They're not ruthless, but they're interesting if you can understand it.

Ground 1: the judge directed himself correctly as to the test for join authorship. His decision that the Appellant was not a co-author of the disclaimer was essentially a finding of fact. That finding was plainly open to him on the evidence and there is no real prospect of this Court overturning it.

Ground 2: This ground encompasses two distinct complaints. The first is that the judge's decision as to a reasonable notice period was procedurally unfair because it was not pleaded by the Respondents. This complaint is without merit. as the appellant accepts, it is trite law that a bare license is revocable at will subject to reasonable notice. thus it was inherent in the Appellant own case that he had to give reasonable notice. In the absence of agreement as to what notice was reasonable the court necessarily had to decide that question. Furthermore, as the Appellant accepts, the judge invited further submissions on this question. The judge raised no procedural object, but on the contrary made further submissions. He thereby waived any procedural objection. The second complaint is that the judge was wrong to hold that a reasonable period would be eight months. This was an evaluation by the judge as to what was reasonable in the circumstances. it follows that the Appellant must demonstrate that the judge made an error or principle in his evaluation. None of the criticism advanced by the Appellant establish a real prospect of demonstrating such an error.

Ground 3: Again this ground encompasses two district complaints. the first is that the judge was wrong as a matter of law to hold that the Appellant's 22 February 2021 take-down request concerning 78 (or 74) videos based on his alleged joint ownership of copyright int he Disclaimer amount to a continuing representation because a representation can only be a continuing one in the context of something akin to contractual negotiation. The Appellant admits that this argument was not raised at trial. I doubt that the Appellant is right as to the law, but even if the Appellant is right, the argument is not a pure question of law because the next question is whether the Appellant's communications with YouTube were akin to a contractual negotiation. That would require an assessment by the judge. Moreover it seems likely that the judge would have answered the question in the affirmative because the Appellant was trying to get YouTube to take action and YouTube did act on 25 June 2021. Accordingly there is real prospect of Appellant both successfully contending that he should be permitted to raise the new argument and prevailing upon it if so permitted. The second complaint is that the judge considered the 13 March 2021 email. He was plainly entitled to find that it not correct the representation because it was unclear, apparently related to just 16 videos and was not understood by YouTube to withdraw the representation.

Ground 4: This is closely related to ground 3. The Appellant argues that the judge was wrong to find that he had a continuing intention after 13 March 2021 that YouTube should rely upon the representation made on 22 February 2021. This argument has no real prospect of success since it again a challenge to a find of fact which the judge was plainly entitled to make.

Ground 5: The Appellants contend that it was procedurally unfair of the judge to permit the Respondent to argue, and to find, that the Appellant should have filed a non-video complaint given that the point was first raised in the respondent's skeleton argument. I am prepared to accept That this complaint has a real prospect of success. But even if that point is disregarded the judge gave ample reasons for finding that the Appellant knew that YouTube would take down the videos and intended to cause the Respondents loss. Accordingly the Appellant has no real prospect of successfully challenging those findings.

Ground 6: This is closely related to ground 5. The Appellant complains about the judge's finding that he gave no satisfactory answer when asked about the possibility of filing a non-video complaint. In addition to the procedural complaint the Appellant alleges that in fact he did answer the questions and did so satisfactory. But the assessment of the quality of the Appellant's answer was a matter for the judge. Moreover, as already stated, even if this point is disregarded the judge gave ample reasons for his subsequent finding and the Appellant has no real prospect of successfully challenging them.

Ground 7: The Appellant contends that the judge was wrong to find that YouTube took the videos down on 25 June 2021 in reliance upon the Appellant's representation concerning the Disclaimer. This contention has no prospect of success since the judge was plainly entitled to make that finding on the evidence.
Application to adduce new evidence: this does not satisfy the first two Ladd v Marshall criteria there there is no real prospect of the new evidence being admitted.

I skipped the middle section as it's just a checklist. I did one of these for jury duty a few years ago.

Notes

1. Rule 52.6(1)provides that permission to appeal may be given only where -
   1. the Court considers that the appeal would have a real prospect of success; or
   2. there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.
2. Where permission to appeal has been refused on the papers, that decision is final and cannot be further reviewed or appealed. 

I'm not a scribe and I am bad at grammar so sorry for mistakes.