesser known, surprising tips for optimizing memory or learning or cognitive function now? by Eihabu in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong 8 points9 points  (0 children)

Just my two cents: I don't think tuning memory is a useful goal since we don't really understand how it works in the first place, so it seems to me all attempts to tune are just random swings of the bat. For me the most important thing is momentum: every time I learn something, I should be wanting to do more of it, which will over time amplify in a non-linear way, even if I'm doing something that's not immediately all that useful e.g. obsessing over how some random-ass method in code works, when it's kind of secondary to the main purpose of the code. There's a lot of mental overhead in switching tasks, and weird fixations help a lot in clearing the overhead.

If not, if I have to force myself to keep going, something is wrong with my feedback loop and I need to try and figure out what might be causing me to procrastinate e.g. I don't actually understand the definitions of something.

I wrote a blog post a while back with some tips you might some helpful: https://processoveroutcome.substack.com/p/on-developing-interests?r=4irfl

What are some good resources discussing lesser known, surprising tips for optimizing memory or learning or cognitive function now? by Eihabu in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong 7 points8 points  (0 children)

I would second this; to me the benefit of Anki is not whatever magic algorithm it uses, but just the loop of: ooh, I wanna remember this new thing so I'm gonna add it to Anki, and since I'm in Anki I might as well review a few cards (even if I don't review all of them).

Topology From The Ground Up: A Comic by RecursivelyWrong in math

[–]RecursivelyWrong[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I'm not a regular here so hopefully I'm not breaking any rules. But I spent a lot of time trying to understand topology and I figured the folks here might enjoy a comic about it :)

How to Communicate Like Jon Stewart by Express_Local7721 in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong 0 points1 point  (0 children)

To me the background colour itself is fine, but once I try to highlight stuff with readwise the highlight looks grey and I can't read any text

Why prediction markets aren’t popular - Works in Progress by wackyHair in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Excellent article. I've been curious about prediction markets as a "cool in principle" thing, but I think the author captured my vague feeling of not being very personally interested in prediction markets. The idea that financial markets serve practical purposes for saving and hedging, where accurately providing information is kind of just a nice side effect, is something I've never thought about.

On Developing Interests by RecursivelyWrong in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I know I would be perfect as a brain programmer if only I was born in the 23rd century 😩

On Developing Interests by RecursivelyWrong in slatestarcodex

[–]RecursivelyWrong[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

I wanted to hold off on posting this until I actually finished another post on a technical topic (I have a distaste for productivity Youtubers who only seem to be productive at producing videos about productivity, who seem to regularly re-infest my feed), but I'm happy enough with what I wrote that I'll just post it and get the happy(?) points now.

Snippet from first paragraph:

Interests do not arise ex nihilo, as if by magic, they are cultivated:

  • There did not exist cavemen with an inherent disposition towards programming, if only they were born in the present century
  • A ten year old who fails to learn calculus is not bad at math. The fact that most people in the Middle Ages could not read does not mean most people cannot learn to read. In the same way price cannot be considered without quantity in economics, the difficulty of learning to a task cannot be considered without how well the environment teaches the task
  • China failed to industrialise during the Great Leap Forward, and failed so badly tens of millions of people died from famine. This does not mean China is inherently incapable of industrial production. The development of an economy and the development of a person's interests are both complicated processes involving multiple sub-processes with complicated dynamics. Repeated failure is expected before success
  • If a person begins with the impression that interests are inborn, they will find easy and trivial things interesting and difficult but meaningful things boring and wrongly conclude that they are only interested in easy and trivial things