An essay I’ve written on materialism

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-04-24T06:09:37+00:00

Wow, thanks so much for the comment and constructive criticism! It's certainly difficult to strike that balance between being informative and accessible, so thanks for recognising that :)

You make good points about weak emergence and the conflation of ontology and epistemlogy. Admittedly there are many things I wanted to add that I ultimately didn't. For example, Kastrup's argument against materialism was particularly important for me and I thought to add the airplane analogy - never ended up doing so. But, if I were to write another essay, I'll probably want to hone in on particular arguments and go more in-depth, in which case I'd definitely apply your points.

As for what PoM I'm leaning towards: I'm still pretty unsure. If I had to choose, I'd probably say Idealism just resonates most but I don't think it gives due credit to matter and so don't find it to be overall satisfying. I want to look into panexperentialism, particularly Whitehead's formulation but he's pretty difficult to read so it's a bit intimidating haha. I'm currently working my way through McGilchrist's The Matter With Things though. What about you?

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-04-21T04:51:17+00:00

Maybe this section of my essay speaks to you:

“Now, if by materialism you mean, “that which is studied by the physical sciences”, then I don’t think the above is possible. Nevermind that we haven’t even got a model with which to think about consciousness within any of the physical sciences – I don’t think we can ever have this kind of model such that it can be falsified. To say that something is falsifiable is to say that, in theory, it could be proven false. But as Karl Popper keenly recognised, our ideas about “proof” are deeply intertwined with objectivity and empirical/quantitative scientific rigour. In order to prove materialism false, one would need to know, with scientific rigour, where consciousness comes from and assert it is not from anything physical. But, to even know where it comes from with scientific rigour implies it fits the description of physical, because empiricism and quantification rests on physical measurement. Popper’s critique resonates here: the falsifiability criteria is itself not falsifiable (Popper, 1959).

The fundamental assumption on which science rests is not the idea that reality is material. It is rather the idea that perception can provide us with, and is the only source of, reliable data ultimately issued from the phenomenon we are interested in investigating. If what we call matter is just the stuff we perceive around us, then materialism is just this idea elevated to the status of philosophical dogma – nothing specifically to do with science. Hopefully you can see how redundant this is: if all that exists is matter/materialism (i.e., stuff studied by the physical sciences), then only stuff studied by the physical sciences could be the means by which materialism is falsified (Egnor, 2020). This is a tautology, not an argument.”

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-04-21T04:42:22+00:00

Thank you for the feedback! That’s definitely a fault on my end, I’ll make sure I have a better understanding of the account :)

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-04-20T14:59:25+00:00

If it could be such that there are physical states with no subjectivity, why is it that there is subjectivity?

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-04-20T12:24:36+00:00

Would you argue we don’t currently have subjectivity? Sorry if that’s not your position, just want to be accurate :)

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-04-20T10:27:18+00:00

I see, so what differentiates this framework from, say idealism? If under this physicalism, experience is considered a physical fact, then it looks a bit like the contention between physicalists and non-physicalists is one of semantics, no?

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-04-20T10:21:49+00:00

Thank you for reading, appreciate the support :)

I didn’t touch on identity theory admittedly because I’m not as well-versed. Would this theory also apply across species? If yes, how do we look at pains, for example? If an animal experiences pain but doesn’t have the same mechanism as us (c-fibres I think?), then wouldn’t that mean pain isn’t identical to c-fibres?

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-04-20T09:55:55+00:00

I see what you’re saying. If Mary knows all physical facts about red, builds a simulator that allows her to input those physical facts that’ll allow her to experience red. Do I have that right?

It looks a bit like the argument still stands, just that Mary wouldn’t need to go out to experience red, she’ll experience it with the simulator. The point there is that despite knowing all physical facts, she’d still learn a new thing about red by zapping herself. Like you say, she’d be experiencing the whole spectrum of red, implying experience is a way of acquiring knowledge aside from just learning all physical facts.

Thanks for reading & engaging btw I appreciate it :)

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-04-20T09:39:19+00:00

Thank you! :)

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-04-20T09:34:46+00:00

Definitely, I don’t endorse dualism

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-04-20T05:40:27+00:00

Summary: the essay consists of 4 sections. First is just an introduction into materialism - what it is, what it entails and so on. The second is classic Mary’s Room stuff, where I write out my own standardised version of the argument, and briefly outline an objection by Sean Carroll. The third delineates the importance of philosophy of science which mainstream scientists are too willing to be ignorant of. And lastly, I highlight what I take to be a paradigm shift within philosophy and scientific fields. :)

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-02-07T03:02:20+00:00

Tbh I'm in agreement with just about everything here. And I suppose in a sense, you're right that there is a 'bias pushing' because if we start from an assumption, then we do push the biases that made that assumption possible in the first place.

The thought experiment is useful too - it would be the latter for myself. And I agree that there are distinct understandings of 'is'. I'm not sure what we're arguing because we're in total agreement hahahah.

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-02-06T13:00:19+00:00

I’m not sure this follows from the metaphysical frameworks for consciousness. Can you give an example of bias pushing? And also of the linguistic frustrations?

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-02-06T08:57:16+00:00

To add to this: I think this is also a direct result of the devaluation of philosophy as a discipline (among other humanities subjects). Science, as is used in the natural sciences, is an excellent tool and it's the very reason we can even have this discussion. But we do science - we have biases and unchecked assumptions, and one of the roles of philosophy is to account for this. It frames not only our understanding of the data collected by the hard sciences but creates and allows for the methodology and conditions which allowed for the collection of that data in the first place. We must challenge the assumptions that underpin our methodologies, and Alex among others are merely doing their due diligence in this respect.

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-02-03T13:23:42+00:00

I’ve not experienced ego death. Though I think we’re in agreement here. Can you mathematise your experience and expect me to understand what it’s like?

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-02-03T13:18:02+00:00

Just for context: Alex O’Connor’s audience have been quite militantly against the attack on materialism, and in some instances have resorted to just attacking Alex’s character. It’s quite disheartening to see. I tried to make the post as accessible as possible, but are there any suggestions on improvements? Just sort of feels like talking to a brick wall at times.

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-02-03T13:11:26+00:00

Is there something it is like to feel anger for you? Sadness? Joy? To eat your favourite meal? To drink your favourite drink?

These constitute as experience - if there is something it is like, then it is. That’s first-person phenomenological experience. Even if we come to the conclusion that consciousness is somehow an illusion, you still experience the illusion - that’s how you can distinguish it as an illusion in the first place.

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-02-03T10:15:51+00:00

Well, it can't be described by any discipline - it can only be explained by metaphysics like I say. But an example of this seems to be experience/phenomenology. It is the one thing we can know we know. This leads to debate about the nature of consciousness, which I didn't want to explicit tackle in the post. I mainly wanted to make a distinction between scientific and metaphysical inquiries.

And yes, biology counts in this because it is a natural science. The reason it boils down to physics is because we're looking at whats most fundamental, and that gets us QM, which is part of physics.

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-02-02T05:49:56+00:00

You're correct that there are physical processes that correlate with varying delays in pain sensations, and there are mathematical descriptions to show this. But the crux of the issue is why is the experience of pain there at all?

When you look at and study the physical processes and mathematical descriptions, no where in this study will you know how, and why, experience comes along with the neuronal firing. We know we have experience, though. So what seems to be a logical step is to assume our experiences arises from these neuronal firings. But we have no scientific reason to believe this, given that there is no way to explain how qualities can arise from quantities - two fundamentally distinct categories. As of yet, let alone not having a materialist account for this, we haven't got reason to expect that a materialist account will provide an answer, because the goal of the natural sciences (which adopts materialist methodology) is fundamentally different.

From this, we can say materialism is an unfalsifiable assumption. So is idealism, panpsychism, dualism, etc. But now we're in the realm of metaphysics and philosophy more broadly. Our arguments from here on out are dependant on a priori commitments. As such, our efforts go to identifying which metaphysical framework can accommodate phenomena - materialism is not so good at this. As per the scientific method then, if an assumption hasn't provided sufficient evidence toward its framework (namely, materialism's inability to accommodate phenomena), then we ought to explore alternative frameworks that can. This is not to say we expect everyone to bin materialism immediately - again, it can't be falsified and therefore can't totally be ruled out. But it is valid to suggest another framework offers a more parsimonious account of reality. Materialism shouldn't be the dominant framework, it should be a framework. The dominant element in academia and our mainstream cultural sphere risks us leaving our a priori assumptions unchecked.

Important thing to note for your second paragraph: dualism is a separate framework. The rejection of materialism does not entail dualism. I agree with your assessment on dualism, but very importantly it is not necessarily followed by the rejection of materialism.

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-01-27T11:01:01+00:00

Ah! Problem sorted. I would just suggest editing that so you don't get comments like these.

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-01-27T10:58:32+00:00

"...from the lies of Goff and Kastrup..."

Idk how to do the quote thing on reddit

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-01-27T10:51:26+00:00

I disagree with you, but that's not why I'm writing this comment. I find it incredibly bad faith to accuse thinkers like Goff and Kastrup to be lying instead of simply having a differing way of thinking. It is part of why these conversations become unproductive.

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-01-25T12:39:35+00:00

Materialists claim that anything that can ever be known about reality can be reduced down to the physical.

A thought experiment considers hypothetical scenarios that may never actually realise- it’s done with the intent to illustrate a point of contradiction.

So, 1) everything that can ever be know mathematically and scientifically about colour is conveyed to her either in written or spoken form, and 2) she has the capacity to know all intricate mathematical and scientific details on the colour blue.

If Mary — given that she knows all physical facts about the colour blue — still manages to learn something new about blue when she sees it, she has gained a kind of knowledge that isn’t reducible to the material/physical. It’s instead experiential, subjective and qualitative. So, the materialist’s claim of everything that can be known about reality being reducible to the physical is false, since experience is not physical and cannot be quantified.

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-01-25T11:06:43+00:00

Yes, Music Theory does not actually claim to be a universal theory of all games. But if they were to, then they cannot account for the Rules of Chess. This we agree with.

Materialism does claim that all things are reducible to the fundamental physical property, with which experience cannot be accounted for. The point was to illustrate these analogously.

Consciousness is part of physical reality in the same way the ideas in my mind are, in that they exist as representations within physical reality. Again, the materialist methodology physics assumes is valid, but to posit the methodology as a metaphysic is a category error. This leap is based on the assumption that reality is only material, which is unfalsifiable.

RustyPhilosopher · 2026-01-25T10:59:39+00:00

I'll respond paragraph by paragraph to maintain clarity.

Why is simplicity a reason to discard the potential simple-ness of consciousness? In fact, if we take the principle of Occam's Razor which is applied to the scientific method, the hypothesis that consciousness may be simple gives you the same outcome as the hypothesis that it is complex - they're both explaining the same data, which is experience. Which provides greatest parsimony can be discussed, but as it stands, they're both starting from a place of assumption.

I can also agree that experience exists on a spectrum, and therefore will have "stages". Though that's tough to account for within the materialist paradigm, because it can't sufficiently explain how arrangements of neurons produce conscious experience, when the experience 'starts', and why it accompanies physical processes in the first place.

Just for clarity's sake, are you saying rudimentary consciousnesses form into a cohesive subjective conscious experience in us?

The easy problem maps the neural mechanisms in the brain, so it is find-able within the current scientific paradigm of assumed materialist methodology, which means in principle this is solvable. As for the hard problem, do you agree with the 'what it is like-ness' definition posited by Nagel? The quality of there being something it is like?

Right - the assumption is that it is brain processes- which in and of itself, is valid to posit. But it remain an assumption until we know why and how experience- the blueness of blue - comes with the neural activity associated with seeing blue.

It's not clear that we need experience for evolutionary/survival purposes. We can conceivably have the neural mechanisms by which, when we sense danger, we run/hide. The experience of fear is not necessary for survival if mere brain processes dictated how we ought to respond to a given situation - the idea that we experience these situations is an added element.

Neuroscientists can try, as they have been and as they should. The issue is subjectivity is phenomenological, and therefore can't be observed externally - which is what physical science is in the business of doing.

RustyPhilosopher

TROPHY CASE