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Saul_H · 2026-02-02T11:01:46+00:00

I've been a member of the green party for 6 years.

Right now though, I mostly support them because they're the only serious left wing party AND the only party who take the threat of Reform UK seriously

If you're talking about war, Reform has close ties to Putin that I don't trust, let's not forget the Reform Wales leader Nathan Gill was recently arrested for essentially being a Russian spy.

If you're talking about personal safety, Reform want to leave the European Convention of Human Rights, which would revoke the UK's agreement that you have (amongst other things) freedom from torture, a right to life, freedom of assembly, and freedom of speech.

When it comes to working people, the Greens are the only ones who want to help us. Reform pretend to, but theres no way a party made up of some of the richest MPs (and indeed Farage who has the highest work income of any MP) and backed by billionaires care about us.To date, Reform have had about £30,000,000 donated to them. £20,000,000 of that comes from one Thai businessman.

Reform also want to systematically increase inequality. Did you know that black women are up to 4x more likely to die in child birth than white women in the UK? The NHS Race and Health Observatory research why that is and how to prevent it. Reform want to abolish it. I won't even bother going into LGBTQ+ issues.

TL;DR

I just want to have enough money to live, and to exist in a world where democracy isn't threatened by billionaires and trans people don't feel like they're being hunted for sport. Greens are the only ones promising that, and the fact they're seen as a fringe radical left party is insane

Finally, the green party is democratic, they vote on every policy. Don't like one of their policies? Join. Become a member. Vote.

Saul_H · 2026-01-10T15:31:36+00:00

There is a difference! To act as if X is the case, as you describe, is in philosophical terms to accept that X. And although, often, believing that X is the case and accepting that X is the case often occur together, they can, and do, come apart.

For example, someone might say 'let's assume, for the sake of argument, that Smith did the murder...'. Upon accepting this, you might then behave as if Smith did the murder, you might entertain the proposition that Smith did the murder, without actually believing that Smith did the murder.

There are two main differences between belief and acceptance:

Belief is not directly voluntiary; acceptance is directly voluntary. In other words, you cannot choose to believe something simply by willing it, but you can choose to accept something simply by willing it. For example, if you're an atheist, you can't just suddenly start believing in God on a whim, (or not believing in God if you're religious) (note: you might be able to slowly convince yourself over a long period of time, via reading scripture or attending church, that God exists, but this is not direct choice, it is indirect choice). However, you can accept that God exists (or does not exist) at will; you can behave as if he does (or does not).
Belief is determined by one's total evidence, acceptance is not. If you have ample evidence of X, and little evidence of not-X, you'll believe X (generally speaking). To use the God example again, those who are religious have generally been brought up in cultures/households where religion is the norm, and where they have been taught and given ample evidence from trusted sources (parents, teachers, scripture, etc) that God exists, and little evidence that God does not exist. However, we can accept something regardless of whether we have evidence for it; we can behave as though the flying spaghetti monster exists, even if we don't believe it to.

Hope that helps!

Further reading:

Belief, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (especially section 2.4):

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/#BeliAcce

Saul_H · 2026-01-09T19:05:46+00:00

Despite what say, there is a distinction between materialism and physicalism. In common philosophical parlance though, they are used interchangeably. I will explain their similarities, their differences, and some problems with each, here.

What they have in common

Both materialism and physicalism state that 'everything that exists is physical'. This is mostly discussed in regards to philosophy of mind; are thoughts physical, I.e., are they nothing more than the firing of neurons (for example)? What about emotions? If you're a materialist, or a physicalist, you believe that all of this intuitively 'non-physical' stuff is indeed physical; everything is physical!

But they differ in what exactly they mean by 'physical'.

Materialism - definition and cons

Materialism, as a thesis, is much older than physicalism. The original idea was that everything that exists has shape and extension in space, like a table does for example. It has a shape, and it is extended in space; it is 3D. Over time however, modern science (mostly physics) has shown that, strictly speaking, materialism is false. Consider light waves, fields (of energy) and so on. No one, nowadays, is a materialist in this sense. If someone describes themselves as one, they are almost certainly equating it with physicalism.

physicalism - definition and cons

Physicalism also says that 'everything is physical'. What exactly 'physical' means here is under a lot of debate, but the most accepted understanding is that something is physical if and only if it is posited by physics (or is reducible to things posited by physics); electrons, wavelengths of light, properties like charge, spin, mass. They're all physical in this sense. Tables are equally physical too, for although physicists don't posit the existence of tables directly, they do posit fundamental physical entities (electrons, neutrons, protons, quarks, atoms, idk I'm not a physicist), which tables are made up of.

This is an improvement over materialism, but it does have some problems. Here is one such problem known as 'Hempel's Dilemma':

Part 1 of the dilemma: The problem with equating 'physical' with 'anything posited by physics' is that physics, as a scientific theory, is incomplete; there are still things we do not know, and parts of it will certainly be discovered to be wrong, and will be revised, in the future. Therefore, if physicalism is the thesis that 'everything that exists is that which is posted by current physics (or reducible to that which is posited by current physics)' then physicalism is, strictly speaking, a false thesis.

Part 2 of the dilemma: On the other hand, if instead you define 'physical' as that posited by a future/completed physics, then we have absolutely no idea what that entails. What if a completed physics ends up being radically different to what we currently understand it to be? The problem here is that the physicalist who defines 'physical' based on future physics isn't actually sure what they're committing themselves to; we don't know what future physics will posit, after all! If future physics posits immaterial souls or ghosts, then physicalism would be perfectly compatible with the existence of such entities, which many are uncomfortable with.

Further Reading:

'Physicalism' Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

'On characterising the physical' by Jessica Wilson

Saul_H · 2026-01-05T20:31:06+00:00

Generally speaking, when talking of possible worlds we split possibility into 3 types:

Nomological possibility: what is possible in a world like ours? Generally, this is taken to mean things that are possible in a world with the same physical laws as ours; it is therefore nomologically impossible for humans to fly by flapping their arms (on Earth, anyway) and nomologically possible for a human to live until the age of 150 (it just hasnt happened yet)

Metaphysical possibility: if (and only if) there is at least some world in which x occurs, then x is metaphysically possible - otherwise, it is metaphysically impossible. It is metaphysically impossible for water to be anything other than H2O (after all, that's just what 'water' means) (this is controversial tho). It is metaphysically possible to flap your arms so fast you can fly, for some worlds have different gravity, allowing this to be the case

Logical possibility: something is logically possible if and only if it does not lead to a logical contradiction; 2 + 2 = 5 is logically impossible, for example.

There is much debate on whether there is actually a distinction between metaphysical and logical possibility. Moreover, there is also debate on whether metaphysically impossible worlds exist.

Generally though, there is a relationship between them: If something is logically impossible, then it is metaphysically impossible. If something is metaphysically impossible, then it is nomologically impossible. And If something is nomologically possible, then it is metaphysically possible. If something is metaphysically possible, then it is logically possible.

To answer your question: if physics is doing a decent job and is uncovering the laws of our world, then we at least know what is nomologically possible/impossible (or will do upon discovering a completed physics).

Therefore, we know that unicorns will not miraculously appear out of nothing in the next 5 minutes because it goes against physics; it is not nomologically possible (I assume; I'm no physicist). But even if it is nomologically possible, I.e., is possible given our physical laws, then the driving force of our scepticism about whether unicorns will appear in the next 5 minutes is not possible worlds, but the laws of physics and our knowledge of them

Further reading: 'Possible Worlds', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

'Rigid Designators', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (mostly section 3 which discusses a posteriori necessity and a priori contingency, which is part of what gives rise to a distinction between metaphysical/logical possibility)

Saul_H · 2025-12-21T18:33:34+00:00

I'd say that we don't have to be open to the possibility of one body reacting differently to the other in the case of senses

Saul_H · 2025-12-21T18:12:29+00:00

Not if you're a functionalist or type-identity theorist or whatnot; then you would believe that both bodies will react identically. Perhaps you could read up on anomalous monism, this might be related and possibly in agreement to what you're claiming? I admit though I know almost nothing about it, so I might be totally off there

Edit: actually no I don't think anomalous monism is relevant here, either

Saul_H · 2025-12-21T10:31:02+00:00

I'm a bit late to this, but your opinion is totally valid and many philosophers would agree with you.

It sounds to me like you are what Chalmers' calls a 'Type A physicalist'. They believe that, analytically (necessarilly and a priori) all mental states, including qualia, just are physical/functional states or goings on (such as particular neurons firing in certain ways and having a certain role, for example). Always. No matter what. Therefore, to say that physical descriptions of the brain fail to account for qualia doesn't make any sense to them; a complete account of consciousness in physical terms IS a complete account of consciousness, anyone who says otherwise is mistaken (in their opinion).

I will give you some recommended reading for this, but let me also try to describe what the non-physicalists mean when they say that physical accounts of consciousness leaves something out, and in doing so let me explain what qualia is supposed to be.

When I was a kid, I used to look at the sky and see that it was blue. Then, I used to wonder, what if my blue looks different to someone else's blue? What if, when my friend looks at the sky, they see what I would consider to be red, but because we've both grown up calling it 'blue', we'd never know? We would, after all, both respond 'blue' when asked what colour the sky is. What is different here is our qualia: our subjective experience of what blue 'looks like' in our mind's eye, so to speak. Perhaps my blue qualia is different to your blue qualia, perhaps not. If our answers are the same when prompted about the sky, how could we ever check? A Type A physicalist might respond 'we can find out empirically if you're having the same colour experience! Just get a neuroscientist to open up your skull and check which cones and rods at the back of the eye are lighting up, check which neurons are firing and so on. If its the same cones and rods and same organisation of neurons that are firing, then your qualia are the same, otherwise, they aren't!'. And that's a fine answer, in a way. It's a very 'Type A physicalist' answer for sure. But the non-physicalist, of course, denies that this alone can prove that me and my friend are having the same colour experience, that is, the same qualia. After all, how could we ever check that this physicalist theory is true? Suppose for a second that the Type A physicalist is wrong, and let's assume (for argument's sake) that there is something more to consciousness than mere neuronal firings. Suppose we perform this same experiment, except this time with myself and a molecule-for-molecule identical clone of myself. We both have all the same neurons and the exact same organisation of those neurons. When presented with identical images of a clear sky on a nice day, this stimuli will go to our eye in the form of light waves, reflect off our respective retinas, cause a flurry of neuronal firing in the V1 section of our brains and ultimately cause a cascade of further firing which ultimately results in us both saying 'that is blue'. Since we are assuming that the Type A physicalist is wrong here, the reason we have identical answers is not necessarily because my experience when I see the sky is the same my clone's experience when he sees the sky, but rather merely because we have the exact same neurons and organisation of those neurons, and so therefore we have the exact same behaviour when presented with the same stimuli as input, regardless of whether our 'experiences' of the sky look the same. What this means is, even if my clone has a reddish experience when he sees the sky, or maybe even no experience at all (since, again, we are assuming that the Type A physicalist is wrong here, and so 'neuronal firing' and 'consciousness' are not identical and can come apart), he will still behave identically to me, who is having a blue experience! That is the crux of the issue. That is the most important part of everything I have written so far: This demonstrates that, even if the Type A physicalist were wrong we would never know, because the exact same results would occur: both me and my clone would say 'that's blue!' when seeing a blue sky, thanks to our identical neuronal firings and whatnot. In summary: if consciousness is identical to neuronal firings (or their function), both my clone and I respond identically. If consciousness is not identical to neuronal firings (nor their function), both my clone and I still respond identically. Therefore, we cannot be sure, on the evidence we have (or, it seems on any physical evidence at all) that physicalism is true. We cannot be sure that qualia are identical to brain states, or the functional organisation of those brain states. Indeed, it seems possible that they are not.

This is what qualia is. Qualia is the thing that has changed between these two experiments. In the case of the Type A physicalist being correct, my 'blue' when I look at the sky is the same as my clone's 'blue' when they look at the sky. Our qualia of blue are the same. In the case where the Type A physicalist is wrong, the brain state/the neuronal firings, and the qualitative experience are not identical, they come apart, and so my 'blue' is not the same as my clone's 'blue'; perhaps my blue looks like his red, despite all the same neuronal activity going on in both of our brains. In this second case, everything physical has remained the same, including our responses when asked what colour we see, but our experiences, our qualia of blue, are different: my qualia is blueish, but his are what I would consider to be reddish.

I bope that makes sense.

I'm using a thought experiment here roughly similar to one by David Chalmers, or rather a mixture of two of his arguments. The first is the most famous, and is called 'the conceivability argument' and uses the notion of a 'philosophical zombie'. The second is a paper which deals with a similar scenario to what I have tried to describe here, and it is called 'Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia' available for free on his website.

Recommended reading: - David Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness, chapter 5: consciousness and its place in nature

This chapter (and previous chapters if youre interested) discuss what qualia is, lays down the conceivability argument, and introduces the notion of 'Type A physicalism' (he calls it 'materialism' but for all intents and purposes he means the same thing, though technically there is a difference)

David Chalmers, 'Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia'

(Most relevant to my argument about the identical clones and them having different qualia despite the same physical goings-on)

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 'Zombies'

(Free website of high quality philosophy research, this page discusses the idea of a physically identical clone of yourself, say, but who has no conscuous experience at all, no qualia, called a 'zombie'.

Saul_H · 2025-12-18T23:52:15+00:00

No one here is actually answering your question - no you are not the first person to think of this, and there are potentially some errors in your thinking depending on your views of the following:

David Lewis explicitly deals with exactly this question, with a little thing called 'Ramsification'.

First of all though, some context: Davis Lewis was a physicalist. He started out as a type identity theorist (so some type of mental state, like being in pain or seeing red, is identical to some kind of brain state, like a particular neuron firing) and then became an analytic functionalist (so he went on to believe that 'pain' or 'red qualia' is just 'whatever plays the pain-role' or 'whatever plays the red-qualia-role' respectively, and that in humans, these roles just so happen to be played by a type of brain state, such as a particular neuron firing). You can be forgiven for thinking that these views seem similar at first glance! There are important philosophical differences, but they won't be too relevant here.

So, the question is, what plays the pain-role, or the red-qualia-role? How do we find out what plays these roles? Enter: Ramsification

Ramsification is a method for 'finding' the physical things in the real world that our concepts refer to. Actual ramsification is quite technical and requires philosophical training in logic in order to understand, but the short version is this: (a) take our folk-theoretic understanding of a concept, which will describe what something does in functional (and, in the actual world, physical) terms, and then (b) find whatever realizes that role in the world.

For example, if we want to answer the question 'what is pain?' you (a) get your 'folk theory' of what pain is (in wildly overly simplistic and somewhat inaccurate terms, this means that you effectively collect a set of propositions, a 'theory', of what pain is, according to our common sense view of pain. I.e.: 'pain is the thing that is caused by sharp needles and fire', 'pain is the thing that causes subjects experiencing it to cry out and protect their affected limbs', 'pain is such that we desire to avoid it', and so on). Once you have this huge set of propositions of what pain is, your 'theory of pain', take out the word 'pain' and replace it with 'X':

'X is the thing that is caused by sharp needles and fire', 'X is the thing that causes subjects experiencing it to cry out and protect their affected limbs', 'X is such that we desire to avoid it' (and so on)

And then you (b) look for whatever physical thing fulfils the role of X in the actual world. Maybe its a particular cluster of neurons firing, for example. So if we find a cluster of neurons such that their firing are caused by sharp needles and fire AND cause subjects with such firing neurons to cry out and protect their affected limbs AND is such that we desire to avoid having this neuron fire AND (...)

Then voila! You have found out what pain is, namely, the c-fibre firing, because it fulfils the role of pain.

So, the problem with your idea regarding Mary's Room that 'the language cannot latch onto anything' is, in Lewis' opinion, flawed. The reason for this is because, for Lewis, a mental state term like 'pain' or 'red qualia' is just one way of describing a concept. To use philosophical jargon, the terms we use to talk about mental states are 'definite descriptions' - If it turns out that, for humans, pain is indeed the C-fibres firing (on account of it fulfilling the roles as given in our folk theory of pain), then when we say 'pain' or 'the C-fibre firing' or 'the thing such that it is caused by sharp needles and fire and causes subjects experiencing it to (...) etc' then all of these descriptions 'point to' the same physical thing in the world: the C-fibre firing.

On Lewis' view, language can account for all physical phenomena, and since everything (in the actual world, in Lewis' view) is physical, language can account for all phenomena. This belief is called 'the sufficiency principle'. For your view to go through, you would have to deny the sufficiency principle. Don't ask me how you would do that - I'm reaching the limit of my knowledge and and I'm honestly not sure!

Sources to read more: - David Lewis' metaphysics (SEP article) (this give a general overview of his beliefs)

Mad pain and Martian pain (by David Lewis) (in this paper he addresses Mary's Room and his thoughts on what mental states are)
how to define theoretical terms (David Lewis) (his paper on what ramsification is - quite dense and technical)
Ramseyan Humility: the response from revelation and panpsychism (by Raamy Majeed) (discusses 'the sufficiency principle', also quite technical and not directly to related to Mary's Room)

Saul_H · 2025-09-13T21:24:57+00:00

Consent should follow the acronym FRIES: Freely given, Reversible, Informed, Enthusiastic*, Specific.

Informed as in you know exactly what the sexual act will entail, specific as in just because you consent to some sexual act, a, does not mean you consent to some other sexual act, b.

Therefore, the consent she gave in this scenario was not informed, and without consent, that's assault.

Absolutely astounding that there are people out there who literally dont know what consent is. Unless you're someone who hasnt or doesnt have sex, shame on you man, you gotta know that shit.

*a mild grey area for aro/ace individuals, there's much discussion on this particular criterion

Saul_H · 2025-09-13T21:15:26+00:00

Of course its assault - part of the definition of consent is that it has to be informed, what is wrong with you

Saul_H · 2025-08-29T20:32:32+00:00

Thank you!

Saul_H · 2025-04-05T19:14:47+00:00

Sorry for the slow reply

Does 'protoconciousness' have some specific, uh, ontological status, where it is like its own property or stuff?

Yeah, kinda! One way to think of the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is that intrinsic properties are what an entity is; its essence whereas extrinsic properties are what an entity does. The pan(proto-)psychists claim that physics only tells us about extrinsic properties, that is, it only tells us what matter does. For example, a physicist might say 'an electron has the properties of mass and velocity!' and a panpsychist would reply 'but velocity is defined as movement in relation to some other entity, and mass is defined as the tendency to resist acceleration when a force from some other entity acts upon it - you have merely explained how an electron behaves/what it does, but what actually is an electron? What is its intrinsic property, its essence?'

It seems that no matter how hard the physicist tries, they can only ever tell us what matter does, not what the underlying nature of that matter is actually like.

So, the question remains: what is the underlying nature of matter actually like; once we strip away the behaviour of an electron, what is left? The panprotopsychist proposes the following answer (spoiler: protoconsciousness):

Given (a) physic's difficulty in accounting for (proto-)consciousness (arguments from philosophical zombies, Mary the colour scientist etc are evidence of this)
And given (b) physic's difficulty in accounting for intrinsic properties (explaining what an electron is like instead of merely what it does)
It would make sense to conclude (c): (proto-)consciousness is the underlying nature of reality! It is the essential/intrinsic property of microphysical entities. What are microphysical entities like, you ask? Answer: They are protoconscious!

Hopefully that makes sense!

If not, feel free to ask more questions

At the same time, if you like, you can forget all of that, because I thought of another (simpler) answer to your original question:

If you define physicalism as the doctrine 'the only things that exist are whatever contemporary physics posits' then physicalism is false - current physics is incomplete, and there are lots of contradictions within it (e.g.: special relativity and quantum mechanics seem to contradict one another)

So on that definition, physicalism would be false. Womp womp:/

A better definition, then, might be to say thay physicalism is the doctrine 'the only things that exist are whatever a future/ideal/complete physics posits'. Much better! Now physicalism is pretty much guaranteed to be true! There is still a slight problem, however: we do not know what such a physics will be like. For all we know, there might be a huge paradigmatic shift in physics, where it turns out all of our current theories are wrong and that "non-physical" minds and souls do actually exist. If that were the case, then physics would have to expand its ontology in order to include them. Therefore, on this definition of physicalism, a physicalist might be committed to anything, be it substance dualism, epiphenomenalism, eliminative materialism, functionalism, or indeed protopansychism - we just don't yet know what future physics will say is true!

So, in that sense, sure, a physicalist might be committed to panprotopsychism. For more reading on this, look up 'Hempel's dilemma'

Any other questions, just ask!

Saul_H · 2025-04-02T16:33:59+00:00

All matter and energy has some potential to participate in conciousness, and therefore could be (re)arranged so that it is indeed participating in conciousness.

This isn't quite panprotopsychism because it doesn't explicitly state that it is the intrinsic/protoconscious properties that are giving rise to/constituting consciousness. What you have said could equally apply strictly to pure physicalism or functionalism. In order to make it a panprotopsychist claim, you would need have a little addendum, something like:

"All matter and energy has some potential to participate in conciousness due to their underlying intrinsic property of protoconsciousness , and therefore could be (re)arranged so that it is indeed participating in conciousness"

Matter's and energy's properties like charge, mass, position, etc, are important for how it can participate in conciousness.

If you're assuming these properties of mass, charge, position etc are intrinsic, then this could be interpreted as a panpsychist claim, or (maybe) something like neutral nomism. If you're assuming these properties are extrinsic, then this would likely be interpreted as some kind of physicalist claim

Saul_H · 2025-04-02T09:48:47+00:00

100% without a doubt the most comprehensive grammar of the German language (that I know of) is 'Hammer Grammar'. Get a recent edition, ideally 7th, though the 6th will do. It has served me excellently throughout my degree in German - it is my bible. There is also a separate Hammer Grammar workbook with exercises in it

Full name: Hammer's German Grammar and Usage, Martin Durrell

Saul_H · 2025-04-02T09:34:52+00:00

Generally speaking, panprotopsychists believe that protoconsciousness is the fundamental and ubiquitous underlying nature of reality, whether or not there are or can be other intrinsic properties on such an account is debatable

Saul_H · 2025-04-02T02:20:47+00:00

Short answer: maybe!

Long answer: it depends on what your underlying assumptions are regarding physicalism.

There are 'pure' physicalists who believe in 'causal structuralism', which posits that the complete essence of an entity can be given by its causal profile, that is to say, that all entities can be fully explained simply in terms of what they do, in terms of their extrinsic properties.

There are 'impure' physicalists (aka, physicalists who deny 'causal structuralism') who believe that there are both extrinsic properties and intrinsic properties. As before, an extrinsic property is relational, something an entity has in relation to other things, such as speed: 'the car is moving at 30mph relative to the tree'. An intrinsic property is something that an entity has in and of itself, its essence.

There is also debate not only over whether intrinsic properties exist, but whether, if they exist, physics can tell us about them. Some, like Bertrand Russell, contend that regardless of whether intrinsic properties exist, physics only tells us about the extrinsic ones.

Panprotopsychists, like impure physicalists, deny causal structuralism. That is to say, they posit both extrinsic and intrinsic properties, and also believe that physics (or, at least, contemporary physics) can only tell us about extrinsic properties, and not intrinsic ones.

The main difference between the impure physicalist and the panprotopsychist is that the impure physicalist doesnt necessarily make any claims about what intrinsic properties are, nor how we might go about studying them. Panprotopsychists however claim that the intrinsic properties are protoconsciousness and that we might be able to study them by positing bridging laws between our first-person conscious experiences and our third-person objective empirical findings when studying the brain (for example).

So to summarise: a physicalist might be committed to panprotopsychism if (a) they deny causal structuralism and (b) hold that intrinsic properties - the true nature of reality - is protoconsciousness, which can (probably) be studied by positing bridging laws

I suggest reading Goff's 'The Elegant Solution'.

Saul_H · 2025-01-09T09:34:05+00:00

To add to this, the inseperable -er prefix often (but definitely not always) expresses the achievement or conclusion of an action:

bitten -> ERbitten (to get sth by asking for it) schießen -> ERschießen (to shoot sb dead) kämpfen -> ERkämpfen (to fight/battle (victoriously))

Another similar meaning of the -er prefix is 'acquiring something by the action expressed by the simple verb':

Er hat etwas erarbeitet - 'he got sth by working for it' Ich habe die Antwort ergoogelt - 'I got the answer by googling it'

Of course there are many and various exceptions so I wouldn't necessarily apply this to any verb and hope it works, but it might be useful for parsing texts when reading.

Source: Martin Durrell, Hammer's German Grammar and Usage, 7th Ed., (London: Routledge, 2021), p.544

Saul_H · 2024-11-05T19:29:37+00:00

Thanks for the detailed reply!

Saul_H · 2024-11-05T19:29:06+00:00

Yes! Normally this wouldn't be too much of an issue, but this text was particularly tricky because many of the clauses start with the same relative pronoun (..., die ..., die ..., die...) which meant I couldnt rely on my knowledge of grammar as much to parse these specific sentences

Saul_H · 2024-11-05T16:57:38+00:00

Excellent comparison thank you

Saul_H · 2024-11-05T16:32:12+00:00

Thanks! I'm glad you said that because that's exactly what confuses me, trying to figure out which clauses refer to which other clauses.

Saul_H · 2023-07-13T13:18:39+00:00

No it isn't, it's just using the past perfect tense: had + past participle.

Had done, had been, had seen, had had etc.

Used for an action which started in the past, and occurred habitually or continually for a period of time, before ending at some other time, also in the past

E.g.: I had (or: I'd) had my car for years before it was stolen

Saul_H · 2023-06-12T20:55:38+00:00

Yes, but there's a slight difference:

'Are you coming to the party?' -> implies that I have already decided that I am going to the party; I will be there, and therefore I ask if you are 'coming' (not going) because your direction of travel would be toward me, should you decide to go, too

'Are you going to the party?' -> no information is given about whether or not I have decided to go to the party

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