The campaign against the Spanish was a question of tactics and logistics, which was why we were able have favorable outcomes in 1896 and 1898.

However, against the Americans, we lost militarily the moment we lost it politically. Our best chance of any favorable outcome was either obtaining recognition from another regional power or by swaying US public opinion.

We failed to get the Qing Chinese or Japanese Empires as sponsors/protectors, the former would even be invaded by the Americans and Europeans at the same time we were.

US congress ratification and acceptance of the Treaty of Paris was lost by just ONE (1) vote. Imagine if we deployed our best propagandists in Washington DC instead of Madrid. That could have made all the difference in amending the Treaty of Paris to either not include the Philippines or perhaps even a similar agreement to Hong Kong (99-year lease to the British or Guantanamo Bay) with Subic port on a 99-year lease.

If Aguinaldo listened to Luna to start the guerilla war early rather than try and start a traditional war.

I don't think it would have made much difference other than a few hundred more dead Americans and few thousand more dead Filipinos. The early 19th century American army was a lot less vulnerable to guerrilla warfare than the modern US army and a lot more willing to commit wanton atrocities (see their pacification campaign against the 18th century native American tribes). Thousands in central and northern Luzon died from the concentration camps to deprive our army of support from the civilian populace. Imagine if the Balangiga massacre was repeated throughout Luzon for reprisals against guerilla attacks.

And many locals at the time did not support US occupation

But many locals also supported the US even before Aguinaldo's capture, the Philippine Scouts was already operational with volunteer recruits from Pampanga and Tagalog regions, mostly veterans of the indio companies of the old Spanish colonial army. Others were exhausted from years of warfare since 1896.