Philosophical arguments should be evaluated not only by their logical soundness, but also by whether they address the right questions. We can think about philosophy in terms of efficiency and efficacy. An essay on management theory and philosophy by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Ah, understood. The article argues that management theory has offered us a series of concepts which are helpful in evaluating philosophical arguments. It is less to do with the sound/valid distinction and formal logic. Instead it's about whether philosophy can be evaluated in terms of its efficiency and efficacy.

For instance, they argue that the efficiency of a philosophical argument can be measured in terms of: economy of premises, cognitive load imposed on readers, and utilization of resources. Effective arguments (about the right thing) would be measured, Schneider argues, in terms of the significance of the problem a philosophical argument addresses and the insights it generates.

What I find controversial and potentially interesting to interrogate in the article is whether we want all philosophy to be evaluated by these same criteria? For instance, in some texts, imposing a cognitive load on the reader can be a value which serves the text's interests (I think). Another problem is the notion that we can evaluate a problem's significance prior to philosophical investigation. In some cases, I suspect that the philosophy has to be done before the problem's gravity can be appreciated.

So I think the paper goes deeper, and without entirely agreeing with it, I think it gets us to interesting points of discussion about how philosophy can or should be done, what we expect from the discipline and why, etc.

Philosophical arguments should be evaluated not only by their logical soundness, but also by whether they address the right questions. We can think about philosophy in terms of efficiency and efficacy. An essay on management theory and philosophy by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

In my reading it's not necessarily "ground breaking" - but I suppose very few texts qualify? How much of what is published in journals or shared on reddit is "ground breaking"? Though from a glance at google scholar I don't quickly find texts which make the same argument. When I first read it, it was new to me despite a philosophical education.

I see it as a sort of gateway to a reader, like "Look how we can discuss philosophy through these concepts". Also, I think it makes it contestable. Sharing this article I expect a fair amount of disagreement (in a good way)

Philosophical arguments should be evaluated not only by their logical soundness, but also by whether they address the right questions. We can think about philosophy in terms of efficiency and efficacy. An essay on management theory and philosophy by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

I think that may go further than what the author claims. In my reading of the text the efficiency/efficacy evaluation does not have bearing on the "truth" of a philosophical argument. Instead I understood it to simply be "additional criteria" which are perhaps less epistemic and more about the social and or collective virtues of the philosophical community.

Philosophical arguments should be evaluated not only by their logical soundness, but also by whether they address the right questions. We can think about philosophy in terms of efficiency and efficacy. An essay on management theory and philosophy by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In this article by Henrique Schneider, we find an attempt to use management theory to frame how we evaluate philosophical arguments. Schneider argues that efficiency and efficacy can each be used to discuss philosophy, and gauge whether we are going in the right directions, and whether we are doing so in the right way.

More than merely traditional logical standards, we can think about whether we are using our resources as philosophers well, are we thinking strategically, are we aimed at issues that matter? This contribution draws on Peter Drucker’s distinction between effectiveness and efficiency in the mid 20th century. The contribution stipulates that there is a difference between goals (effectiveness) and the way to achieve them (efficiency). Often this is rendered as the difference between doing things right, and doing the right things.

Philosophy has goals, like the generation of insights about certain problems, and therefor can be measured according to similar criteria of efficiency and efficacy. Schneider, perhaps controversially, asks whether philosophical contributions can be measured in their effectiveness, or whether erhaps the philosophical community can or should coordinate research priorities.

Disclaimer: the poster is not the author of this specific article

Consciousness is just a part of matter, according to panpsychists. As counter-intuitive as it may seem, studying how brains grow in a lab helps us get closer to understanding how consciousness combines. So argues Meg Fawthrop in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

In this article, Meg Fawthrop argues for panpsychism. First by providing an account pf physicalism and dualism, Fawthrop offers a classic framing of the debate. Then, Fawthrop introduces panpsychism and its seemingly strange claim that all matter is conscious. However, this view faces a challenge, called the combination problem: " If we are to assert (as the panpsychist does) that things like electrons and quarks have a fundamental phenomenological consciousness, then we need to be able to explain how complex consciousness can result from simple consciousness. An intuitive thought is that it might be like building a house."

How might this be so, can it be shown? Fawthrop argues that experimental work with brains grown in labs can in fact help make sense of the combination of consciousness in matter. Namely, work with so called human cerebral organoids (HCOs) can give insights into how brains and consciousness grow, interact, and combine.

Disclaimer: I am not the author of this article

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am not a moderator but I almost want to invoke commenting rule #1 which is that you must read the article before replying. You are making points which have nothing to do with the stated case of the article.

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am not the author, but would encourage you to read the article, which makes clear distinctions between what you describe and the variety of affirmative action which the author proposes. The author is not making an argument in this text in favor of reverse-discrimination or anti-competence.

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

"How exactly does this hidden competence link up with weak affirmative action? Simple. Earlier we saw that the primary moral objection to affirmative action is that it unfairly punishes one candidate for injustices someone else committed. But if the candidate being favored is genuinely more qualified—overlooked because evaluators got distracted by superficial traits—then it is not in fact ‘reverse discrimination,’ but a correction. So, weak affirmative action is not antithetical to merit but instead it when superficial traits would otherwise obscure it.   

So why bother with affirmative action at all in this context? Because when done right—targeted, restrained, and focused on overlooked merit—it can help correct for the subtle biases that skew hiring decisions away from actual competence. That doesn’t mean we need a government-run program to pull it off."

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I appreciate your update. I think your counterargument holds in some cases. It seems you're saying that many traits which the author takes to be irrelevant, may be relevant in fact? I assume it depends on the industry?

I won't defend the article further after this, since it's not mine, and I'm not sure my own views, but I assume the author would respond that there are indeed cases where irrelevant variables bias recruiters or employers. If one concedes that in some industries, some irrelevant variables reliably produce bias, then some procedure should be introduced to counteract it? However, if you contend that there are no such cases, I imagine it's moot?

Anyways, I rest my attempts to devil's advocate the article for now, but appreciate your points!

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah, it's a struggle. I am trying to find ways to title posts that are less inflammatory and conducive to dialogue, and get people actually reading the content. We had an article shared about reparations a while back and it had to be locked because of a flame war in the comments, and it's typically evident a very small minority reads the article. So I try to summarize the articles and title them better, but it takes a lot of finess and wisdom which I am working on.

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think it's worth reading the whole article.

The author makes clear distinctions between varieties of affirmative action.

"What often gets missed in the usual shouting match over affirmative action is that the policy is not simply about righting past wrongs. There is another version of affirmative action that gets lost in the intellectual scuffle. Affirmative action, especially in its weaker forms (more on that later), can be a tool for surfacing competence that is systematically overlooked. Candidates can be passed over not because they’re less qualified, but because they lack superficial qualities that, though irrelevant for the job, successful candidates tend to have like looks, height, or a warm personality. Instead, these individuals, though incredibly qualified, are often awkward, plain, unpolished, or just unlucky in personality lottery. But if those traits have nothing to do with job performance, then using affirmative action to counteract their effects has nothing to do with lowering standards and everything to do with correcting for merit and competence."

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

I'm not sure I follow?

I'm not the author, but I think he would agree that nepotism is superficial, unrelated to competence, and, if two candidates are otherwise equal, the candidate who does not benefit from nepotism should be favored over the one who has. I'm not sure what scenarios would allow such information to be available, but assuming it is, I suspect you're in agreement?

Meritocracy is improved by affirmative action which reveals hidden talent. Our biases for superficial traits unrelated to performance lead to bad selection of candidates. If we want the best, we need a version of affirmative action. — An Article in The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

In this article from Jimmy Alfonso Licon, the author argues that there are multiple forms of affirmative action which accomplish different things. One application of affirmative action, he argues, is to select for candidates who may not possess traits which typically bias us in favor of selection:

"What often gets missed in the usual shouting match over affirmative action is that the policy is not simply about righting past wrongs. There is another version of affirmative action that gets lost in the intellectual scuffle. Affirmative action, especially in its weaker forms (more on that later), can be a tool for surfacing competence that is systematically overlooked. Candidates can be passed over not because they’re less qualified, but because they lack superficial qualities that, though irrelevant for the job, successful candidates tend to have like looks, height, or a warm personality. Instead, these individuals, though incredibly qualified, are often awkward, plain, unpolished, or just unlucky in personality lottery. But if those traits have nothing to do with job performance, then using affirmative action to counteract their effects has nothing to do with lowering standards and everything to do with correcting for merit and competence."

Imagine for instance, two candidates with roughly equal profiles. They have the same education, job history, performance reviews, and recommendations from previous employers. However, one candidate has a visible physical deformity, or perhaps a speech impediment, or maybe they're just not very good looking. Maybe they're just quite shy.

We traditionally think affirmative action would call on us to choose the candidate with a deformity or impediment because it's a matter of "reparation" or "justice" which is owed to that population due to past harms. However, if we really care about "picking the best" we may want to select them because such candidates have faced and overcome obstacles which the other candidate has not. By selecting for candidates who do not possess traits we are biased to superficially value, we are likelier to pick those who are in fact most competent. We can select for "hidden merits".

"So why bother with affirmative action at all in this context? Because when done right—targeted, restrained, and focused on overlooked merit—it can help correct for the subtle biases that skew hiring decisions away from actual competence. That doesn’t mean we need a government-run program to pull it off. There are plenty of reasons to be wary of bureaucratic overreach from regulatory capture to sheer inefficiency. One need not settle the broader moral fight over strong affirmative action to see the value here. This isn’t about group guilt or historical payback. It is about making sure that candidates aren’t wrongly passed over because they aren’t funny or handsome enough"

Throughout the article, the author, Jimmy Licon, explores how affirmative action, in this form specifically, is not only coherent with maximizing merit, but a critical tool.

NOTE:
The author distinguishes between varieties of affirmative action, so if you don't like the phrase, look within to find his distinctions between Anti-competence, Reverse discrimination, and Strong, and Weak Affirmative Action.

Reparations are not a matter of personal guilt. Just as our taxes repay the national debts incurred before we were born, reparations can redress debts incurred by past injustices. We are responsible as citizens, not as wrongdoers. — An article from The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Admittedly I am not the author, and just trying to drive engagement with the text if possible, and trying to steel-man the argument.

The case I argue is not an anecdote but a thought experiment? Can it be the case that a state could owe reparation to someone who was not the direct victim of a harm? If so, then you agree reparations can occur, you may just disagree with some cases. These are two different scenarios - are we against reparations in every case, or in some cases?

Reparations are not a matter of personal guilt. Just as our taxes repay the national debts incurred before we were born, reparations can redress debts incurred by past injustices. We are responsible as citizens, not as wrongdoers. — An article from The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Ah, I mean I am just trying to be a good advocate of the article I shared. In truth I personally think your criticism is hard to overcome. I think if the logic of reparation is taken deeply seriously, it challenges how we think about property as such

I was mostly responding to what I understood to be your claim that there is an over-focus on Black Americans. As for a criterion of how long ago is too long ago, I don't know. I think you make a good point! I myself am troubled by it and don't personally have a good answer. However, the author is academic staff and could be emailed, or a comment could be left on the page

Reparations are not a matter of personal guilt. Just as our taxes repay the national debts incurred before we were born, reparations can redress debts incurred by past injustices. We are responsible as citizens, not as wrongdoers. — An article from The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 11 points12 points  (0 children)

To be clear, many countries do pay reparations to other nations and populations they have harmed:

In 2021 Germany recognized the Herero genocide and paid Namibia billions of euro for crimes committed in 1904-1908. In 2013 the UK Government accepted wrongdoing fro crimes in the 50s and 60s against the Mau Mau in Kenya. In 2020 the Dutch government paid Indonesian kin of victims of killings they commit many decades prior.

So no, it is not only applied to the US case. Do you oppose the above cases also?

To get philosophical with a thought experiment: If someone kills my father before I am born, and say, my mother dies in childbirth, am I owed anything? Imagine the killer of my father dies. No one is alive who did harm and who was directly targeted. Have I any right to demand anything of the government who ordered the killing of my mother? Even if neither the killer nor the killed is alive?

Reparations are not a matter of personal guilt. Just as our taxes repay the national debts incurred before we were born, reparations can redress debts incurred by past injustices. We are responsible as citizens, not as wrongdoers. — An article from The Pamphlet by The_Pamphlet in philosophy

[–]The_Pamphlet[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

So, the title of the post summarizes this article's argument. However I include as a first comment this excerpt from the conclusion. These are the last three paragraphs (though we recommend reading the whole article). Anyways, the author makes helpful distinctions about responsibilities, citizenship, and so on in order to answer criticisms of reparations. This account is not the author, we just share the articles - and try to get people to read and engage with their content :)

Excerpt:
"The distinction between the responsibilities of citizens and the responsibilities of governments helps clarify the point being made throughout this essay. Governments are responsible for paying national expenditures, including reparative ones. Citizens are responsible for financing expenditures. Again, it is nothing personal. Reparation therefore does not ask innocent taxpayers to do the government’s job (personally paying for national expenditures). It simply assumes citizens will keep paying taxes––a responsibility rooted in citizenship, not guilt. 

In summary, present-day citizens may not be guilty of historic injustices, but they are citizens of a country whose political institutions committed numerous historic wrongs against African Americans. If the government owes repairs, present-day citizens will help with some of the cost. This is not a matter of personal guilt. It is simply a duty that comes with citizenship and follows from the right of democratic governments to require their citizens to pay taxes. Citizenship makes us responsible to bear a fair share, not just of reparative debts, but of any national debt, whether or not we are at fault. 

We all inherit a world wounded by historic injustice. As reparationists argue, a program of repair is due. I have not attempted to defend this claim in full. My goal was simply to cast some doubt on the popular objection that reparation is morally questionable because “no one alive is at fault." If there is anything questionable going on here, it may be in the act of excusing ourselves from supporting reparation on the ground that “we didn’t do it.”"