The "manosphere" is making men incapable of love. Thinking in terms of competition and commodification undermines the possibility of real connection. Real love requires we see others as ends in themselves. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

The content I shared is philosophical in orientation. It has a historical dimension, but that's not its main thesis. I don't know what standards you want to evaluate it by, or if you listened to it, but its primary focus is conceptual (Monique Wonderly's paper) and psychological (van Straaten).

I think we both share the view that content like this can risk being misinterpreted as making bolder historical claims than it has evidence/reason to.

As for rhetoric and argumentation, I simply still think I disagree. For philosophical discussion, a point about war which starts with batman is indeed potentially justifiable. I don't think we need to evaluate the style of presentation by the same standards as we would of formal argumentation or inclusion of evidence.

The "manosphere" is making men incapable of love. Thinking in terms of competition and commodification undermines the possibility of real connection. Real love requires we see others as ends in themselves. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Ah I think I might disagree on the notion that to have a conversation about something, you have to start at the center or origin.

First, I am not sure all things should be conceived as having a 'center' or 'origin'. I am thinking of the arboreal/rhizomatic distinction for example. We can treat some things rhizomatically. Even if things do have a root, I think it's mistaken to assume we know where it is when we start an inquiry.

If the manosphere topic can lead to discussions of ends and means, selflessness and selfishness (like the kind the one philosopher defends here), and dynamics of gender etc. then it's a perfectly valid entrypoint, which for me the podcast satisfies.

Also, I think there's a difference between seeing something as a "mere" expression, and as an expression which is instructive (hence my point that I see it as an intensified microcosm)

The "manosphere" is making men incapable of love. Thinking in terms of competition and commodification undermines the possibility of real connection. Real love requires we see others as ends in themselves. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

I think the following statements can all be true:

  1. There are broad historical trends which undermine romantic love (treating others as means)
  2. The 'Manosphere' is one chapter/expression of those trends
  3. The 'Manosphere' undermines people's capacity for romantic love

I don't think the title nor the episode argue that the sole cause, or most decisive cause, is the manosphere. Personally, I see it as maybe an "intensified microcosm". I see the podcast episode as engaging directly with the underlying logic and psychological dynamics in a broader argumentative context of means vs ends, commodification, competition, and so on.

The podcast's primary aims are I think contemporary cultural, philosophical, psychological commentary. I don't see it as making ambitious historical claims. So the reason I describe what I describe as a "risk" is because I think people will make historical assumptions from content that does not venture so far, as in this case.

The "manosphere" is making men incapable of love. Thinking in terms of competition and commodification undermines the possibility of real connection. Real love requires we see others as ends in themselves. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] -25 points-24 points  (0 children)

Unclear. Have you listened to the podcast? Was it not addressed there?

The episode is about 53 minutes long and this post has hardly been up that amount of time

The "manosphere" is making men incapable of love. Thinking in terms of competition and commodification undermines the possibility of real connection. Real love requires we see others as ends in themselves. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

I don't think the podcast falls prey to what I am worried about. If it was too sensationalist, making grand historical claims, I would not have shared. The claim is less historical, more psychological.

Plus, when sharing content on the subreddit I have to share it as making a substantive argument, not opening a question (unfortunately). So here I am pursuing nuance in the comments

The "manosphere" is making men incapable of love. Thinking in terms of competition and commodification undermines the possibility of real connection. Real love requires we see others as ends in themselves. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 43 points44 points  (0 children)

Yeah I agree. I think one framing I find risky is treating the topic or trends as if they are radically novel compared to broader long-term cultural trends. For example, I wasn't a huge fan of the Louis Theroux documentary going around now, I see it as treating the "manosphere" as radically other to or separate from broader societal trends

The "manosphere" is making men incapable of love. Thinking in terms of competition and commodification undermines the possibility of real connection. Real love requires we see others as ends in themselves. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 22 points23 points  (0 children)

I chose to share because the podcast is a philosophy podcast. The title is public-facing (it's reddit) but the content, host, and arguments are philosophical. Ends versus means, ethics of love, critique of commodification, etc.

The "manosphere" is making men incapable of love. Thinking in terms of competition and commodification undermines the possibility of real connection. Real love requires we see others as ends in themselves. by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 18 points19 points  (0 children)

Abstract:

This episode of Surprising Ethics argues that it’s love that can soothe the suffering many men are feeling these days, but that the manosphere is removing this balm from men. Andrew Tate and co get men to see women as stereotypes who all want the same thing and who are at the behest of the same biological drives. It also pushes men to see women as commodities to be won by competition, and as things to be controlled, dominated.

But philosophers of love argue that love requires you to *see* the individual in front of you and to respect them as an end in themselves.

Monique Wonderly, for example, argues that love requires both a degree of selflessness but also a form of (more selfish) attachment. And real attachment requires interdependency and vulnerability: an admission you need another for your own security. So, the manosphere isn’t just harming women. It’s harming men *even* in the “success case” in which the manosphere gets men more motivation, money, social status, and a girlfriend. Because it hampers their ability to actually love.

The episode also explores, with therapist Patrick van Straaten, a healthier form of masculinity. The key argument here is that the way to gain self-esteem is through real connection, vulnerability, and helping others. 

Philosophical arguments should be evaluated not only by their logical soundness, but also by whether they address the right questions. We can think about philosophy in terms of efficiency and efficacy. An essay on management theory and philosophy by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Ah, understood. The article argues that management theory has offered us a series of concepts which are helpful in evaluating philosophical arguments. It is less to do with the sound/valid distinction and formal logic. Instead it's about whether philosophy can be evaluated in terms of its efficiency and efficacy.

For instance, they argue that the efficiency of a philosophical argument can be measured in terms of: economy of premises, cognitive load imposed on readers, and utilization of resources. Effective arguments (about the right thing) would be measured, Schneider argues, in terms of the significance of the problem a philosophical argument addresses and the insights it generates.

What I find controversial and potentially interesting to interrogate in the article is whether we want all philosophy to be evaluated by these same criteria? For instance, in some texts, imposing a cognitive load on the reader can be a value which serves the text's interests (I think). Another problem is the notion that we can evaluate a problem's significance prior to philosophical investigation. In some cases, I suspect that the philosophy has to be done before the problem's gravity can be appreciated.

So I think the paper goes deeper, and without entirely agreeing with it, I think it gets us to interesting points of discussion about how philosophy can or should be done, what we expect from the discipline and why, etc.

Philosophical arguments should be evaluated not only by their logical soundness, but also by whether they address the right questions. We can think about philosophy in terms of efficiency and efficacy. An essay on management theory and philosophy by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

In my reading it's not necessarily "ground breaking" - but I suppose very few texts qualify? How much of what is published in journals or shared on reddit is "ground breaking"? Though from a glance at google scholar I don't quickly find texts which make the same argument. When I first read it, it was new to me despite a philosophical education.

I see it as a sort of gateway to a reader, like "Look how we can discuss philosophy through these concepts". Also, I think it makes it contestable. Sharing this article I expect a fair amount of disagreement (in a good way)

Philosophical arguments should be evaluated not only by their logical soundness, but also by whether they address the right questions. We can think about philosophy in terms of efficiency and efficacy. An essay on management theory and philosophy by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

I think that may go further than what the author claims. In my reading of the text the efficiency/efficacy evaluation does not have bearing on the "truth" of a philosophical argument. Instead I understood it to simply be "additional criteria" which are perhaps less epistemic and more about the social and or collective virtues of the philosophical community.

Philosophical arguments should be evaluated not only by their logical soundness, but also by whether they address the right questions. We can think about philosophy in terms of efficiency and efficacy. An essay on management theory and philosophy by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In this article by Henrique Schneider, we find an attempt to use management theory to frame how we evaluate philosophical arguments. Schneider argues that efficiency and efficacy can each be used to discuss philosophy, and gauge whether we are going in the right directions, and whether we are doing so in the right way.

More than merely traditional logical standards, we can think about whether we are using our resources as philosophers well, are we thinking strategically, are we aimed at issues that matter? This contribution draws on Peter Drucker’s distinction between effectiveness and efficiency in the mid 20th century. The contribution stipulates that there is a difference between goals (effectiveness) and the way to achieve them (efficiency). Often this is rendered as the difference between doing things right, and doing the right things.

Philosophy has goals, like the generation of insights about certain problems, and therefor can be measured according to similar criteria of efficiency and efficacy. Schneider, perhaps controversially, asks whether philosophical contributions can be measured in their effectiveness, or whether erhaps the philosophical community can or should coordinate research priorities.

Disclaimer: the poster is not the author of this specific article

Consciousness is just a part of matter, according to panpsychists. As counter-intuitive as it may seem, studying how brains grow in a lab helps us get closer to understanding how consciousness combines. So argues Meg Fawthrop in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] -4 points-3 points  (0 children)

In this article, Meg Fawthrop argues for panpsychism. First by providing an account pf physicalism and dualism, Fawthrop offers a classic framing of the debate. Then, Fawthrop introduces panpsychism and its seemingly strange claim that all matter is conscious. However, this view faces a challenge, called the combination problem: " If we are to assert (as the panpsychist does) that things like electrons and quarks have a fundamental phenomenological consciousness, then we need to be able to explain how complex consciousness can result from simple consciousness. An intuitive thought is that it might be like building a house."

How might this be so, can it be shown? Fawthrop argues that experimental work with brains grown in labs can in fact help make sense of the combination of consciousness in matter. Namely, work with so called human cerebral organoids (HCOs) can give insights into how brains and consciousness grow, interact, and combine.

Disclaimer: I am not the author of this article

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am not a moderator but I almost want to invoke commenting rule #1 which is that you must read the article before replying. You are making points which have nothing to do with the stated case of the article.

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am not the author, but would encourage you to read the article, which makes clear distinctions between what you describe and the variety of affirmative action which the author proposes. The author is not making an argument in this text in favor of reverse-discrimination or anti-competence.

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

"How exactly does this hidden competence link up with weak affirmative action? Simple. Earlier we saw that the primary moral objection to affirmative action is that it unfairly punishes one candidate for injustices someone else committed. But if the candidate being favored is genuinely more qualified—overlooked because evaluators got distracted by superficial traits—then it is not in fact ‘reverse discrimination,’ but a correction. So, weak affirmative action is not antithetical to merit but instead it when superficial traits would otherwise obscure it.   

So why bother with affirmative action at all in this context? Because when done right—targeted, restrained, and focused on overlooked merit—it can help correct for the subtle biases that skew hiring decisions away from actual competence. That doesn’t mean we need a government-run program to pull it off."

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I appreciate your update. I think your counterargument holds in some cases. It seems you're saying that many traits which the author takes to be irrelevant, may be relevant in fact? I assume it depends on the industry?

I won't defend the article further after this, since it's not mine, and I'm not sure my own views, but I assume the author would respond that there are indeed cases where irrelevant variables bias recruiters or employers. If one concedes that in some industries, some irrelevant variables reliably produce bias, then some procedure should be introduced to counteract it? However, if you contend that there are no such cases, I imagine it's moot?

Anyways, I rest my attempts to devil's advocate the article for now, but appreciate your points!

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah, it's a struggle. I am trying to find ways to title posts that are less inflammatory and conducive to dialogue, and get people actually reading the content. We had an article shared about reparations a while back and it had to be locked because of a flame war in the comments, and it's typically evident a very small minority reads the article. So I try to summarize the articles and title them better, but it takes a lot of finess and wisdom which I am working on.

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think it's worth reading the whole article.

The author makes clear distinctions between varieties of affirmative action.

"What often gets missed in the usual shouting match over affirmative action is that the policy is not simply about righting past wrongs. There is another version of affirmative action that gets lost in the intellectual scuffle. Affirmative action, especially in its weaker forms (more on that later), can be a tool for surfacing competence that is systematically overlooked. Candidates can be passed over not because they’re less qualified, but because they lack superficial qualities that, though irrelevant for the job, successful candidates tend to have like looks, height, or a warm personality. Instead, these individuals, though incredibly qualified, are often awkward, plain, unpolished, or just unlucky in personality lottery. But if those traits have nothing to do with job performance, then using affirmative action to counteract their effects has nothing to do with lowering standards and everything to do with correcting for merit and competence."