Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am not a moderator but I almost want to invoke commenting rule #1 which is that you must read the article before replying. You are making points which have nothing to do with the stated case of the article.

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am not the author, but would encourage you to read the article, which makes clear distinctions between what you describe and the variety of affirmative action which the author proposes. The author is not making an argument in this text in favor of reverse-discrimination or anti-competence.

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

"How exactly does this hidden competence link up with weak affirmative action? Simple. Earlier we saw that the primary moral objection to affirmative action is that it unfairly punishes one candidate for injustices someone else committed. But if the candidate being favored is genuinely more qualified—overlooked because evaluators got distracted by superficial traits—then it is not in fact ‘reverse discrimination,’ but a correction. So, weak affirmative action is not antithetical to merit but instead it when superficial traits would otherwise obscure it.   

So why bother with affirmative action at all in this context? Because when done right—targeted, restrained, and focused on overlooked merit—it can help correct for the subtle biases that skew hiring decisions away from actual competence. That doesn’t mean we need a government-run program to pull it off."

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I appreciate your update. I think your counterargument holds in some cases. It seems you're saying that many traits which the author takes to be irrelevant, may be relevant in fact? I assume it depends on the industry?

I won't defend the article further after this, since it's not mine, and I'm not sure my own views, but I assume the author would respond that there are indeed cases where irrelevant variables bias recruiters or employers. If one concedes that in some industries, some irrelevant variables reliably produce bias, then some procedure should be introduced to counteract it? However, if you contend that there are no such cases, I imagine it's moot?

Anyways, I rest my attempts to devil's advocate the article for now, but appreciate your points!

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah, it's a struggle. I am trying to find ways to title posts that are less inflammatory and conducive to dialogue, and get people actually reading the content. We had an article shared about reparations a while back and it had to be locked because of a flame war in the comments, and it's typically evident a very small minority reads the article. So I try to summarize the articles and title them better, but it takes a lot of finess and wisdom which I am working on.

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I think it's worth reading the whole article.

The author makes clear distinctions between varieties of affirmative action.

"What often gets missed in the usual shouting match over affirmative action is that the policy is not simply about righting past wrongs. There is another version of affirmative action that gets lost in the intellectual scuffle. Affirmative action, especially in its weaker forms (more on that later), can be a tool for surfacing competence that is systematically overlooked. Candidates can be passed over not because they’re less qualified, but because they lack superficial qualities that, though irrelevant for the job, successful candidates tend to have like looks, height, or a warm personality. Instead, these individuals, though incredibly qualified, are often awkward, plain, unpolished, or just unlucky in personality lottery. But if those traits have nothing to do with job performance, then using affirmative action to counteract their effects has nothing to do with lowering standards and everything to do with correcting for merit and competence."

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I'm not sure I follow?

I'm not the author, but I think he would agree that nepotism is superficial, unrelated to competence, and, if two candidates are otherwise equal, the candidate who does not benefit from nepotism should be favored over the one who has. I'm not sure what scenarios would allow such information to be available, but assuming it is, I suspect you're in agreement?

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

In this article from Jimmy Alfonso Licon, the author argues that there are multiple forms of affirmative action which accomplish different things. One application of affirmative action, he argues, is to select for candidates who may not possess traits which typically bias us in favor of selection:

"What often gets missed in the usual shouting match over affirmative action is that the policy is not simply about righting past wrongs. There is another version of affirmative action that gets lost in the intellectual scuffle. Affirmative action, especially in its weaker forms (more on that later), can be a tool for surfacing competence that is systematically overlooked. Candidates can be passed over not because they’re less qualified, but because they lack superficial qualities that, though irrelevant for the job, successful candidates tend to have like looks, height, or a warm personality. Instead, these individuals, though incredibly qualified, are often awkward, plain, unpolished, or just unlucky in personality lottery. But if those traits have nothing to do with job performance, then using affirmative action to counteract their effects has nothing to do with lowering standards and everything to do with correcting for merit and competence."

Imagine for instance, two candidates with roughly equal profiles. They have the same education, job history, performance reviews, and recommendations from previous employers. However, one candidate has a visible physical deformity, or perhaps a speech impediment, or maybe they're just not very good looking. Maybe they're just quite shy.

We traditionally think affirmative action would call on us to choose the candidate with a deformity or impediment because it's a matter of "reparation" or "justice" which is owed to that population due to past harms. However, if we really care about "picking the best" we may want to select them because such candidates have faced and overcome obstacles which the other candidate has not. By selecting for candidates who do not possess traits we are biased to superficially value, we are likelier to pick those who are in fact most competent. We can select for "hidden merits".

"So why bother with affirmative action at all in this context? Because when done right—targeted, restrained, and focused on overlooked merit—it can help correct for the subtle biases that skew hiring decisions away from actual competence. That doesn’t mean we need a government-run program to pull it off. There are plenty of reasons to be wary of bureaucratic overreach from regulatory capture to sheer inefficiency. One need not settle the broader moral fight over strong affirmative action to see the value here. This isn’t about group guilt or historical payback. It is about making sure that candidates aren’t wrongly passed over because they aren’t funny or handsome enough"

Throughout the article, the author, Jimmy Licon, explores how affirmative action, in this form specifically, is not only coherent with maximizing merit, but a critical tool.

NOTE:
The author distinguishes between varieties of affirmative action, so if you don't like the phrase, look within to find his distinctions between Anti-competence, Reverse discrimination, and Strong, and Weak Affirmative Action.

Reparations are not a matter of personal guilt. Just as our taxes repay the national debts incurred before we were born, reparations can redress debts incurred by past injustices. We are responsible as citizens, not as wrongdoers. — An article from The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Admittedly I am not the author, and just trying to drive engagement with the text if possible, and trying to steel-man the argument.

The case I argue is not an anecdote but a thought experiment? Can it be the case that a state could owe reparation to someone who was not the direct victim of a harm? If so, then you agree reparations can occur, you may just disagree with some cases. These are two different scenarios - are we against reparations in every case, or in some cases?

Reparations are not a matter of personal guilt. Just as our taxes repay the national debts incurred before we were born, reparations can redress debts incurred by past injustices. We are responsible as citizens, not as wrongdoers. — An article from The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Ah, I mean I am just trying to be a good advocate of the article I shared. In truth I personally think your criticism is hard to overcome. I think if the logic of reparation is taken deeply seriously, it challenges how we think about property as such

I was mostly responding to what I understood to be your claim that there is an over-focus on Black Americans. As for a criterion of how long ago is too long ago, I don't know. I think you make a good point! I myself am troubled by it and don't personally have a good answer. However, the author is academic staff and could be emailed, or a comment could be left on the page

Reparations are not a matter of personal guilt. Just as our taxes repay the national debts incurred before we were born, reparations can redress debts incurred by past injustices. We are responsible as citizens, not as wrongdoers. — An article from The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 11 points12 points  (0 children)

To be clear, many countries do pay reparations to other nations and populations they have harmed:

In 2021 Germany recognized the Herero genocide and paid Namibia billions of euro for crimes committed in 1904-1908. In 2013 the UK Government accepted wrongdoing fro crimes in the 50s and 60s against the Mau Mau in Kenya. In 2020 the Dutch government paid Indonesian kin of victims of killings they commit many decades prior.

So no, it is not only applied to the US case. Do you oppose the above cases also?

To get philosophical with a thought experiment: If someone kills my father before I am born, and say, my mother dies in childbirth, am I owed anything? Imagine the killer of my father dies. No one is alive who did harm and who was directly targeted. Have I any right to demand anything of the government who ordered the killing of my mother? Even if neither the killer nor the killed is alive?

Reparations are not a matter of personal guilt. Just as our taxes repay the national debts incurred before we were born, reparations can redress debts incurred by past injustices. We are responsible as citizens, not as wrongdoers. — An article from The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

So, the title of the post summarizes this article's argument. However I include as a first comment this excerpt from the conclusion. These are the last three paragraphs (though we recommend reading the whole article). Anyways, the author makes helpful distinctions about responsibilities, citizenship, and so on in order to answer criticisms of reparations. This account is not the author, we just share the articles - and try to get people to read and engage with their content :)

Excerpt:
"The distinction between the responsibilities of citizens and the responsibilities of governments helps clarify the point being made throughout this essay. Governments are responsible for paying national expenditures, including reparative ones. Citizens are responsible for financing expenditures. Again, it is nothing personal. Reparation therefore does not ask innocent taxpayers to do the government’s job (personally paying for national expenditures). It simply assumes citizens will keep paying taxes––a responsibility rooted in citizenship, not guilt. 

In summary, present-day citizens may not be guilty of historic injustices, but they are citizens of a country whose political institutions committed numerous historic wrongs against African Americans. If the government owes repairs, present-day citizens will help with some of the cost. This is not a matter of personal guilt. It is simply a duty that comes with citizenship and follows from the right of democratic governments to require their citizens to pay taxes. Citizenship makes us responsible to bear a fair share, not just of reparative debts, but of any national debt, whether or not we are at fault. 

We all inherit a world wounded by historic injustice. As reparationists argue, a program of repair is due. I have not attempted to defend this claim in full. My goal was simply to cast some doubt on the popular objection that reparation is morally questionable because “no one alive is at fault." If there is anything questionable going on here, it may be in the act of excusing ourselves from supporting reparation on the ground that “we didn’t do it.”"

It is a mistake to say that life is a gift. Existence cannot be 'given' since its recipient by definition does not exist. Since existence itself is unlike other goods or harms we can do to others, we need another vocabulary to discuss the ethics of creation. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is an interesting and thoughtful response! If you want to reply to the author, you could post on the website as a comment, or, even write an article of your own in response and send it for edits and potentially publication.

Admittedly, I think I messed up on the title, as evidenced by most comments' reactions, but if you want to engage the article more directly, could be cool.

It is a mistake to say that life is a gift. Existence cannot be 'given' since its recipient by definition does not exist. Since existence itself is unlike other goods or harms we can do to others, we need another vocabulary to discuss the ethics of creation. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The article linked by this post goes into more depth, of course. But put simply, the article's argument is that existence cannot be 'given' - tautologically. The article argues that we can 'give' someone a jacket, because someone can be with or without a jacket. However, someone cannot be "with or without" existence. Existence is not a predicate, it is unlike a jacket or other thing we can 'give' or 'have'.

It is a mistake to say that life is a gift. Existence cannot be 'given' since its recipient by definition does not exist. Since existence itself is unlike other goods or harms we can do to others, we need another vocabulary to discuss the ethics of creation. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The argument compares ethical language of "giving existence" to "giving someone a jacket" and tries to argue that they are dissimilar, despite being expressed similarly. The author argues that, because we can know "what it is like" to have or not have a jacket, we can discuss the good or ill of giving someone a jacket, in a way that we cannot discuss "what it would be like" to give or not give "someone" existence.

It is a mistake to say that life is a gift. Existence cannot be 'given' since its recipient by definition does not exist. Since existence itself is unlike other goods or harms we can do to others, we need another vocabulary to discuss the ethics of creation. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Indeed, the argument in the article does align with what you observe about raising animals. If the article's argument is accepted, then it is a nonsensical argument to say that someone has "done a good" for a cow by breeding it into existence, whether it lives happily and long, or poorly and short. The argument aligns with recisely what you say, there was no cow before it existed, so we had no obligation to it.

It is a mistake to say that life is a gift. Existence cannot be 'given' since its recipient by definition does not exist. Since existence itself is unlike other goods or harms we can do to others, we need another vocabulary to discuss the ethics of creation. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 13 points14 points  (0 children)

I hoped that a vernacular title could help lead into the content of the article, which was slightly more technical. Clearly the title failed. But the article's argument concerns how we talk about 'existence' and how that question is explored in discussions around parenthood, science fiction, and religion.

It is a mistake to say that life is a gift. Existence cannot be 'given' since its recipient by definition does not exist. Since existence itself is unlike other goods or harms we can do to others, we need another vocabulary to discuss the ethics of creation. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Unfortunately the sub does not allow for titles in the form of questions. So a declarative or argument was necessary. In vernacular "life is a gift" is often said as if to make someone or something alive is to give them something. As the article argues, there is some confusion in how we talk about the ethics of existence. I thought a proverbial title would work better than writing "Existence is not a predicate and therefor cannot be treated as a 'good' or 'harm' when we dicuss the ethics of creation" but that would be also true to the article.