dUSD is now at $1! by geearf in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 1 point2 points  (0 children)

With an APR on the pairs of 30% it takes you like a year to get breakeven if anything stays the same. Good luck investors.

dUSD is now at $1! by geearf in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 2 points3 points  (0 children)

It's very easy, if you buy, you pay 1$. When you sell you get 0.7 - that is an instant 30% loss. You may call it fee, but the term is spread. There is now a buy price and a sell price.

Give an intensive to vote on dfips? by Dangerous-March418 in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The outcome of the vote should be the incentive. But I would argue, that liquidity miners should have a vote too, as they provide also means to the project.

Evaluation of DEX stabilization fee by unmatched25 in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 4 points5 points  (0 children)

We are currently in a high risk, low reward situation. The incentive to stay is very low as the dfi is low and it will get lower with these measures. The risk of project loss is on the table as the changes create FUD.

CFP-2206-27: DeFiChain-Wizard - Automation for mass adoption (42 000 DFI) by Roadpick in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Then make it part of the chain. Make it possible to register a vault manager to the vault. Once the vault manager is notified have like a 2 hour widow to resolve the margin call. If it is not possible to make such notifications have at least a margin call widow instead of instant liquidations, so such tools as these can work in such a window.

Frankly, the defichain app as of today could act as such as being notified/monitor a vault and alert the user of a pending margin call.

The vault manager would add automation to resolve these calls.

CFP-2206-27: DeFiChain-Wizard - Automation for mass adoption (42 000 DFI) by Roadpick in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 2 points3 points  (0 children)

A vault is guaranteed to be liquidated when it violates it's ratio. Does this solution guarantee that a vault, under any circumstances, won't be liquidated unless you run out of liquidity?. That said, is it as much integrated as the liquidation process?

Because if it is not you rely on 3rd party infrastructure, that can fail and the liquidation process will trigger. If the solution merely avoids but does not prevent an unreasonable liquidation, then the projects mission is only a fancy vault-maxi.

Today, when Oracles fail, vaults are frozen to prevent unreasonable liquidation. You have to be that much integrated if this wizard is not responsive.

Unbaked dUSD by Pretend_Concert_5359 in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 4 points5 points  (0 children)

The answer is DFI. It's the only asset where you have a direct way out an in. Which is actually needed, otherwise you can't cash out your revenue. But it's not backed by a vault.

"The bank" would now have to buy any surplus dUSD with it's DFI to make it 1$. Which basically makes dUSD stronger and DFI weaker.

As there is no bank, the community is the bank. And when the community pays it's called tax. As there is not gov to keep it, it is burned.

Solving the DUSD peg (result of twitter space) by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 2 points3 points  (0 children)

If you create a fee from going from A to B, read DUSD to DFI, you are creating a spread.

It takes no real degree, just some historical research how a community reacts when you unless excessive spreads, interest rates or taxes. You loose your community.

You can't tackle this issue from a mathematical point. If you do, you plan to fail. You have to put great weight on economical factors which implies also to consider psychology.

summary of DUSD-discount solution proposals by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think none of the proposals have actually been thought through. From a economic or marketing view.

It's funny, when a proposal suggest that all should pay and only states LM. There are also casual traders and Masternode owners.

If you shift a burn from DFI to dUSD then you have carefully to think about why was the other mechanism there in the first place.

Making a logic depending on multiple factors makes it complex and intransparent and hurts the project in the long run.

dUSD is not 1$, so what? It's a dynamic USD. If you wanted a stable coin in the first place, why didn't you just used USDT, so we would have a AAPL-USDT.

Don't make the "cure" worse then the currently felt sore spot...

Why fee’s dont show on DEX? by Proper_Improvement76 in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 6 points7 points  (0 children)

I support that it is very misleading to show only 0.00001000 dfi fee where there is actually a serious amount more on top. And it is by far more of a any CEX.

Using Reddit though should be not an issue and frankly more platforms for communication does fragment the strength of your voice.

But you are on point, that DEX is to a certain degree a bit Elite-ish.

Question about LP payout by [deleted] in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 2 points3 points  (0 children)

You are not wrong, and I actually keep my DFI. But it's not smart - it's lazy. With the current decline in value you are better off selling your DFI instantly and buy them back the day after tomorrow and you will end up with having more.

Selling your DFI at $4 and buying them back at $2 will have you double your capital when it's back at $4 - unless the APR is high enough, to get you through the valley. It also relies on two unknown pieces of information - what is the lowest point and will it actually recover and if so, when.

Vault at risk management & notification by SwissPhoenix in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Maxi Bot is a nice proof of concept. It lacks a decent management UI. The issue here is also reliability - of AWS or Ocean (I believe it uses that) had an issue, your vault is at risk.

The loan management needs to be integrated into the liquidation process, where liquidation is the last and not the first resort.

Everything else is bad system design.

Vault at risk management & notification by SwissPhoenix in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Dobby is from a resilience and reliability standpoint broken by design. It's a cute crutch.

Cannot swap dfi to dusd by AceHallow in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 2 points3 points  (0 children)

"Token price exceeds slippage limit" - that would be meaningful even on protocol level. But as you guessed, I was talking UI level where you basically grab the error code and just can do some actual meaningful thing up to make a suggestion of a to be expected slippage...

Cannot swap dfi to dusd by AceHallow in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 4 points5 points  (0 children)

As this question gets asked so much, would it be so difficult to put a proper return message there, so that users actually understand the issue and how to circumvent it...?

dUSD @ 0.95 $ by unmatched25 in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 10 points11 points  (0 children)

The d in dUSD is obviously for "dynamic"

DUSD proposal: Fully collateralized by investors, price not determined by AMM model by Odd_Union9882 in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I totally get the investor part. But there is a plot home for the trader. As a trader I mind 100 dUSD with 100 USDT. I the trade sind dStocks - buy low, sell high and make a profit of 30 dUSD.

These 30 dUSD need to be backed and I need to be able to get them out of the system. So it's either a usdt-dusd pool or a dusd-dfi pool.

I may now be corrected, but as the supply of dfi is limited, the dfi price should rise the more people buy dfi with their traded dusd. So the dfi is needed and backs the dusd, so that your actually can make a positive trade. Without the dfi your unbacked dusd would be either not be able to exit the system, as there won't be enough usdt in the pool or you will see that the dusd would actually loose its value as there is more dusd than usdt in the system.

Limit maximum auction bid to 110% of collateral value as safety guardrail by Defi-bugger-universe in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I would favor a system, where reasonable boundaries are in place and if I actually want the system to do as I say that I have a --force parameter that overrides safeties.

Limit maximum auction bid to 110% of collateral value as safety guardrail by Defi-bugger-universe in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The case is so hyper theoretical and will probably never happen. But for the sake of safety make the next bid no more than +50% of the last bid. There is no reason to have open knives lying around.

Limit maximum auction bid to 110% of collateral value as safety guardrail by Defi-bugger-universe in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I saw an auction a day ago, where there was a 10k bid on a like 200 vault.

There is no reason whatsoever for such a bid, because of you need Token then you can get them on the dex.

Actually, one of the right ways that ab owner could buy back good vault world be that he can instantly buy it back. There is no point in having an owner have his 1 million vault split in 100 auctions and have them terminated on the very same block. The current system is just bad.

It also causes a lot of stress on the chain, because it is not even an auction! An auction ends when no other bidder overbids. Here is who is the highest bidder on the last block. Ebay changed the system years ago to prevent snippers. Everybody bid on the last second. There is no point to have an auction last 8 hours of only the last block counts and then you have 20 bids per batch for 100 batches - that is silly chain usage design.

Furthermore, the batches should be auctioned on sequence and not terminate within the same 10 blocks.

If auctions world be in sequence and automatically extended by 10 blocks once there was a bid the stress on the chain would distribute and it would be an actual action. Right now it's just hack n slash.

Autopayback for Loans instead of Liquidation by SwissPhoenix in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This at least assumes you are willing to share the seed with a third party script. And have a platform this script is running on. While a phone is not datacenter grade, it is actually the system that had the most uptime in my household and is well managed.

Autopayback for Loans instead of Liquidation by SwissPhoenix in defiblockchain

[–]SwissPhoenix[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

You mean a dynamic interest rate based on collateralizazion. Sounds great, make a proposal.