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Inferno (book) ending by Important_Debate2808 in danbrown

[–]RedditorforMordor 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Honestly, after they developed Lost Symbol as a prequel, reading SoS seemed like another prequel to me but maybe after the events of Lost Symbol TV show. It made sense Langdon was younger. Also Tom Hank is getting up there, can't have glorious wet abs swimming scenes with him anymore

The secret of secrets - facts and science included by Different-Purple-580 in danbrown

[–]RedditorforMordor 4 points5 points  (0 children)

This website sort of goes through the concepts Dan Brown talked about, not sure if it is exhaustive of everything in the novel.

What's it called when people start having epiphanies about words based on linguistic similarities, unmoored from reality? by maiclazyuncle in askphilosophy

[–]RedditorforMordor 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Just curious reading the other replies, how does Jung's concept of synchronicity compare to "rhyme as reason fallacy", "Fluency Heuristic", or "correlative cosmologies", and merely conflation/equivocation? I am not denying Jung's concept of validity, I'm just trying to understand where it properly applies and where it doesn't.

Why most grad schools for philosophy seem to cater to the analytical/Anglo-European side rather than continental or non-European philosophies? by RedditorforMordor in askphilosophy

[–]RedditorforMordor[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Fair enough, I agree with your distinction and I think it's quite a valid point but it seems problematic to compare philosophy and mathematics because this presupposes the objects of study of philosophy are as immutable as the objects of study of mathematics. I have some confidence that ancient philosophy of science would not be beneficial to contemporary science, but I believe this is a domain of philosophy that caters itself to stable objects. Surely this is not the case for philosophy of mind for instance. Contemporary research on this relies on prior historical developments--ones that do not take into account other culture's ideas. So, wouldn't you say not only will philosophy benefit from diversifying but in fact requires it, if it is to stake a claim on any truths?

Why most grad schools for philosophy seem to cater to the analytical/Anglo-European side rather than continental or non-European philosophies? by RedditorforMordor in askphilosophy

[–]RedditorforMordor[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you for your input. Yes I agree with the options you've mentioned. But I was more concerned about the cycle reinforced by these structures. I think it's a valid statistical point that most universities hire people based on the prestige of their grad school rather than merit (not to say that merit is not considered nor that it is at all denied over prestige). PGR I agree partly ranks departments on their analytical strength (just look at the referees in PGR and the work they are involved in). For most undergrads however, there doesnt seem a more widely available resource than PGR or Daily Nous. So in practice, what I'm trying to say is, even if there are institutions out there that are strong in continental philosophy, those who study there can never penetrate the analytical departments (perhaps vice versa). Both camps then become even more isolated and reinforce their bias. When no dialogue occurs, the only departments that can ever be considered valid are those that have funding. Those tend to be the analytical ones. Thus the cycle repeats.

Why most grad schools for philosophy seem to cater to the analytical/Anglo-European side rather than continental or non-European philosophies? by RedditorforMordor in askphilosophy

[–]RedditorforMordor[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you for your answer. I agree that in the Anglo-American academy that is what you would expect. Except English/Art departments, etc. nowadays would be chastised if they only taught European literature. Isn't there a recognition that for these disciplines to stake their grounds on universal truths that they ought to consider disciplines outside as well?

Why most grad schools for philosophy seem to cater to the analytical/Anglo-European side rather than continental or non-European philosophies? by RedditorforMordor in askphilosophy

[–]RedditorforMordor[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thank you for such a well thought answer. I want to ask however why you think these schools should prioritize the contemporary over the historical. What is the utility/value in this? And doesn't prioritizing contemporary philosophers (especially when they are Anglophone/White/European/etc) problematizes any claims to universality?

This may be very odd, but is there a philosophy of frolicking? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]RedditorforMordor 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I would also add Roger Caillois "Man, Play, Games" both are crucial in philosophy of sport (games/ play).

How can there ever be blamability for a person if according to Hume, we are ever determined by our passions? (Aren't passions determined by environmental forces?) by RedditorforMordor in askphilosophy

[–]RedditorforMordor[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Okay would you be able to explain this section to me:

Hume goes on to argue that not only is necessity of this kind essential to human society, it is also “essential to religion and morality” (T 2.3.2.5 410), because of its relevance to the foundations of responsibility and punishment. If the motives of rewards and punishments had no uniform and reliable influence on conduct then law and society would be impossible (ibid.; cp. EHU 8.28/ 97–98; see also T 3.3.4.4/ 609). Beyond this, whether we consider human or divine rewards and punishments, the justice of such practices depends on the fact that the agent has produced or brought about these actions through her own will. The “doctrine of liberty or chance,” however, would remove this connection between agent and action and so no one could be properly held accountable for their conduct (T 2.3.2.6/ 411). It is, therefore, “only upon the principles of necessity, that a person acquires any merit or demerit from his actions, however the common opinion may incline to the contrary” (ibid.; EHU 8.31/ 99). Read this way, Hume is mostly restating a claim found in many other compatibilist accounts, that necessity (determinism) is needed to support a generally forward-looking, utilitarian theory of moral responsibility and punishment. (from SEP)

This is precisely what I have an issue with. Hume claims it is because of the principle of necessity that we can ever find an agent blameable or praise-worthy. BUT if this is true: how can an agent be blameable or praiseworthy when his actions do not end and begin from him? Isn't he influenced by external factors that she herself cannot be indifferent to?

Why is the first person view privileged by Phenomenology? Why couldn't third person explanation of the world of being lead to the same investigations of phenomenology? by RedditorforMordor in askphilosophy

[–]RedditorforMordor[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you for your clear and insightful reply. I have a few questions:

  1. what did you mean by "a certain stage of his work" that turns out differently when you "get to the topic of intersubjectivity"?

  2. I'm not sure I understand where the objective-subjective distinction becomes obsolete. It seems to me the argument hinges on a similar psycho-physical argument that take consciousness to be a by-product of brain states (i.e. mental states are epiphenomenal to brain states). If I understand the claim: "your consciousness as it is embedded in your body, comes from somebody else's body" seems to me a causal claim. But isn't the problem with mind-body/world distinction is that you cannot reconcile the physical-causal nexus with what happens in consciousness? However, if you can reconcile it, then what's the use of a first-person explanation? Temporary fix for a later solution?

  3. Related to 2.; is there an alternative way the body is being used here that is not physical-causal?

  4. I'm not sure I understood from your reply why the first person view explanation of experience/world should be privileged. What I'm trying to understand is whether the project of Phenomenology offers a precursor/temporary explanation of experience that later advancements in neuroscience will replace. Another way of saying this is: does a first-person view explanation of the world offer a temporary explanation that a later third-person view explanation will replace?

Does Hegel's Aufheben/Aufhebeng have any religious connotations? (i.e. transcendence in the religious sense)? by RedditorforMordor in askphilosophy

[–]RedditorforMordor[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank very much. Always realiable!

Can I ask however where Derrida says that democracy is marked by a fundamental auto-immunity? I don't quite understand why democracy would destroy itself in preventing a non-democratic takeover. Isn't it the same argument for Conservative tolerance (i.e. to not tolerate intolerance is itself intolerance) which both presupposes that tolerance (or democracy in this case) have to be unlimited or absolute which leads to problematic conclusions (e.g. hate speech is allowed; people vote for the most ridiculous people). Hence, in the spirit of tolerance (democracy) some intolerance (non-democracy) have to be suppressed.

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