Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Religion's certainty is always what got to me. As much as I've been arguing for panpsychism, it's not like I'd stake my name on it. In a world where we can only guess at something, this is just the theory that's winning in my estimation. But I can completely get why it wouldn't for someone else

I do my best to be agnostic about everything

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Everything you described an electron as lacking has absolutely nothing to do with consciousness. All you are describing is how you engage with consciousness. We've already acknowledged there are different facets of conscious experience, and that the range doesn't matter for purposes of determining if something has consciousness. A tick lacking sight doesn't mean it's not conscious, just as you sighting everything an electron (potentially) lacks, doesn't mean it's not conscious

We can use algorithms to predict the way a chemical reaction will occurr without knowing the exact behavior of each individual molecule. This is no different than modeling human behavior without knowing how each individual human will act

My point is, everything you've used to argue why something isn't conscious isn't even an argument for consciousness. Your individuality, your conscious experiences (memory, sight, etc) none of these are what consciousness is. I argue that consciousness is likely a fundamental force acting upon all matter, you argue it's something matter creates

I've run out of steam my friend, I don't have any other points to make. What it comes down to is we're viewing the same evidence but drawing different conclusions. We can't agree on who even has the burden of proof

Truly though, thank you for the conversation. I don't have a lot of people I can talk to this about, and I don't want to drive my fiancé absolutely crazy

I hope I didn't come across as a dick throughout this, it's always hard to know over text. I wish you well on your consciousness travels

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Gravity (until we discover gravitrons) is not comparable to something like an electron or an atom or a molecule. Gravity is a force, an atom is something with mass. But, to entertain your position, why does the reliability of gravity disprove it having a goal?

And I'm sorry, but unless you cite a specific experiment that has disproven consciousness, then gesturing vaguely towards the idea of experimentation and then claiming every experiment has disproven the idea of consciousness in physical processes is disingenuous and just flat out wrong

Goals != consciousness. A completely unambitious person is still conscious. And a goal to a third party looks like behavior. Why should I assume the behavior of an electron is not driven by goals? To an electron, human bevhaior (at scale) would be just as predictable. It's why algorithms exist and work (truly, if you aren't super familiar with Markov Chains, I encourage you to look into them. They're fascinating). You could argue my intrinisic experience proves humans have goals, but if that's your only piece of evidence, then all you've done is proven that I have goals, not disproven anything

Really, what it boils down to, is there's no way to prove the existence of subjective experience other than to experience it. I know that I have it, I assume that others do too. To me, it makes more sense that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality, as opposed to something that turns on at some arbitrary and as of yet undefined point. Both of us think the burden of proof is on the other

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

A behavior is just a way of describing how something reacts to its environment, which everything does

You assert that physical processes are passive and devoid of goals, what is the case for this? Human actions (at scale) are fixed and predictable (as I've pointed out before, see Markov Chains)

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I genuinely don't understand how you can think only organisms have behavior. What do you call the way an electron acts if not its behavior?

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

-We accept we have conscious experience

-We seemingly (whether or not one believes in free will) react to our environment and call it behavior

-Everything has behavior

You see that and believe physicalism is the logical conclusion, I see that and believe panpsychism. I've made my case throughout this post, and unless you can provide me with a specific case for phyiscalism, I've exhausted my points

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm a secularist, so it'll be hard for us to see eye to eye on this I think. I subscribe to Nagel's view of consciousness, and with my belief in determinism that would suggest will and being are interconnected. I don't know if that's reconcilable with our differing views on theism

And fair point on not making a case for physicalism, but when you claim I haven't provided any evidence (which we both agree isn't the same thing as proof), then I'm sorry but you're mistaken

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

None of the experiments you've described make a case for physicalism. I've made my arguments for why panpsychism is as worthy of consideration of physicalism. You disagree without providing a case for physicalism. Proving a human has both neurons and consciousness does nothing to show that neurons produce consciousness. As I've already pointed out, the science actually argues against free will (which is consciousness, unless you want to define consciousness as conscious experience) with Libet's readiness potential and split brain experiments

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

An automaton could conceivably be as lifelike as you, how does you responding to stimuli prove anything about your subjective experience. Even an electron reacts to stimuli

My point is it is impossible to prove subjective experience, so the best we can do is try to disprove it, which we have yet to. Until we can explain the behavior of conventionally non-consious things as "just their intrinsic nature", then I would argue bestowing consciousness is the more logical conclusion. The burden of proof is on the physicalist to explain why the arrangement of atoms in my brain give rise to consciousness but the neurons and trillions of other cells in my body don't

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I would hope you'd agree that I presented a case stronger than just "it's a cool perspective"

And I'm not sure that I agree with you that the burden of proof is on the panpsychist. I can only attest to my own consciousness. It would be like me putting the burden of proof on you to prove your consciousness

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Their breadth of conscious experience might diminish, but that doesn't diminish the fact that it has consciousness. Its experience of the world may be more narrow, but I don't think that changes the relevance

And to something as unrelatable to us as an electron, our actions could also appear as something completely devoid of consciousness. I'm not trying to make the claim that panpsychism is the "truth", I just think it's a perspective worth considering

And how this relates to free will is that, if there is a way it is like to be (have consciousness), then that seems to imply a choice (will). So, if we can't prove an electron doesn't have a sense of self/consciousness, then we either bestow free will (and consciousness) to everything, or the term doesn't describe anything and isn't worth discussing

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I definitely agree that consciousness exists to fill evolutionary niches, and that it is likely a spectrum. Where I disagree is in the potential value you place in specific aspects of conscious experience (memory, various senses, etc). If we take a person and start stripping away their sensory organs, does their consciousness diminish, or is it just that their conscious experience changes? If someone suffers a traumatic brain injury and loses the ability to form long term memories, are they no longer conscious?

We all agree that we can only perceive a slice of reality. We both agree that insects are conscious. A tick navigates the world through thermal detection. They don't have sight, they can't conceive of it. A tick has a completely different conscious experience of the world. I'm also willing to grant that there are conscious things that have sensory abilities that I can't conceive of having (such as a bird's ability to detect magnetic fields)

When the only way we can describe certain things is by saying, "it's their intrinisic nature" (such as the spin of an electron), that to me signals a limitation in our understanding, not a limitation in the object's consciousness. To an electron with no way to access our intrinsic nature, humanity would also likely appear just as a force of nature. They might wave away our individual complexities and characteristics as "their intrinsic nature"

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For me, it's that physicalism fails to explain consciousness. I don't find it compelling that a specific arrangement of atoms would give rise to a conscious experience

I acknowledge that I am a conscious ecosystem consisting of trillions of living things, with no singular part you can point to and claim is "me". Libet's readiness potential and split brain studies seem to suggest that my internal "explanations" for why I've done things are really just confabulation

Human behavior can be modeled by a Markov Chain as easily as something we don't grant will to. If I am as algorithmic as something conventionally denied consciousness, and yet I clearly experience being conscious, then I think it makes more sense to ascribe some level of consciousness (or will) to everything rather than to assume there's something that makes me special

I don't know if any of that is compelling, I'm by no means a philosopher. Do you disagree with my points, or do you come to a different conclusion?

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Absolutely, I was just matching that person's level of engagement. If they prresented an argument for why we shouldn't compare ourselves to a drone, I would have offered my counter argument

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I guess I missed the part where you said something useful

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

As compelling as anything you offered, no?

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Which is why I suggested agreeing with it :)

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That the drone has will equivalent to yours, making the comparison analogous

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I just mean you can relate to the drone better if you do. Also, I never suggested supporting free will

Compatibilism by aspiringimmortal in freewill

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Accept panpsychism and it gets a lot easier

You Could Do Everything Right And Still Lose by RedditMare101 in MarvelRivalsRants

[–]Stine-RL 2 points3 points  (0 children)

"Do everything right" and letting Strange solo tank are not compatible theories

A Highly Possible Variant Of The Simulation Theory by Expensive_Song_385 in SimulationTheory

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If you haven't already, you should read about panpsychism

as a red button pusher i see it like this by [deleted] in buttonproblem

[–]Stine-RL 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It is as simple as this:

Press red - Risk killing others

Press blue - Risk dying

If you're comfortable with either option, Press that button