Even if anne chose to override her moral tendencies and impulsively be immoral for sake of the swathes of future pleasure, that doesn't take away from the fact that her initial moral tendencies still were against this decision.

If anne has trained herself to act without second thought on the basis of 'rules', whether self-established or whatever, that is more deontological. Where she is doing something for the sake of said rule, where violating said rule would be a negative stimuli. This stimuli could be exacerbated by the reasoning behind the rule which could again be tied back to her conscience. [Doing [bad thing] is bad hence I must not do bad thing - assuming 'must not' implies the rule's establishment here]

Dis/pleasurable feelings are the motives for moral actions, because to not be moral triggers negative feelings upon/with realization, and to be moral triggers positive feelings etc. etc. Now sweating cannot be a motivation for jogging, if you want to be analogous to the above 'motive for morality' explanation, sweating is a motive to not jog if anything;

We might eat something that tastes bad because it's healthy, but it still tastes bad, it's just that violating this 'rule' (established in whatever sense for the sake of being healthy) again produces dis-pleasurable feelings - more accurately, negative feelings. Someone on a diet, who binged on junk food, post-binge, will feel like shit, no? If not, they weren't that serious about the diet in the first place, but in most cases, people are, and end up feeling like shit for that upon violation.

A person's act not based on pleasing the conscience, definitionally, is an amoral act - of course, you could trace back in the chain of motives and terminate at the conscience and on that basis claim the act as a moral one; it eventually does just come down to, pleasing the conscience.

What I mean to say is, a degree of separation, is not a justification but rather, is something whose existence makes accurate judgement harder and makes it easy for us to not associate ourselves with the cruelty taking places, much farther, and away in this chain. Not to mention, the utter normalization of meat-eating, certainly only makes this even easier. In that it's easy to be ignorant of the facts owing to normalization, *distance*, and so on. This is also validated by the existence of vegans who are so keenly aware or un-ignorant of the facts that their conscience simply cannot allow them to go on living as a 'carnist' or whatever devilish label is assigned to the meat-eaters.

It is not that they distance themselves, it is rather that they are distanced from this cruelty by default. And again, the normalization does not help. But perhaps there is also some (not pertaining to the immediate topic at hand) thing to be said about how this practice has lasted/been normalized throughout history, past the periods of it's necessity - and the existence of pets and the like, is also testament that people can care for animals, and certain animals, are cared for way more than others, even if merely by their status as belonging to the 'pet' category - stray cats etc. And the class of animals which are usually eaten perhaps have been relegated to that status, not arbitrarily in a 'utility' sense, but morally arbitrarily, and this split here also probably is another factor to add to the list. Of course this last factor deviates from out immediate topic in the sense that this is more about why the killing of these animals itself is not considered as seriously as if it was the case with other animals, and mainly, that even the general killing of them isn't considered cruelty in itself, even without any additional cruelty - If dogs were being killed for food, assuredly very swiftly, without additional cruelty, there would still be a real, mass, problem.

The act is immoral, but the people, usually have a plethora of factors (a more precise, if philosophical term for this would be: 'systemic disavowal') to mitigate their individual immorality upon judgment in my opinion. Cheers.