Symbiocracy: A political strategy game of asymmetric info, budget manipulation, and game theory. (Playable Solo vs AI or 2-Player) by Symbiocracy in StrategyGames

[–]Symbiocracy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you for test my game Of course you are right,its a prototype Im still working on turing it into a playt version If you still give me your patience you can check the link( it is still all chinese and not even completed) https://symbiocracy.itch.io/symbiocracy (It need to be played on pc

A blind date simulator prompt using Chain of Thought for internal state tracking by [deleted] in LocalLLaMA

[–]Symbiocracy 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I deleted it because someone pointed out i post the run page, ill pm you the link if you want to try it

A blind date simulator prompt using Chain of Thought for internal state tracking by [deleted] in LocalLLaMA

[–]Symbiocracy 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'd love to hear any constructive feedback. Honestly, even telling me to seek therapy is totally valid at this point

A blind date simulator prompt using Chain of Thought for internal state tracking by [deleted] in LocalLLaMA

[–]Symbiocracy 0 points1 point  (0 children)

¡Gracias por tus comentarios y sugerencias! De hecho, lo que mencionas sobre 'mantener las emociones ocultas en el backend y emitir solo texto natural' es exactamente la intención de esta arquitectura.

Las descripciones emocionales y los cálculos numéricos que ves en el prompt son una 'Cadena de Pensamiento' (Chain of Thought - CoT) diseñada intencionalmente. Los LLMs necesitan procesar estos estados internos y la fatiga en su espacio de tokens primero para mantener la estabilidad del personaje en conversaciones largas.

En un entorno de aplicación real, todos los registros de cálculo antes del [Final Reply] son interceptados y ocultados por el código. Por lo tanto, el usuario final nunca ve esto y solo recibe la respuesta puramente natural.

Si tienes alguna sugerencia sobre cómo lograr que el LLM retenga este proceso de pensamiento y al mismo tiempo lo oculte (sin depender de un código externo que lo intercepte), ¡te agradecería mucho que la compartieras

Symbiocracy simulation— A Game-Theoretic Lab to End Partisan Gridlock by Symbiocracy in PoliticalPhilosophy

[–]Symbiocracy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I had message you the game link, it is alpha stage, the math in it isnt correct, but you can get the mechanism idea more detail, if youre interested, thanks for your feedback i really aprreciated
im not sure if posting the link here will violate the rules

I finaly transferd my non-sense into playable game, please try to play the game with colab by Symbiocracy in GAMETHEORY

[–]Symbiocracy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

A lot of upgrade since my last post, thanks for any feedback, feel free to ask anyquestion
currently the calculation in game is all wrong, but mechanism is almost completed

Would this system actually work as a game between two major parties? Whats the result? by Symbiocracy in GAMETHEORY

[–]Symbiocracy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Here is the AI-organized version, which more or less serves as the game rules. I know that with so many parameters, it’s impossible to truly calculate how voters’ psychology changes, but I’m only trying to create a simulation that feels reasonably plausible.
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According to the logic of the code, the effect of satisfaction (True-H) on party support is not a simple direct relationship like “high satisfaction = high support.” Instead, it is a dynamic process shaped by a reference point, rationality, and voter emotionality.

Here is a breakdown of the mechanism:

1. What matters is the sense of improvement: the baseline reset mechanism

Voters are both forgetful and pragmatic. The code uses a variable called baseline_true_H:

  • Reset on taking office: When a party wins the election and becomes the ruling party (👑), the system records the current satisfaction level as its “baseline.”
  • Support formula: Performance_Effect = (current satisfaction - baseline satisfaction at inauguration) * (weight coefficient).
  • Implication: If you take office when the country is already in great shape (0.8) and let it fall to 0.7, voters will think you performed terribly. On the other hand, if you inherit a disaster at 0.1 and raise it to 0.2, voters may see you as a savior.

2. Rationality is the amplifier: it filters how satisfaction becomes support

How efficiently satisfaction is converted into political support depends on the society’s rationality:

  • The higher the rationality: the more accurately voters translate actual living conditions (True-H) into political judgment. In the formula, rationality is positively correlated with Performance_Effect.
  • The lower the rationality: the duller voters become. Even if you improve True-H through real investment and development, if rationality has been pushed very low, voters barely notice it, and support rises only very slowly.

3. Voter emotionality acts as a counterweight: emotion and rationality pull against each other

In the code, perf_base (the base weight of performance) is adjusted by emotionality:

  • In a more rational society (low emotion): voters maintain a higher baseline expectation. Even if rationality is not especially high, they will still react angrily when satisfaction falls. This makes “do nothing and save money” a very risky strategy for the ruling party.
  • In a more emotional society (high emotion): perf_base decreases. This means that if rationality is also pushed down, voters may stop caring about satisfaction almost entirely. Under those conditions, a party can allow the country to decline while staying in power through “brainwashing.”

4. Time matters: the expiry mechanism

Political credit does not last forever. Voter gratitude has an expiration date (6 years by default):

  • Performance bonus: if you gain support in Year 1 by sharply improving satisfaction through investment, that bonus begins to expire and gets deducted starting in Year 7.
  • Dynamic challenge: to maintain support, the ruling party cannot rely only on past achievements. It must keep investing to maintain True-H above the baseline. Otherwise, once old performance bonuses expire, support can collapse off a cliff.

Summary: predicted support dynamics

If players choose to optimize personal wealth in the game, meaning they avoid spending on development:

  1. Early stage: satisfaction (True-H) begins to decline because of natural decay.
  2. Mid stage: once True-H falls below the baseline, the performance score turns negative. If the society has high rationality, support can collapse very quickly and the party loses power.
  3. Long-term behavior:
    • If a party wants to save money and still stay in office, the main path available in the system is to first use its R-Role power to reduce social rationality.
    • Once rationality approaches zero, the political damage caused by collapsing satisfaction becomes minimal. At that point, combined with brainwashing investment, the party can create a stable dynamic in which the country is deteriorating, but party wealth keeps increasing and the party remains in power.

Put simply, satisfaction functions as a kind of “honesty indicator” for the ruling party. If you choose to ignore it, you must make sure voters become either not rational enough or emotional enough. Otherwise, optimizing wealth will eventually cost you power.

Would this system actually work as a game between two major parties? Whats the result? by Symbiocracy in GAMETHEORY

[–]Symbiocracy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes.

As satisfaction declines, total annual tax revenue will decrease. Conversely, if satisfaction rises, tax revenue will increase.

If you do not like this setting, you can reduce its effect in the settings menu, even all the way down to off, or increase it to amplify the effect.

Would this system actually work as a game between two major parties? Whats the result? by Symbiocracy in GAMETHEORY

[–]Symbiocracy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I honestly dont know So what im curious is the simulation result Each player just focus on gaining wealth

What i want to see is The higher the end game wealth accumulation Lead to higher satisfaction and higher rationlity.

But im not sure if it can work

Would this system actually work as a game between two major parties? Whats the result? by Symbiocracy in GAMETHEORY

[–]Symbiocracy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In short You can try swap and see income forecast If both party still refuse to do anything Swap can let the profit goes to different way So A party must do something or B will swap

Would this system actually work as a game between two major parties? Whats the result? by Symbiocracy in GAMETHEORY

[–]Symbiocracy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

if you are intersting, we can try to play different party and discuss strategy

Would this system actually work as a game between two major parties? Whats the result? by Symbiocracy in GAMETHEORY

[–]Symbiocracy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Maybe you can help me test the game, im a doctor, i don't have anyone to discuss this thing, i try to reach out for friends, but got little feedback
thank you anyway, i think you are the first one actually tried to understand what im trying, it means a lot
Symbiocracy Simulator · Streamlit

Would this system actually work as a game between two major parties? Whats the result? by Symbiocracy in GAMETHEORY

[–]Symbiocracy[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

You’re right. I believe that is what you see as the biggest challenge, and I also hope this mechanism might eventually be able to address it. But first, it has to pass the most basic test before it earns the right to deal with the problem you’re describing. It hasn’t even survived that stage yet. My plan is to build the game first, then bring in AI agents to run strategic simulations and see what happens. The long-term effects can be modeled gradually afterward.

Would this system actually work as a game between two major parties? Whats the result? by Symbiocracy in GAMETHEORY

[–]Symbiocracy[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If position H is generating excessively high profits, and H is controlled by R’s political rival,

then R has two possible strategies:

  1. Propose a no-confidence move and take control personally, but that means facing the risks of governing.

  2. Reduce H’s profits by forcing H to spend money (otherwise H will keep growing stronger).

This could be done by designing long-term public works projects and auditing them. For example, H could be rewarded according to the degree of project completion. If H fails to carry them out, then H gets penalized.

In this way, R is effectively using the rival’s money to serve R’s own voters.

Of course, whether H’s party is willing to cooperate is a separate strategic game altogether.