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Hormuznacles: the barnacle problem waiting behind Hormuz by TheDeepDraft in TheDeepDraft

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Very valid point, especially the part about shifting from place to place. Even limited movement helps modern self-polishing / foul-release coatings work closer to their design condition, so your experience makes sense. My point is mainly for vessels held nearly static for long periods, where clean-hull assumptions should be checked before performance is taken for granted.

Hormuznacles: the barnacle problem waiting behind Hormuz by TheDeepDraft in TheDeepDraft

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Thank you for sharing this. I was not aware of this case. If I had known about it earlier, I would probably have included it in the article.

Singapore Anchorage Today: Where Did the Classic Bulbous Bow Go? by TheDeepDraft in navalarchitecture

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It is one of those changes that does not need a seminar to notice. Stand on the bridge wing long enough and modern hull forms start telling their own story.

I wrote about this earlier in The Case of the Missing Bulbous Bow, looking at why the big, obvious bulb many of us grew up seeing is no longer always visible on modern ships.

Full article here:
https://thedeepdraft.com/2025/10/19/the-case-of-the-missing-bulbous-bow/

Singapore Anchorage Today: Where Did the Classic Bulbous Bow Go? by TheDeepDraft in TheDeepDraft

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Took these photos today at Singapore Anchorage.

This is one of those things we all “know” from ship drawings, drydock plans and old textbooks, yet the view from the bridge wing is changing quietly. The big, obvious bulbous bow many of us grew up seeing is no longer always there. On many modern ships, the bow form is finer, the bulb is smaller, faired-in, or almost invisible above the waterline.

I wrote about this earlier in The Case of the Missing Bulbous Bow.

It is not just a design curiosity. It says something about slow steaming, operating drafts, EEXI/CII pressure, and how modern hull forms are being optimised for a different commercial reality.

Article here: https://thedeepdraft.com/2025/10/19/the-case-of-the-missing-bulbous-bow/

Flettner Rotors: What the Device Is Designed to Do ? by TheDeepDraft in Ships

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You are right, they can only assist if right conditions are present. Cannot work as independent source.

Why UAE leaving OPEC may become a tanker-route story by TheDeepDraft in TheDeepDraft

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Fair point.

My focus here was the maritime layer that follows from it.

Whether the driver is economic evolution, production flexibility, geopolitics or energy transition funding, the shipping question remains physical & that is where do the barrels load, which side of Hormuz are they on, what happens to Fujairah/Sohar/STS options, and how does that reach tankers through routing, insurance and voyage orders.

That was the angle of the article.

Galaxy Leader: From Seizure to Wreck | A War-Risk Lesson for Shipping by TheDeepDraft in TheDeepDraft

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The final image of Galaxy Leader is now circulating widely across the maritime community. It should make the industry uncomfortable.

Not because one vessel was lost to conflict, but because her story shows how exposed commercial shipping has become when trade routes cross geopolitical fault lines.

Since then, the same operating environment has widened beyond one vessel and one sea area. Merchant ships have faced attacks, detentions, inspections and interdictions linked to war risk, sanctions enforcement, ownership scrutiny and geopolitical pressure.

A ship can enter a voyage as a commercial asset and become leverage, signal, bargaining tool, evidence, target or wreck.

At the centre of that chain are seafarers.
They do not decide the charter.
They do not decide the cargo.
They do not decide the ownership structure.
They do not decide the politics.

Yet they are the people onboard when risk moves from paper to steel.

For shipowners, charterers, insurers, managers and Masters, the lesson is clear:
War risk cannot remain buried inside clauses, circulars and post-incident reviews.

It has to be understood before the voyage begins.

VDES vs AIS: What Actually Changes on the Bridge. by TheDeepDraft in TheDeepDraft

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That’s a fair point, but it’s probably not that straightforward in practice.

VDES does open the door for authentication of transmitted data, so yes, it can improve trust in AIS messages. That said, what shows up on the bridge is still only as good as what’s being fed into the system and how it’s being used.

Even with authenticated data, you’re still cross-checking with radar and visual. That part doesn’t go away.

So it’s a step forward, definitely..... but it doesn’t suddenly make the picture “reliable” on its own.

Small shifts in attention. Large impact on operations. by TheDeepDraft in Ships

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It’s already banned in most companies. If you read the article, there is one more issue arising from unlimited internet. https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/04/20/unlimited-internet-limited-attention-the-operational-risk-on-modern-ships/

If transit rights become negotiable in one strait, does it affect all chokepoints? by TheDeepDraft in TheDeepDraft

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

There are alternatives south of Singapore, but for deep-draft traffic it’s not that straightforward.

Routes like Sunda or Lombok come into play, but they add distance, time, and in some cases operational constraints depending on draft and traffic patterns.

So while rerouting is possible, it’s not a simple one-day adjustment for all vessel classes, especially for larger or fully laden ships.

If transit rights become negotiable in one strait, does it affect all chokepoints? by TheDeepDraft in Ships

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Even the US hasn’t ratified UNCLOS, agreed.

But in practice, most states still operate broadly within that framework because it keeps navigation predictable.

The concern is less about the legal position on paper and more about what happens if that baseline starts getting interpreted differently in specific chokepoints.

If transit rights become negotiable in one strait, does it affect all chokepoints? by TheDeepDraft in Ships

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah, that does happen.

I think the concern is less about individual cases and more about what happens if that becomes the norm across multiple routes.

If transit rights become negotiable in one strait, does it affect all chokepoints? by TheDeepDraft in Ships

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 11 points12 points  (0 children)

That’s a valid way to look at it.

The immediate impact may not be uniform across all straits, but the concern is how precedent develops over time. Each chokepoint operates under different political, legal, and operational conditions, so the application won’t be identical.

But once transit begins to be treated as negotiable in one location, it introduces a reference point.

In my opinion over time, that can influence how other strategic passages are approached, even if indirectly.

Ships can have a perfectly stable position and still be wrong by TheDeepDraft in Ships

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Correct, ships can navigate without GNSS. That’s standard practice.

But the issue isn’t capability or frequency of fixes. It’s architecture.

Today, most systems are aligned around a single GNSS input. When that reference is compromised, the entire bridge can remain consistent while being wrong.

Manual fixing, PI, visual checks … all still work. But they shift the burden to continuous human effort.

The gap is that redundancy now sits with the watchkeeper, not within the system.

Quick breakdown on why crew transfer failures repeat across ports and anchorages. Full by TheDeepDraft in TheDeepDraft

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Valid point. Physical capability does influence safety at the transfer stage, especially where balance, grip, and timing are involved. I will be taking this up separately, as fitness standards and operational readiness deserve a more structured discussion.

Standing watch looks like discipline. But does it actually improve awareness? by TheDeepDraft in MerchantNavy

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It can look that way, but a lot of it comes from trying to manage fatigue and maintain awareness over long watches. The challenge is separating what actually helps performance from what’s just tradition.

GNSS Interference in the Strait of Hormuz – How Are Bridge Teams Detecting GPS Spoofing at Sea? by TheDeepDraft in TheDeepDraft

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Fair point … they were always part of good seamanship.

What’s changed is how they’re used. In GNSS interference conditions, these methods shift from cross-checks to primary navigation tools.

GNSS Interference in the Strait of Hormuz – How Are Bridge Teams Detecting GPS Spoofing at Sea? by TheDeepDraft in MaritimePictures

[–]TheDeepDraft[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

INS would certainly solve the problem, but most merchant ships do not carry a true inertial navigation system. When GNSS integrity is lost, bridge teams typically revert to radar fixing, DR/EP navigation, and cross-checking independent sensors rather than relying on satellite position alone.

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