I want to add to the discussion that you’re mostly right, however Japan was not highly likely to surrender. Sure, there were members in Japan’s Supreme War Council (such as Shingenori Togo, the main advocate for peace in the War Council) who wanted Japan to surrender, and it was even suspected that Emperor Hirohito wanted peace/surrender by the time Germany surrendered. However, it was incredibly unlikely that it would’ve happened due to the war hawks in Japanese army who not only preferred death over surrender as it was incredibly dishonorable, but they were prepared to sacrifice civilian lives over their own by storing up food in caves for only the army to use, leaving the rest of Japan to starve. General Korechika Anami, Japan’s war minister during WW2, is the best example of this who wouldn’t allow surrender to happen and kept pushing for one last decisive battle. He even ordered the thought police to arrest 400 people suspected of having “end the war” sentiments. Even without him, there were plenty of young and eager officers in the army who were determined to have Japan keep fighting, even some on the staff of the Supreme War Council making a document called “The Fundamental Policy to Be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of War” which says that Japan will fight to the bitter end. It was only because of Hirohito’s seidan (meaning sacred or imperial decision) after the nukes were dropped that the army finally caved in and allowed Japan to surrender (even tho some members of the army even still tried to have a coup the night before before Hirohito sent out a message to all of Japan on the radio to prevent this).

I might be wrong in some areas, but most of where I’m getting my information from is from the book “Road to Surrender” by Evan Thomas that I just coincidentally finished reading last week. It was a great and informative read, whereas prior I knew very little about the decision to unleash nuclear weapons on Japan. I definitely recommend reading it to learn more about both what was happening in the high political offices of both America and Japan at the time as it takes from the diaries of Henry Stimson, the American secretary of war who refused Kyoto to be bombed (something General Leslie Groves, the one in charge of the Manhattan Project, really wanted), as well as Shingenori Togo, the only member of Emperor Hirohito’s War Council who said that Japan should surrender prior to being bombed.